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This paper examines 207 cross-border investments by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
and 144 cross-border investments by hedge funds (HFs) in publicly traded companies 
between January 1990 and December 2009. We find that both SWFs and HFs tend to 
invest in companies that displayed positive abnormal returns in the year prior to the 
investment announcement. Results show that both cross-border SWF and HF 
investments are associated with significant positive abnormal returns in the target 
companies during the 3-day announcement window. Reactions are similar for SWFs 
and HFs as the announcement period abnormal returns of the two samples are not 
significantly different. In the first year following the investment, SWF investments 
display negative mean cumulative market-adjusted returns, whereas HF investments 
display mean cumulative market-adjusted returns not significantly different from 
zero. Only in later years (from year 2 onwards for the HF sample and in year 5 for the 
SWF sample) are mean cumulative market-adjusted returns positive. The results for 
the HF sample are significantly higher than for the SWF sample from year 2 onwards, 
indicating that over the very long-run, HF investments outperform SWF investments 
on average. We also analyze the crisis period of 2007 and 2008 and find that mean 
announcement period abnormal returns of SWF investments are significantly higher 
during these years. HF investments do not display significantly higher announcement 
period abnormal returns during the crisis period of 2007 and 2008.  
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Section 1.2 provides the motivation for this paper and lists its main objectives. 
Section 1.3 highlights the contribution of the paper and its major findings. Section 1.4 
concludes the chapter.  
 
1.2 Motivation and Objectives   
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have gained in importance in the last couple of 
years due to an increase in their capital market activities. The growing SWF literature 
can be classified into two streams (Bortolotti et al., 2009). The first stream focuses on 
the effects on the valuation of the SWF target (for example, Bernstein et al., 2009; 
Fernandes, 2011). These studies examine the impact of SWF investments on 
valuation as measured by accounting variables. Fernandes (2011) finds that 
companies with higher SWF ownership have higher valuation, better operating 
performance and higher Tobin‟s Q. The second stream of literature focuses on the 
price performance of the SWF target (Dewenter et al., 2010; Bortolotti et al., 2009; 
Kotter and Lel, 2010). These studies not only examine the announcement period 
abnormal returns that SWF investments generate, but also investigate long-run 
market-adjusted returns in order to determine whether the target companies achieve 
positive long-run market-adjusted returns in the years following the SWF investment. 
Most of the studies find that SWF investments lead to positive announcement period 




abnormal returns. However, Bortolotti et al. (2009) finds negative market-adjusted 
returns in the first two years following the SWF investment, suggesting that SWFs are 
not active investors and do not create value through monitoring. The only 5-year 
study is conducted by Dewenter et al. (2010). They report insignificant results after 
the 1
st
 year, but positive abnormal returns after year 3 and year 5.   
This study will focus on the effects of SWF investments on the price performance of 
the target companies. It adds to the existing literature in that it examines the cross-
border equity investments of SWFs and compares them to the cross-border equity 
investments of other institutional investors (in this case, Hedge Funds (HFs)) to see 
whether the market values SWF investments differently than investments by other 
institutional investors.  
Some studies have explained the effects of HF investments on the price performance 
of their target companies (Klein and Zur, 2009; Brav et al., 2008; Greenwood and 
Schor, 2009). They analyze 13D filings
1
 of HFs and report positive announcement 
period abnormal returns. Other studies have analyzed the long-run market-adjusted 
returns. Greenwood and Schor (2009) report that long-run market-adjusted returns are 
positive and significant if the HFs are involved in activities such as asset sales and 
mergers. For other activities such as capital structure changes, corporate governance 
and corporate strategy, the long-run returns are not significantly different from zero.  
There are a few compelling arguments that make a comparison to HF investments 
interesting. For example, Bortolotti et al. (2009) state that although SWFs are state-
owned entities and therefore organized and managed differently than other investment 
funds, “SWFs appear similar to HFs in that both are stand-alone, unregulated pools of 
                                                 
1
 Investors are obliged to submit a 13D filing with the SEC within 10 days after acquiring at least 5 percent of a publicly 
traded equity security with the stated intent to influence the policies of the firm.  




capital, managed by investment professionals and mandated (or at least allowed) to 
purchase large ownership stakes in foreign companies.” In addition, they state: “A 
natural question to ask is whether SWFs can and do achieve investment returns 
similar to these [pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds] private-sector 
institutional investors.” This is exactly the research question of this paper. The 
financial press has also compared SWFs to HFs, mainly because of concerns due to 
the lack of transparency
2. The IMF stated in a 2007 New York Times article that “a 
debate about the political risks and opportunities of SWFs, similar to the ongoing 
debate about HFs is now developing”3. Avendaño and Santiso (2009) compared SWF 
holdings to mutual fund holdings and reported that “the difference in equity 
investments between SWFs and other institutional investors are less pronounced than 
suspected.”, which further supports a comparison between SWF and institutional 
investors such as HFs.  
This paper will analyze both the short-term announcement period cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) as well as the long-term cumulative market-adjusted returns 
(CMARs). In addition, a separate analysis will be conducted on the financial crisis 
years 2007 and 2008 to investigate the impact of SWF investments in financial and 
non-financial companies during this period.    
 
1.3 Contribution and Findings 
We study a sample of 207 cross-border SWF investments and 144 cross-border HF 
investments for the period from 1990 to 2009. We focus on cross-border investments 
                                                 
2
 “Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Hedge Fund?”, The New York Times, 1 August 2007 
3
 “The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds”, F&D, September 2007, Volume 44, Number 3 




to avoid problems where the SWFs may be deemed to be subjected to local influence 
or political control. Also, we focus on transactions where the target (or its immediate 
or ultimate parent) is listed as a public company so that stock market reactions can be 
analyzed.  
We find that in the 1-year period prior to the investment, the target companies of both 
SWFs and HFs outperform their local benchmarks, suggesting that both SWFs and 
HFs tend to invest in „outperformers‟. Both cross-border SWF investments and cross-
border HF investments display statistically significant positive abnormal returns for 
the 3-day [-1, +1] announcement window. Reactions are similar for SWFs and HFs as 
the announcement period abnormal returns of the two samples are not significantly 
different. We also divide the SWFs and HFs into subsamples to see whether certain 
deal characteristics influence the results
4
. We find that the performance could not be 
sustained and the target companies of SWFs display negative long-run cumulative 
market-adjusted returns in the first year after the investments. For the HF sample, the 
mean cumulative market-adjusted returns of the target companies are not significantly 
different from zero after the first year. However, the results for the two samples are 
not significantly different, indicating that HF investments are not able to outperform 
SWF investments over that time period. Only in later years (from year 2 onwards for 
the HF sample and in year 5 for the SWF sample) are mean cumulative market-
adjusted returns positive. The mean cumulative market-adjusted return results for the 
                                                 
4
 For the SWF sample, the subsamples „Direct‟ and “Subsidiary‟ as well as „Direct Acquirer‟ and „Indirect Acquirer‟ are 
analyzed separately. For the HF sample, the subsamples „Direct‟ and „Subsidiary‟ as well as „Investor Group‟ and 
„Excluding Investor Group‟ are analyzed separately. „Direct‟ refers to transactions in which the target company is 
publicly traded, „Subsidiary‟ refers to transactions in which the target company is not publicly traded, but a subsidiary of 
a publicly traded company. „Direct Acquirer‟ refers to transactions in which the SWF is the direct acquirer, „Indirect 
Acquirer‟ refers to transactions in which the SWF is the immediate or ultimate parent of the acquirer. „Investor Group‟ 
refers to transactions where two or more institutional investors are involved, whereby at least one HF is included. 
„Excluding Investor Group‟ refers to transactions where only the HF is listed as acquirer.  




HF sample are significantly higher than for the SWF sample from year 2 onwards, 
indicating that over the very long-run, HF investments outperform SWF investments. 
We also examine the crisis years of 2007 and 2008 and find that SWF Investments 
display higher mean announcement period abnormal returns during these two years 
than during other years, suggesting that the market valued SWF investments higher 
during that time. HF investments do not display significantly higher announcement 
period abnormal returns during the crisis years of 2007 and 2008. We analyze SWF 
investments in financial companies during the crisis years separately, but their 
announcement period abnormal returns are not significantly different from 
announcement period abnormal returns of SWF investments in non-financial 
companies during the crisis period, despite the precarious situations of many financial 
companies during that time.   
 
For the purpose of this analysis, we focus on the interpretation of the mean results. 
However, one possible concern is that the sample sizes for both cross-border SWF 
investments and cross-border HF investments are small and that results may be 
influenced by individual transactions with extreme values. For such cases the median 
results are more stable than the mean results, so we also report the median results and 
apply tests to see whether they are statistically significant. We also winsorize the 
sample at the 1 percent and 99 percent level to see whether results are different. 
Another concern of the small sample sizes is that the samples may not be normally 
distributed. Non-parametric tests are conducted to provide robustness.    
 





This introduction provides an overview of the SWF and HF literature and highlights 
the contribution of the study to the existing literature. It is the first paper to directly 
compare the cross-border equity investments of SWFs with the cross-border equity 
investments of other institutional investors (HFs). In addition, it analyzes the 
investments of SWFs and HFs during the financial crisis years of 2007 and 2008. The 
main findings of the paper are highlighted in this chapter. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature 
on SWFs and on HFs. Chapter 3 describes the data selection process as well as the 
data sources. Chapter 4 introduces the test hypotheses and describes the methodology 








Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). Section 
2.3 discusses some of the research papers on SWFs and their main findings. Section 
2.4 reviews some of the research papers on Hedge Funds (HFs) and their main 
findings. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 A brief overview of Sovereign Wealth Funds    
Although Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)
5
 are not new to financial markets, it has 
only been in recent years that they have become large global players. Many of these 
SWFs are newly set up. For example, Kazakhstan, China, South Korea, Qatar, 
Australia, Russia all set up their SWFs within the last ten years - see Table 1 for 
details. Currently the total number of SWFs is around 40 funds. According to the 
SWF Institute, assets under management (AUM) reached over USD 3.9 trillion in 
September 2010 and are expected to reach USD 10 trillion by 2015
6
. The biggest 
SWFs are located in Asia and the Middle East, accounting for 38 percent and 37 
percent of SWF market size, respectively (18 percent in Europe, 3 percent in Africa, 2 
                                                 
5
 There are controversies about the definition of a Sovereign Wealth Fund. The International Working Group of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) defines SWFs as “special-purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by 
the general government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that include investing in 
foreign financial assets. SWFs have diverse legal, institutional, and governance structures. They are a heterogeneous 
group, comprising fiscal stabilization funds, savings funds, reserve investment corporations, development funds, and 
pension reserve funds without explicit pension liabilities”. (Source: Sovereign Wealth Funds - Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles”, IWG, October 2008, http://www.iwg-
swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf)  
6
 “SWFs and foreign investment policies –an update”, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 2008 






. In comparison to other investors, SWFs are large and almost 
the size of the combined hedge fund (HF) and private equity (PE) industry. 




The SWF Institute publishes a list of the largest SWFs by AUM. Table 1 shows the 
20 largest SWFs as of September 2010. 
Table 1: The largest SWFs by AUM as of September 2010 
This table lists the 20 largest SWFs by assets under management (AUM) as published by the SWF Institute as of 
September 2010.  
      
Country Fund Name Assets $ Billion Inception Origin LMTI
9
 
      
      
UAE- Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority $627 1976 Oil 3 
Norway Government Pension Fund Global $512 1990 Oil 10 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings $415 n/a Oil 2 
China SAFE Investment Company $347.1 1997 Non-Commodity 2 
China China Investment Corporation $332.4 2007 Non-Commodity 6 
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corp.  $247.5 1981 Non-Commodity 6 
China-HK SAR HKMA Investment Portfolio $227.6 1993 Non-Commodity 8 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority $202.8 1953 Oil 6 
China National Social Security Fund $146.5 2000 Non-Commodity 5 
Russia National Welfare Fund $142.5 2008 Oil 5 
Singapore Temasek Holdings $133 1974 Non-Commodity 10 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority $85 2005 Oil 5 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority $70 2006 Oil 2 
Australia Australian Future Fund $59.1 2004 Non-Commodity 9 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund $56.7 2000 Oil 1 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund $38 2000 Oil 6 
US – Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund $35.5 1976 Oil 10 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund $33 2001 Non-Commodity 10 
South Korea Korea Investment Corporation $30.3 2005 Non-Commodity 9 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency $30 1983 Oil 1 
      
 
The main sources of funding for SWFs include oil revenues, government savings and 
foreign exchange reserves. As the table shows, some SWFs, like the Kuwait 
Investment Authority, have a long history and go back to the 1950s.  
With the emergence of SWFs as large global financial players
10
, policy issues arise. 
The size of the funds as well as the likelihood of further growth, combined with the 
                                                 
7
 Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (www.swfinstitute.org), as of December 2009 
8
 As of 2006, SWFs managed USD 3 trillion in global financial assets, versus HFs managing USD 1.9 trillion and Private 
Equity managing USD 1.3 trillion. (Source: Butt el al. (2008)).  
9
 LMTI stands for the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute has created the LMTI 
and publishes the transparency rating of individual SWFs on a quarterly basis. The index ranges from 0 to 10, whereas 0 
refers to being non-transparent and 10 being very transparent. For details, please refer to the homepage of the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute (www.swfinstitute.org). 
10
 Fernandes (2011) reports that traditionally SWFs used to invest in debt instruments, but low returns have prompted 
them to start to invest in equities in recent years.  








Due to this development, academic research has started to pay more attention to 
SWFs. However, despite the increasing interest in this field, the number of research 
papers on SWFs is still comparatively low. This can be explained by the lack of data 
and the lack of transparency in most SWFs
12
. Nevertheless, with the introduction of 
the Santiago Principles
13
, some SWFs have started to improve their transparency and 
disclose best practices. Thus we expect that more research will be dedicated to this 
area going forward.  
 
2.3 Sovereign Wealth Fund Literature    
There are several studies that examined the stock price reactions on announcements 
of investments by sovereign wealth funds.  
Dewenter et al. (2010) analyze a sample of 202 transactions between January 1987 
and April 2008. They find that the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around 
the 3-day announcement window [-1, +1] is significantly positive (+1.5 percent) for 
investments and significantly negative (-1.4 percent) for divestments
14
. Furthermore, 
                                                 
11
 For details, see: “State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds”, by Gerard Lyons, Journal of Management 
Research, 2007, Volume 7, Number 3 
12
 For details, see: “The impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on global financial markets” (Beck and Fidora, 2008). The 
authors state that “Using the corporate governance index for SWFs proposed by Truman (2007) as a yardstick for 
transparency, the seven most non-transparent SWFs – which basically do not publish any information on their portfolios 
– account for almost half of all SWFs holdings.” 
13
 The Santiago Principles were introduced in October 2008 by the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (IWG). The IWG comprises 26 IMF member countries with SWFs. The report summarizes the generally accepted 
principles and practices (GAPP) which cover the areas of 1) legal framework, objectives, and coordination with 
macroeconomic policies, 2) institutional framework and governance structure, 3) investment framework and risk 
management framework. The GAPP contain 24 principles. The report can be found at http://www.iwg-
swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf 
14
 Dewenter et al. (2010) distinguish between a „full sample‟ and a „clean sample‟. The clean sample only contains 
transaction announcements that do not have other concurrent announcements that might influence the stock price of the 




they find that the 3-day CAR of direct investments is greater than the 3-day CAR of 
subsidiary investments
15
. Also, stock price reactions are a non-monotonic function of 
transaction size. For investments, abnormal returns initially increase with the 
percentage stake acquired, reach a maximum and then decline. They also conduct a 
long-run abnormal return study and find that target firms display mean cumulative 
market-adjusted returns (CMARs) insignificantly different from zero in the year 
following the announcement date.  However, mean CMARs turn positive over the 3-
year and 5-year period
16
. Furthermore, they analyze SWF activity after the investment 
in the target firm and find that some of these investments are followed by SWF 
monitoring, lobbying, or tunneling.  
Bortolotti et al. (2009) analyze a sample of 802 SWF investments during the time 
period from May 1985 to November 2009. They report that SWFs prefer to invest in 
large and profitable growth firms and that these firms are usually headquartered in an 
OECD country. Announcements of SWF investments yield average abnormal 
cumulative returns over a 3-day announcement window [-1, +1] of 1.25 percent 
[median of 0.17 percent]. The average abnormal cumulative returns increase to 2.91 
percent [median of 0.37 percent] if Norway is excluded
17
. However, when looking at 
performance in the following two years, they find that target firm performances 
                                                                                                                                           
target company. For the clean sample, the average 3-day CAR for investments is slightly higher (1.7 percent).  
Subsequent studies of subsamples are based on the clean sample.  
15
 Whereas „direct investments‟ relate to transactions where the target company is a publicly traded firm, „subsidiary 
investments‟ relate to transactions where the target firm is a subsidiary of a publicly traded firm. 
16
 Dewenter et al. (2010) only report insignificant results after the 1
st
 year for their CMAR results. But they also calculate 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) which show significantly negative median abnormal returns. Also, the 3-year 
CMARs are only significant under the t-statistic, but not under the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Only the 5-year CMARs 
are significant under both the t-statistic and the Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
17
 Although Norway‟s Government Pension Fund-Global (GPFG) ranks amongst the most transparent SWFs, it is not 
included in all working papers. Furthermore, studies which include the GPFG often analyze the fund separately. The 
reason is that because the Norway fund “always accumulates small stakes in listed companies through open market share 
purchases, its investments are rarely documented in the press and are almost never recorded as direct share acquisition by 
SDC” (Bortolotti et al., 2009). However, it annually publishes a list of all the equity holdings on its homepage. The 
GPFG will not be included in this study as it is not included in the SDC database and because it generally does not 
purchase more than 1 percent of outstanding shares of a company.    




deteriorate and SWF investments underperform relative to local market indices. If 
Norway is excluded, the average abnormal cumulative return is -2.63 percent [median 
of -4.62 percent] for the 6-month period, -4.32 percent [median of -10.36 percent] for 
the 1-year period, -3.09 percent [median of -13.55 percent] for the 2-year period and 
3.72 percent [median of -9.30 percent] for the 3-year period. Results are significant 
for the first two years. The authors find that long-run abnormal return decreases as the 
stake that the SWF acquires in the target company increases. Long-run abnormal 
return also decreases if the investment is direct (in contrast to investments through 
subsidiaries)
18
, and if the SWF takes a seat on the board of directors of the target 
company. The underperformance also worsens for investments in foreign target firms. 
These findings are all in line with their „Constrained Foreign Investor Hypothesis‟19 
and lead them to conclude that the poor long-term performance of SWFs cannot be 
explained by poor stock picking alone, but that poor monitoring by SWFs is one of 
the reasons why SWF investments do not lead to increases in the firm valuations of 
the target companies. When they analyze board compositions of target firms, they 
find that SWFs acquire seats on only 14.9 percent of the boards of the target 
companies (26.8 percent if Norway is excluded). The likelihood that SWFs acquire a 
seat in the board is significantly higher if the target company is a domestic company 
rather than a foreign company.  
                                                 
18
 Bortolotti et al. (2009) report that subsidiaries of the SWF are more likely to take seats on the boards of target 
companies in foreign deals than the SWF itself. They argue that SWFs choose subsidiaries to invest in companies rather 
than to invest directly because of the „low-visibility‟ of subsidiaries.  
19
 Bortolotti et al. (2009) argue that SWFs are constrained foreign investors because “SWFs seem to face numerous, 
severe restrictions on the monitoring and/or disciplinary role that they can realistically play, at least regarding their cross-
border investments in listed companies. This is largely because any posture they take other than being purely passive 
investors might generate political pressure or a regulatory backlash from recipient-country governments.” Because of 
these restrictions, the authors expect that “SWFs will not make effective monitors of investee company managers and 
will not create value in the long term”. They also argue that this lack of monitoring might “even exacerbate conflicts 
between managers and minority shareholders by freeing managers from effective oversight”, a reason why larger stake 
acquisitions lead to lower abnormal long-run returns.   




Fernandes (2011) investigates the effects of SWF holdings on the firm value of target 
companies. He analyzes SWF holdings in more than 8,000 firms in 58 countries 
during the time period from 2002 to 2007 and compares them to a control group
20
. He 
reports a positive relationship between SWF holdings and firm values of target 
companies (as measured by Tobin‟s Q21) as well as the existence of a premium for 
firms in which SWFs hold a stake (after controlling for institutional ownership), 
suggesting that SWF holdings are viewed positively by the market. In addition, he 
reports a positive relationship between SWF investments and operating performance 
of the target companies after the investment took place (as measured by ROA (return 
on assets), ROE (return on equity), and higher operating returns). He states that these 
results are not consistent with the idea that SWF invest with hidden political agendas 
or try to extract private benefits of control
22
. He analyses different channels of how 
SWFs may impact the firms they invest in and finds that after large SWF investments, 




Knill et al. (2009) investigate whether SWF investments are destabilizing
24
. They 
analyze a sample of 232 acquisitions and 140 divestments from January 1990 to 
                                                 
20
 The control group consists of all the firms in the Datastream/Worldscope database for the years 2002 through 2007. 
21
 Tobin‟s Q is frequently used as a measure of firm value. Fernandes (2011) calculates Tobin‟s Q as the book value of 
total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by total assets. In his analysis, he 
regresses Tobin‟s Q on a number of variables such as Size, Industry, Leverage, Cash, Investment Opportunities, etc.  
22
 Fernandes (2011) states that SWFs may use cross-border investments to help the economic development in their home 
country (for example, by trying to pursuade the target company to build off-shore facilities). Influencing the target 
company‟s strategy and investment decisions might come at the expense of the performance and value of the target firm. 
On the other hand, SWFs may be able to influence government decisions in favor of the target firm, thereby increasing 
its firm value. However, his results are not consistent with the idea of SWFs following political agendas.   
23
 Fernandes (2011) uses CEO turnover as a measure of how well a company is monitored. He finds that after a SWF 
investment, the CEO turnover rate is significantly higher than in the control group. He also finds that SWF average 
turnover is low (7% per year), suggesting that SWFs are long-term investors and that this “raises the possibility that 
SWFs… may provide capital for future funding needs and therefore reduce the uncertainty regarding the company‟s 
future financing ability”. Using foreign sales as a proxy for product market impact, he finds that the percentage of foreign 
sales increases significantly after a SWF investment.     
24
 Knill et al. (2010) describe an event as destabilizing if there is a significant decline in returns of the target company 
and the risk-to-return relation of the target company deteriorates.   




December 2009. They find cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the trading 
days -1 to 0 of 1.37 percent for SWF acquisitions (1.17 percent for SWF 
divestments). Using a difference of means test, they find that the benchmark-adjusted 
returns are lower in the year following the acquisition by the SWF. Also, volatility 
decreases over time, however, the decrease is not sufficient to compensate investors 
for risk in the same manner as before the investment. They also investigate Sharpe 
and Appraisal ratios and find a decrease in these ratios in the years after the SWF 
investment, an indication that there is a decrease in risk compensation. They conclude 
that their results support the argument that SWF investments are destabilizing. 
Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) investigate equity investments of the following four 
SWFs: Government Pension Fund of Norway, National Pensions Reserve Fund of 
Ireland, Alaska Permanent Fund, and New Zealand Superannuation Fund. The total 
sample, measured until the end of 2007, consists of 10,282 global equity investments 
from these four SWFs
25
. They find that these SWFs prefer to invest in countries with 
common cultural traits
26
. Compared to other institutional investors, they find that the 
cultural bias of SWF investment is particularly pronounced. Furthermore, SWFs 
display significant industry bias and tend to invest more in large-cap stocks.  
Bernstein et al. (2009) examine private equity investment strategies of SWFs and 
analyze a total sample size of 2,662 transactions during the time period from January 
1984 to December 2007. They report that SWFs seem to engage in „trend chasing‟. 
That is, SWFs tend to invest in the companies that are located in the SWF‟s home 
country when equity prices at home are already high and domestic equities are 
                                                 
25
 The authors only include these four SWFs because coverage for all the other SWFs is incomplete and they are 
concerned that incomplete coverage will bias their results.  
26
 The authors define closeness in language and religion as cultural proximity variables that should indicate whether there 
exists a similarity in culture between the home country of the SWF and the country in which it decides to invest.   




expensive compared to foreign equities (in terms of P/E) and they tend to invest in 
companies located abroad when foreign equities are expensive compared to domestic 
equities. Furthermore, they analyze the governance structures of SWFs and try to 
determine whether investment behavior of the SWFs changes depending on whether 
politicians and/or external managers are involved in the decision making process. 
They find that when politicians are involved, it is more likely that the SWF will invest 
in companies that are located in the SWF‟s home country and in industries with 
higher P/E. Also, valuations of the target firms change negatively in the first year. 
However, when external managers are involved, SWFs invest more in industries with 
lower P/E. In that case, valuations of the target firms change positively in the first 
year. This leads them to conclude that home investments, especially those where 
politicians are involved, are associated with worse performances and trend chasing. 
Possible reasons for these results are “less sophisticated decision structures within 
these funds or outright distortions in the investment process due to political or agency 
problems.” 
Karolyi and Liao (2010) analyze cross-border deals by government-led acquirers 
during the time period from 1990 to 2008. They compare these deals to those by 
corporate-led acquirers. They are able to distinguish the government-led acquisitions 
between those led by SWFs and those without SWF involvement. They report that 
acquisitions led by SWFs are less likely to fail compared to acquisitions by 
government-led acquirers without SWF involvement. Also, SWF-led acquisitions 
focus on larger target companies and companies with fewer financial constraints. 
They calculate cumulative abnormal market-adjusted returns (CMARs) over a 3-day 
announcement window [-1, +1] and find that the median CMARs are 0.88 percent for 




SWF-led acquisitions that seek majority stakes and 0.85 percent for those that seek 
minority stakes (for comparison, results are 5.8 percent and 1.4 percent for corporate-
led acquirers and 2.1 percent and 1.0 percent for government-led acquirers without 
SWF involvement).  
Kotter and Lel (2010) examine investment strategies of SWFs and analyze a sample 
of 358 observations between 1980 and February 2009. They report that SWFs prefer 
large firms with poor performance, high leverage, international presence and low cash 
reserves. When they account for transparency of SWFs, they find that more 
transparent SWFs are more likely to invest in firms with poor performance and more 
transparent SWFs have a greater positive impact on target firm value (higher 
abnormal return). They argue that voluntary SWF transparency is a proxy for the 
quality of monitoring by SWFs and that it can be seen as both a signal of the 
likelihood that the investment choices of a SWF have financial objectives and that 
they will increase the value of the target company. Also, abnormal returns are higher 
if the SWF invests in more opaque firms
27
, firms with high leverage, low cash 
reserves or when the SWF takes a large stake. The average cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) over a 3-day announcement window [-1, +1] is 2.25 percent (1.78 
percent for cross-border investments only). Furthermore, they find that SWF 
investments do not have a substantial effect on profitability, growth, firm 
performance and corporate governance in the long-run. Given that they do not find 
any evidence that investments by SWFs influence the performance of the target 
companies in the long-run (both financially and operationally), they conclude that 
SWFs are not active shareholders. Instead, they conclude that SWFs are similar to 
                                                 
27
 As a proxy for opaqueness, they use the natural logarithm of the number of analysts that cover the target firm.  




other passive institutional investors in that they have comparable preferences with 
regards to the characteristics of the target company and the effect that they have on 
the performance of the target.  
Avendaño and Santiso (2009) use holding-level data from FactSet/Lionshares and 
Thomson Financial databases in order to compare equity investments of 17 SWFs 
with other institutional investors (the 25 largest mutual funds – both index funds and 
actively managed funds) in the last quarter of 2008. They analyze geographical, 
sector and industry allocation relative to these mutual funds (the „benchmark‟ 
investor allocation) as well as the political bias of their investments. They find that 
there are only small differences in the investment profile of the firms in which SWFs 
and mutual funds invest in (in terms of P/E ratio, P/B ratio, Dividend Yield, Sales 
Growth (%), and Beta). They find that SWFs have a more diversified allocation by 
country than mutual funds, which show a high concentration of holdings in the U.S.. 
However, the authors state that this result could be due to a sample bias as most of the 
mutual funds in their sample are based in the U.S.. They also find that SWFs mainly 
invest in Asia, followed by investments in Europe and North America. Mutual Funds 
focus on investments in North America and Asia, with fewer investments in Europe. 
SWFs also have a higher proportion of investments in the Middle East. Overall, they 
find that SWFs are diversified more in terms of investments in countries, regions, as 
well as sectors and industries. When analyzing political regimes and corporate 
governance of target firms
28
, the authors find that there are no significant differences 
between SWF and mutual fund investments. This leads them to conclude that SWFs 
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 Avendaño and Santiso (2009) define several criteria that determine the political regimes and corporate governance of 
target firms. For example, an indicator for „political regime‟ is „institutionalized democracy‟ and it reflects the 
competitiveness of political participation in a particular country.  An indicator for „corporate governance‟ is „Regulation 
of Chief Executive Recruitment‟ and it refers to the procedures for transferring executive power. 




are more risk-return and profit-maximization oriented then often assumed and that 
despite differences in allocations, investment motives between SWFs and mutual 
funds are not very different.  
Balin (2010) analyses the effects of the global financial crisis since 2007 upon SWFs. 
He finds that following heavy losses during the crisis, SWFs started to transform. 
Overall, SWFs have moved towards relatively shorter investment time horizons
29
, 
more liquid holdings and have worked towards becoming more transparent. In 
addition, they started to re-evaluate their management, have begun to hold controlling 
stakes in major corporations and have improved their coordination with institutional 
investors and other SWFs.   
As this study will investigate how well the cross-border equity investments of SWFs 
perform, on average, compared to the cross-border equity investments of other 
Institutional Investors (Hedge Funds (HFs)
30
), this chapter also provides an overview 
of the Hedge Fund literature. 
2.4 Hedge Fund Literature 
Analyzing the performances of HFs can be challenging as they invest in a 
heterogenous range of financial assets and often lack transparency (Gehin, 2004).  
                                                 
29
 Balin (2010) states that before the financial crisis, SWFs believed that the probability was low that their assets would 
be used for domestic purposes and therefore held mainly less liquid assets with a long time horizon that provided higher 
returns. When sovereigns called SWFs to participate in domestic stabilization efforts, some SWFs were subsequently 
forced to sell their assets at high losses. In response, SWFs have started to change their investment horizon to incorporate 
more sovereign payouts.    
30
 Brav et al. (2008) state that HFs can be “identified by four characteristics: (1) they are pooled, privately organized 
investment vehicles; (2) they are administered by professional investment managers with performance-based 
compensation and significant investments in the fund; (3) they are not widely available to the public; and (4) they operate 
outside of securities regulation and registration requirements”.    




Klein and Zur (2009) examine HF holdings. They analyze a sample of 13D filings
31
 
between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2005. The sample consists of 101 HF 
activists and 151 HF target firms vs 134 other entrepreneurial activists and 154 other 
entrepreneurial target firms
32
. They report that HF targets earn 10.2 percent average 
cumulative abnormal returns during the initial Schedule 13D filing period window [-
30, +30], while other activist targets earn 5.1 percent average cumulative abnormal 
returns during the same time period. The abnormal return is significantly higher if the 
activist obtains its stated goals within 1 year of the Schedule 13D filing date. For the 
[-30, +30] window, average cumulative abnormal return for the HF activist is 13.2 
percent if stated goals are obtained, but only 5.6 percent if stated goals are not 
obtained. In the 1-year period following the initial 13D filing, HF targets earn 11.4 
percent abnormal return, while other activist targets earn 17.8 percent abnormal 
return. The firms that HFs target are more profitable and financially healthy whereas 
the other entrepreneurial activists target more poorly performing firms.  
Brav et al. (2008) analyze 13D filings of 236 activist HFs
33
 between 2001 and 2006. 
They find that, unlike pension funds and mutual funds, HFs are able to influence 
corporate boards and company management because of their different organizational 
structure and incentives. HFs are in a better position than other institutional investors 
to monitor a company because they are not subject to the same regulations that 
govern pension funds and mutual funds but, instead, are able to hold large positions in 
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 Investors are obliged to submit a 13D filing with the SEC within 10 days after acquiring at least 5 percent of a publicly 
traded equity security with the stated intent to influence the policies of the firm. Reasons for the transactions as stated in 
the 13D filings include, for example, the change of the board of directors‟ composition, pursuing strategic alternatives, 
opposing/supporting a merger.   
32
 The authors define an entrepreneurial activist as “an investor who buys a large stake in a publicly held corporation with 
the intention to bring about change and thereby realize a profit on the investment”. They analyze two samples: The first 
sample consists of HF activist campaigns, the second sample consists of other entrepreneurial activist campaigns. Other 
entrepreneurial activists constitute individuals, private equity funds, venture capital funds, and asset management firms.     
33
 Investors are obliged to submit a 13D filing with the SEC within 10 days after acquiring at least 5 percent of a publicly 
traded equity security with the stated intent to influence the policies of the firm.  




a small number of companies. In relation to their investments, HFs prefer „value‟ 
firms (low market-to-book ratio) that are profitable with good operating cash flows 
and high ROA. They invest in the companies they believe to be undervalued. Given 
that they want to gain a sizeable stake in the target company, few of the target firms 
are large-caps. Over a 40-day announcement window [-20, +20] the positive average 
cumulative abnormal return of a HF investment ranges between 7 percent and 8 
percent. Furthermore, they analyze ex-post operating performance and report that 
companies in which HF activists invest in show a higher ROA and operating profit 
margin than their peer companies. They report that the median ownership stake for 
the sample is 9.1 percent, indicating that HFs on average do not seek to control the 
firms they invest in. However, as they rely on management cooperation or support 
from other shareholders, they prefer target companies that show high institutional 
ownership and high analyst coverage as these are signs of a sophisticated shareholder 
base.  
Greenwood and Schor (2009) analyze SEC (Schedule 13D and DFAN14A)
34
 filings 
from HF activists during the period from 1993 to 2006. They report 15-day average 
cumulative abnormal returns around the event window of the filing date [-10, +5] of 
approximately 3.5 percent. The returns are positive when the activist requests an asset 
sale, blocks a merger, or wages a proxy fight. Other activities such as capital structure 
issues, corporate governance, corporate strategy, and spin-off do not lead to positive 
market reactions – the returns are insignificantly different from zero. They show that 
activism can increase the likelihood of a target being taken over. In the case of a 
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 Investors are obliged to submit a 13D filing with the SEC within 10 days after acquiring at least 5 percent of a publicly 
traded equity security with the stated intent to influence the policies of the firm. Investors need to submit a DFAN14A 
filing with the SEC if they intend to engage in a proxy fight with the management of the firm. It is possible to initiate a 
proxy fight with a stake that comprises less than 5 percent of the shares outstanding. 




takeover, long-term returns are high. But for other outcomes, they find that long-term 
returns are not significantly different from zero.  
Ferreira and Matos (2008) examine a sample of equity holdings of more than 5,300 
institutional investors
35
 from 27 countries during the time period from January 2000 
to December 2005 in an attempt to analyze their role. The authors focus their analysis 
on non-U.S. stocks. While all institutional investors (independent of their geographic 
origin) prefer large firms with good governance that do not have controlling 
blockholders and are physically located near the institutional investor‟s home market, 
they find that there are differences between foreign institutional investors and 
domestic institutional investors. While foreign institutional investors prefer firms that 
have external visibility (high foreign sales and high analyst coverage), are cross-listed 
in the U.S. and are members of the MSCI World Index, domestic institutional 
investors underweight these stocks. They also analyze whether there are differences 
between U.S. institutional investors and non-U.S. institutional investors. They find 
that U.S. institutional investors differ from non-U.S. institutional investors in that 
U.S. institutional investors display a preference for value stocks, stocks from English-
speaking countries and emerging markets. In addition they find that firms have higher 
valuations, lower capital expenditures and better operating performance if the 
ownership of foreign and independent investors
36
 is high.  
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 The authors get their data from the Factset/LionShares database which holds information on global institutional 
ownership. Professional money managers with discretionary control over assets (for example, mutual funds, pension 
funds, insurance companies and bank trusts) have to disclose their holdings.    
36
 Ferreira and Matos (2008) divide institutions into independent institutions (these are mutual funds and investment 
advisors) and grey institutions (these are bank trusts, insurance companies and others).  





This chapter first provides a brief overview of SWFs and the existing literature on 
SWFs. While all studies report positive announcement period abnormal returns, 
results are mixed for long-run abnormal returns. We also provide an overview of the 
existing literature on HFs. Similarly, the studies on HFs report positive announcement 
period abnormal returns, but mixed results for long-run abnormal returns.   








This chapter provides an overview of the data used to conduct the analysis. Sections 
3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 describe the data selection process as well as the data sources. Section 
3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Selection Criteria and Data Sources for Sovereign Wealth Funds 
The Mergers & Acquisitions database from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
Platinum
37
, which is provided by Thomson Reuters Financial, is used to obtain the 
data on SWF investments.  All the deals from the SDC categories U.S. Targets and 
Non-U.S. Targets that show a sovereign wealth fund involvement during the time 
period from January 1
st
, 1990 to December 31
st
, 2009 are downloaded.  In order to 
obtain a clean sample, the following data screening is conducted:   
 Deals flagged as Asset Swaps, Divestitures, Spinoffs, Going Private, LBOs, 
Liquidations, Joint Ventures, Private Tender Offers, Privatizations, and 
Repurchases are excluded from the sample.  
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 Stock purchases in the SDC M&A database are included if either of the following criteria is met: 
- More than 5% (value does not need to be disclosed), or 
- More than 3% and the transaction value is greater than USD 1 million, or 
- Less than 3% if the acquirer indicates it may launch an offer for the entire company, or if the purchase results 
in ownership of greater than 50%, or  
- If the purchase is of a remaining stake of any size which will result in 100% ownership (i.e. squeeze out). 




 Observations involving pension funds such as CalPERS38 are excluded. 
 The analysis only includes transactions where the target (or its immediate or 
ultimate parent) is listed as a public company.   
 Observations that indicate transfers between subsidiaries of a SWF are 
excluded (this is frequently the case when SWF involvement is shown as 
being both on the Buyside and on the Sellside). 
 All observations which show SWF involvement on the sellside (target) are 
excluded.  
 Observations where the transaction was withdrawn are excluded.  
 As the paper only analyses cross-border investments39, observations that are 
not cross-border deals are excluded
40
. In addition, all observations where the 
country of the acquirer in the SDC database is shown as „unknown‟ are 
removed as it otherwise becomes difficult to determine whether an investment 
is cross-border or not.  
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 In determining whether a fund is to be considered as a SWF or a pension fund, we follow the guidelines set by the 
SWF Institute and highlighted in Bortolotti et al. (2009) which state that a SWF is identified as “a wealth fund rather than 
a pension fund – meaning that that fund is not financed with contributions from pensioners and does not have a stream of 
liabilities committed to individual citizens.” For this reason we will not include the California Public Employees‟ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) in our sample.  
39
 Dewenter et al. (2010) state that “the idea that SWFs might have superior information about, or the ability to influence, 
government actions that affect target firm values seems most likely for target firms in the same country as the SWF and 
firms in heavily regulated industries. Favorable government decisions are common when the SWFs acquire shares of 
firms headquartered in their home countries.” In order to avoid this potential issue, we decided to focus on cross-border 
investments.  
40
 Observations are excluded if the cross-border flag in SDC Platinum equals „No‟. SDC Platinum defines a deal as cross-
border if the target company in the deal is not located in the same country as the acquirer ultimate parent. For some 
particular deals, however, this may not be clear-cut. For example:    
On November 19
th
, 2007, Bank of China Hong Kong (Acquirer) acquired a stake of Bank of East Asia Ltd (Target). Both 
acquirer and target show Hong Kong as their nation. However, Bank of China Hong Kong is shown as a subsidiary with 
the acquirer ultimate parent being „People‟s Republic of China‟. Because the acquirer ultimate parent is based in China 
and the target is based in Hong Kong, it is considered a cross-border deal.  
Fortunately, there are only a few deals in the database where the nation of the acquirer and the nation of the acquirer 
ultimate parent are not identical.  




 Observations where the SWF (or one of its investment vehicles41) is the direct 
acquirer and observations where the SWF is shown as the acquirer‟s 
immediate or ultimate parent are included in the sample. However, tests will 
be conducted to determine whether there are differences in the results when 
observations where the SWF is shown as the acquirer immediate parent or 
acquirer ultimate parent of a company are excluded
42
. 
 Simultaneous transactions are treated as one event43. 
  
3.3 Selection Criteria and Data Sources for Hedge Funds  
For the data on HF investments, we use the same database as for the SWF 
investments (SDC Platinum, M&A Database, U.S. Targets and Non-U.S. Targets). 
We only keep the deals that show a Hedge Fund involvement. The data screening 
conducted is very similar to the data screening used for the SWF investments:    
 Deals flagged as Asset Swaps, Divestitures, Spinoffs, Going Private, LBOs, 
Liquidations, Joint Ventures, Private Tender Offers, Privatizations, and 
Repurchases are excluded from the sample.  
 The analysis only includes transactions where the target (or its immediate or 
ultimate parent) is listed as a public company.   
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 For example, Aranda Investments (Mauritius) Pte Ltd and Dunearn Investments (Mauritius) Pte Ltd are wholly owned 
units of Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd. In these cases, Aranda Investments and Dunearn Investments are shown as acquirers 
and Temasek is shown as acquirer immediate parent.   
42
 These observations are treated separately in additional tests because if the SWF is not the direct acquirer, it is difficult 
to determine how much influence the SWF had on the investment decision. For example, on 11
th
 of April 2000, it was 
announced that Singapore Airlines acquired a 8.3% stake in Air New Zealand (Source: Evening Standard). Temasek 
Holdings Pte Ltd is listed as the acquirer immediate parent in this case. However, such an acquisition looks more like a 
strategic acquisition among airline carriers, rather than an investment decision of the SWF.  
43
 For example, on 24
th
 of December, 2007, it was announced that “Temasek…will invest $4.4bln in Merrill (Lynch)‟s 
common stock and has the option to purchase an additional $600m of its stock by the end of March.” (Source: Financial 
Times). The SDC Platinum database shows two entries for this transaction on the same announcement date, one for a 
transaction value of $4.4bln and the other for a transaction value of $600m. In such cases, we will combine the two 
entries and treat them as one event. 




 Observations where HF involvement is shown on both the Buyside and 
Sellside are excluded.  
 All observations which show HF involvement on the sellside (target) are 
excluded.  
 Observations where the transaction was withdrawn are excluded.  
 As the paper only analyses cross-border investments, observations that are not 
cross-border deals are excluded. In addition, all observations where the 
country of the acquirer in the HF database is shown as „unknown‟ are 
removed as it otherwise becomes difficult to determine whether an investment 
is cross-border or not.  
 
3.4 Other Data Sources 
In order to obtain historical stock prices of the target companies, we use the 
Datastream database
44
. We also use Datastream to get historical prices for local stock 
market indices
45
. They are used as benchmark in order to calculate abnormal returns 
of the target companies in the event studies. Historical prices data ranges from 
January 1
st
, 1990 to September 30
th
, 2010. In addition, we use Datastream to obtain 
accounting variable data for the target companies. The accounting variables are used 
in the cross-sectional and pooled sample regressions.  
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 In order to obtain historical stock prices, we match the target companies in the SDC database with the Datastream 
database using the company‟s Datastream code as displayed in the SDC database. In some cases, the SDC database does 
not show a Datastream code in which case we use the Sedol code of the target or, if this code is unavailable as well, the 
Sedol code of the target‟s parent. If neither Datastream code, nor Sedol code of the target or the target‟s parent are 
available, then the observation will be removed from the dataset.   
45
 The main equity indices of single countries are used as benchmark, for example: S&P 500 Index is used as the 
benchmark for the U.S. target companies, CAC 40 is used as the benchmark for the French target companies, HSI is used 
as the benchmark for the Hong Kong target companies, Nikkei 225 is used as the benchmark for the Japanese target 
companies, etc. In cases where there is no local benchmark index available, the MSCI World Index is used as 
benchmark.  




Both the Truman Index and the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (LMTI) are 
included in the cross-sectional regressions. Information about both indices can be 
found in Appendix A.  
For the determination of the industries, we follow the guidelines by Fama and French 
and allocate the stocks among 17 industries according to their SIC codes. However, in 
the 17 industries definition, financials and real estate are still clustered in the same 
industry. For the purpose of this analysis, we split this industry into two in order to 
analyze real estate companies and financial companies separately. For a detailed 




This chapter describes the data selection process for SWF and HF investments. The 
data screening process is the same in order to ensure that the data is comparable. In 
addition, information about data sources for historical stock prices, accounting 
variables, industry selection and SWF transparency is provided.  
The next chapter will introduce the test hypotheses, the return models and the 





Hypotheses and Methodology Design 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the hypotheses to be tested as well as the models 
used to conduct the analysis. Section 4.2 describes the test hypotheses for the 
analysis. Section 4.3 discusses the return models used to calculate the announcement 
period abnormal returns. Section 4.4 describes the computation of the long-term 
cumulative market-adjusted returns. Section 4.5 discusses the cross-sectional 
regressions and introduces the explanatory variables used. Section 4.6 concludes the 
chapter.  
 
4.2 Test Hypotheses 
There are six hypotheses that are tested in this paper: 
  
Hypothesis 1: The market responds positively to announcements of cross-border SWF 
investments and the target companies show positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement date.  
A SWF investment suggests that the SWF is confident about the future prospects of 
the company and/or thinks that the company is undervalued. It may also result in 
better access to capital and foreign products markets for the target company (as 
observed by Fernandes, 2011). Papers by Dewenter et al. (2010), Bortolotti et al. 




(2009), and Kotter and Lel (2010) have reported positive announcement period 
average cumulative abnormal returns for SWF investments which indicate that the 
market values a SWF investment as a positive signal for the target company.  
 
Hypothesis II: The market responds positively to announcements of cross-border HF 
investments and the target companies show positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement date. 
A HF investment suggests that the HF is confident about the future prospects of the 
company and/or thinks that the company is undervalued. If the HF is perceived to be 
an „activist‟ by the market, the market might value it positively if the goals that the 
HF pursues are likely to be obtained (Klein and Zur, 2009).  Papers by Klein and Zur 
(2009), Brav et al. (2008) and Greenwood and Schor (2009) have reported positive 
announcement period average cumulative abnormal returns for HF investments in the 
U.S., which suggests that the market values HF investments as a positive signal for 
the target company.    
 
Hypothesis III: The announcement period abnormal returns of target companies are 
higher for HF investments than for SWF investments.  
The announcement period abnormal return is a reflection of how positive or negative 
an investment is perceived by the market. Several papers (e.g. Dewenter et al., 2010; 
Bortolotti et al., 2009) report negative abnormal returns in the first year after the SWF 
investment. One explanation for this underperformance is that SWFs are 
„constrained‟ and do not monitor target companies effectively [„Constrained Foreign 




Investor Hypothesis‟, as described by Bortolotti et al., 2009]46. Kotter and Lel (2010) 
report that there is no evidence that SWFs have an effect on the long-run performance 
of the target companies and that SWFs have a role similar to passive institutional 
investors. HFs, on the other hand, are known to be efficient monitors that have an 
influence on the management and board of the target companies (Brav et al., 2008). 
This suggests that the market values investments by HFs more as it believes that HFs 
are better able to help improve the long-run performance of a target company. This 
should be displayed in higher announcement period abnormal returns.  
 
In order to test Hypotheses I, II and III, we calculate the 3-day [-1, +1] announcement 
period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for both the SWF and HF samples. 
Additional tests are conducted to determine whether Hypothesis III holds and HF 
investments are, on average, associated with higher announcement period abnormal 
returns. Section 4.3 describes the tests in more detail.   
 
Hypothesis IV: The long-run abnormal returns of target companies are higher for HF 
investments than for SWF investments.  
As mentioned under Hypothesis III, SWFs are perceived to be „constrained‟ 
(Bortolotti et al., 2009) and not have an effect on the long-run performance of the 
target companies (Kotter and Lel, 2010), whereas HFs are perceived to be efficient 
monitors that influence management and board of the target companies (Brav et al., 
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 Bortolotti et al. (2009) identify „constrained foreign investors‟ as an investor group. „Constrained foreign investors‟ are 
unlikely to monitor the target companies properly and are unlikely to have a positive impact on the corporate governance 
of the target companies. They conjecture that especially foreign governments and government-related entities are 
reluctant to take on an active role in governance in order to avoid a political opposition or regulatory backlash. 
Furthermore, they are reluctant to divest in order to avoid resentment by the target company‟s management, as well as 
regulators and market participants. This further reduces their monitoring role. Being purely state-owned investment 
vehicles, they conjecture that SWFs are among the most constrained investors.     




2008). This suggests that the long-run abnormal returns of HF investments should be 
higher than the long-run abnormal returns of SWF investments.  Also, the fee 
structure of HFs is usually dependent on the profits they generate. HF fees therefore 
provide strong incentives for fund managers to try to pick stocks that have positive 
abnormal returns.    
 
For the testing of Hypothesis IV, we calculate the long-run cumulative market-
adjusted returns (CMARs) for both the SWF and HF samples. Additional tests are 
conducted to determine whether Hypothesis IV holds and HF investments are, on 
average, associated with higher long-run cumulative market-adjusted returns. Section 
4.4 describes the tests in more detail.   
 
Hypothesis V(a): The market values investments by SWFs during the crisis years of 
2007 and 2008 more than during other times. This is evident in higher announcement 
period abnormal returns during the crisis period. 
Hypothesis V(b): The market values investments by HFs during the crisis years of 
2007 and 2008 more than during other times. This is evident in higher announcement 
period abnormal returns during the crisis period. 
It is expected that during the crisis in 2007 and 2008, the market‟s response to news 
about company investments is stronger as it displays confidence in the target 
company. This should be displayed in higher announcement period abnormal returns 
than during other years.   




Hypothesis VI: During the crisis years of 2007 and 2008, financial targets of SWF 
investments display higher announcement period abnormal returns than non-
financial targets
47
 of SWFs. 
During the crisis years of 2007 and 2008, SWFs attracted much attention by acting as 
„White Knights‟ and acquiring stakes in troubled financial companies48. As SWFs are 
perceived to have a long-term investment horizon and little need for liquidity, an 
investment by a SWF in a troubled financial company might be viewed as a strong 
positive signal. As the crisis mainly affected financial companies which consequently 
jeopardized the stability of the financial system, it is expected that the market valued 
investments in financial targets more. Therefore it is expected that, on average, 
financial targets will show a higher announcement period abnormal return than non-
financial targets.  
 
 
In order to test Hypotheses V and VI, announcement period CARs for the years 2007 
and 2008 are used. Additional tests are conducted to determine whether, on average, 
SWF (HF) investments are associated with higher announcement period abnormal 
returns during the crisis period and whether SWF investments in financial companies 
are associated with announcement period abnormal returns that are different from 
SWF investments in non-financial companies during the crisis period. Section 4.3 
describes the calculation method and tests in more detail.    
 
                                                 
47 As HFs did not appear to invest large sums in financial companies during the crisis years of 2007 and 2008 and we 
only have 8 observations of investments in financial companies during that time period, we refrain from testing this 
hypothesis for the HF sample in this paper. However, results are available upon request. 
48
 One famous example is the stake acquisition in Merrill Lynch by the Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) and the 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) which was announced on 15 January 2008 (Source: “Merrill Lynch gets fresh cash 
injection”, Financial Times, 15 January 2008).  




4.3 Announcement Period Abnormal Return  
In order to determine whether target companies experience a positive abnormal return 
during the announcement period, average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 
the 3-day window [-1, +1]
49
 are calculated. The announcement date is day zero. In 
order to obtain the CARs, the daily stock returns of a target company are regressed on 





tstiissts RR ,,,,  
where:  Rs,t  is the stock return of target company s on day t 
Ri,t is the index return of the corresponding local market index i on day 
t 
βs,i is the beta of target company s and reflects the sensitivity of target 
company s to fluctuations in the local market index i  
αs is a measure of the excess return of target company s 
εs,t is the error term and assumed to be normally distributed with mean 
zero 
The alpha (αs) and beta (βs,i) of a target company that are obtained from this 
regression are then used to calculate an estimated stock return based on a return 
                                                 
49
 In a few cases, the announcement date falls on a weekend. For the calculations of the CARs, it is assumed that the 
announcement of the SWF (HF) investment happened on the Friday before the weekend. Announcement Date – 1 is then 
on Thursday and Announcement Date + 1 the following Monday.  
There are a few exceptions as there are cases of trading suspensions around the announcement date. Examples are:  
- CIC‟s stake acquisition in Noble Group (Announcement Date: 21st September 2009). The window was 
extended as Noble Group had a trading suspension for almost a week during the time of the announcement 
date. While 21
st
 September 2009 was still considered as date 0, date -1 was set as the last trading day before 
the suspension of trading and date +1 was set as the first trading day after the suspension was canceled.   
- GIC Real Estate Pte Ltd‟s stake acquisition in GPT Group (Announcement Date: 23rd October 2008). The 
announcement date window was also extended due to a trading halt during that period.  
50
 Some target companies do not have a one year trading history prior to the announcement date. For this reason, a cutoff 
of 30 trading days is set. For an observation to be included in the sample, data from at least 30 trading days need to be 
available in the year prior to the announcement date.   




model. The estimated stock return is calculated for each day during the 3-day window 
[-1, +1]. The abnormal return (AR) for each day is then determined as the difference 
between the actual stock return of target company s and its stock return estimate.  
 
)(,)(,, estimatedtsactualtsts RRAR  
 
The abnormal returns of target company s for each of the three days during the 
announcement period are then summed up to give the CAR over the 3-day 
announcement period window.  
 





The 3-day CAR for the entire sample is the mean (median) of the CARs for all target 
companies. The 3-day CAR is tested in several ways. Firstly, we test whether the 
mean is significantly different from zero. Next, the Sign test and the Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test are conducted to determine whether the median is significantly different 
from zero. Both the Sign test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test are non-parametric 
tests. Unlike the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, the Sign test does not require the 
assumption that the distribution is symmetric.  
 
In order to compare the 3-day CARs of the SWF and HF investments and to test 
whether they are significantly different, two tests will be conducted: 
- The independent samples t-test will determine whether the means of the two 
samples are significantly different. Assumptions are that the two samples are 
independent and identically normally distributed. 




- In addition, we conduct the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test which is the non-
parametric equivalent of the independent samples t-test. It tests whether the 
medians of the two samples are significantly different.   
 
For the SWF sample, results are shown for the full sample as well as for the following 
subsamples: „Direct‟ vs „Subsidiary‟ and „Direct Acquirer‟ vs „Indirect Acquirer‟. For 
the HF sample, results are shown for the full sample as well as for the following 
subsamples: „Direct‟ vs „Subsidiary‟ and „Investor Group‟ vs „Excluding Investor 
Group‟.  
The subsample „Direct‟ refers to transactions in which the target company is a 
publicly traded company. The subsample „Subsidiary‟ refers to transactions in which 
the target company is not publicly traded, but a subsidiary of a publicly traded 
company. The subsample „Direct Acquirer‟ refers to transactions where the SWF is 
the direct acquirer, whereas „Indirect Acquirer‟ refers to transactions where the SWF 
is the immediate or ultimate parent of the acquirer
51
. The subsample „Investor Group‟ 
consists of two or more institutional investors, where at least one of them is a HF
52
. 
The „Excluding Investor Group‟ describes the sample without Investor Group 
involvement. 
 
                                                 
51
 For example, on 3 November 2009 it was announced that Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd would acquire a stake in Seoul 
Semiconductor, a South Korean company. This is viewed as a typical transaction where the SWF is the direct acquirer. 
However, when a company in which the SWF holds a stake makes an acquisition, the SWF is viewed as an indirect 
acquirer. An example would be SingTel‟s announcement on 28 January 2007 to acquire a stake in Bharti Air, an Indian 
company. Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd holds a stake in SingTel which makes it the indirect acquirer.  
In the HF sample, this distinction is not necessary as all HFs are „Direct Acquirers‟.    
52
 An example of a transaction involving an investor group is the stake acquisition in Mercer International Inc., a Swiss 
company, which was announced on 30 December 1997. The synopsis that SDC Platinum provides on the deal is: “An 
investor group, including Greenlight Capital LLP, acquired a 5.81% stake in Mercer International Inc,…, in open market 
transactions.”   




4.4  Long-Run Abnormal Return 
In order to determine whether the target companies experience long-run positive 
abnormal returns, we examine several periods, namely 6 months [+2, +182], 1 year 
[+2, +365], 2 years [+2, +730], 3 years [+2, +1095] and 5 years [+2, +1825] after the 
investment.   
We follow the method described in Dewenter et al. (2010)
53
. The market-adjusted 
return (MAR) of target company s on day t is the difference between the return of the 
stock of target company s on day t and the return of its corresponding local market 
index i on day t.  
 
tsMAR , = tits RR ,,  
 
The cumulative market-adjusted return (CMAR) of a target company s is defined as 
the sum of MARs over the period from day + 2 to day m.  
 






where:  m = period end date (182, 365, 730, 1095, or 1825, respectively)
54
 
The CMARs are not only calculated for the long-term post-announcement date 
periods, but also for the 1-year pre-announcement date period [-365, -2]
55
 in order to 
                                                 
53
 Dewenter et al. (2010) use market-adjusted returns, and not market model abnormal returns, in their long-run 
performance calculation. The reason is that many target companies in their sample show large positive pre-event stock 
returns, making the estimated betas unsuitable for the long-run performance calculation. This is also the case for both the 
SWF sample and the HF sample in this study. Therefore, only market-adjusted returns are calculated in order to 
determine long-run performance.    
54
 For some of the companies, returns are not available for the full period. In order to account for that, a company is only 
included in the sample if it has a trading history of at least 120 trading days for the 6-month period, 240 trading days for 
the 1-year period, 480 trading days for the 2-year period, 720 trading days for the 3-year period, and 1,200 trading days 
for the 5-year period. We assume that there are 252 trading days in a calendar year.  
55
 In order to be included in the sample, a company must have a trading history of at least 240 trading days during this 
period. 




gain insight into how the target companies performed in the year prior to the 
investment.  
For the CMAR results, t-statistics as well as Sign test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
will be displayed. In order to compare the long-term CMARs of the SWF and HF 
investments and to test whether there are significant differences, the independent 
samples t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are conducted.  
 
4.5 Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Cross-sectional regressions require the identification of variables that have a large 
influence on the abnormal returns of the target firms. For the purpose of this analysis, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are conducted. These are linear regressions 
where the dependent (response) variable is assumed to be a linear function of the 
independent (explanatory) variables. An OLS regression model can be written as: 
 
Y = Xβ + ε 
 
where:  Y is a vector of dependent (response) variables 
  X is a matrix of independent (explanatory) variables 
  β is a vector of parameters 
ε is a vector of independent normal random variables with mean zero 
The first set of regressions will use the 3-day [-1, +1] CARs as the dependent 
variable. The explanatory variables are shown in Table 2.  
 
 




Table 2: List of explanatory variables  






Share sought The fraction of the target company‟s shares outstanding (in percent) that the SWF or HF acquires. 
Share sought
2 
The squared term of „Share sought‟56. 
Full control A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF acquires 100 percent ownership of the target company, and set to 0 otherwise
57
. 
Initial A dummy variable that is set to 1 if it is the first transaction of the SWF or HF in a company, and set to 0 otherwise. 
Direct A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a publicly traded company, and set to 0 otherwise. 
Direct Acquirer A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is the direct acquirer, and set to 0 otherwise.  
  
Target industry dummies:  
Finance target A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a financial company, and set to 0 otherwise. 
Real estate target A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a real estate company, and set to 0 otherwise. 
  
Target geographical dummies:   
OECD target A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in an OECD country
58
, and set to 0 otherwise. 
BRIC target A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in Brazil, Russia, India or China, and set to 0 otherwise. 
  
SWF dummies:  
ME SWF A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is from one of the Greater Middle Eastern
59
 countries, and set to 0 otherwise. 
SG SWF A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is from Singapore (either the GIC or Temasek), and set to 0 otherwise.  
  
SWF transparency indices:  
Truman It refers to the Truman Scoreboard
60
 which evaluates SWFs based on the four categories „Structure‟, „Governance‟, 
„Accountability & Transparency‟, and „Behavior‟ with its scores ranging from 0 to 100. 
LMTI It refers to the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index for individual SWFs whose scores range from 0 (intransparent) to 10 
(very transparent).  
  
HF dummies:  
US HF A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the HF is located in the U.S., and set to 0 otherwise. 
UK HF A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the HF is located in the UK, and set to 0 otherwise. 
Investor Group A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the HF belongs to an Investor Group, and set to 0 otherwise. 
  
Crisis year dummy: 
Crisis  A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the year of the transaction was either 2007 or 2008, and set to 0 otherwise. 
  
Accounting variables:  
Market 
Capitalization 
Market capitalization is defined as:  Market price year end * common shares outstanding  
It is quoted in USD and shown for the fiscal year prior to the investment. For the regression, the logarithm of market 
capitalization is used. 
Leverage Leverage is defined as: Long-term debt divided by total assets.  
Long-term debt represents all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding amounts due within one year. Total assets 
represents the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property, plant and equipment and other assets. Leverage is shown for the fiscal year prior to the investment. 
ROE The Return on Equity, calculated using:  (Net Income before Preferred Dividends – Preferred Dividend Requirement) 
                                                                                                     Last year‟s Common Equity  
It is quoted in percent and shown for the fiscal year prior to the investment. 
Dividend Yield It is defined as: Dividend per share / Share price 
Dividend per share represents the total dividends per share declared during a calendar year for U.S. corporations and fiscal 
year for Non-U.S. corporations. It includes extra dividends declared during the year. Share price is calculated by dividing 
market capitalization by common shares outstanding. Common shares outstanding represent the number of shares outstanding 
at the company‟s year end. Dividend Yield is quoted in percent and shown for the fiscal year prior to the investment. 
  
Target company’s return prior to the investment:  
Pre-Event CMAR The cumulative market-adjusted return (CMAR) of the target company for the year prior to the SWF or HF investment [-365, 
-2]. The calculation method is described in more detail in Chapter 4.4. 
                                                 
56
 Dewenter et al. (2010) report that the effect that SWF investments have on firm value is a nonlinear function of the 
stake that they acquire. As a tradeoff exists between gains from monitoring and losses from tunneling, firm value should 
increase for stakes acquired below a certain percentage (due to monitoring gains), but then decline for stakes acquired 
above a certain level (due to tunneling losses). In order to capture any nonlinearity in „Share sought‟, the squared term of 
„Share sought‟ is added to the regression.   
57
 As there is no transaction in the HF sample in which a HF acquires 100 percent ownership, the variable „Full control‟ 
is only included in the SWF regression. 
58
 „OECD‟ stands for „Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development‟. The list of OECD countries can be 
found on www.oecd.org. 
59
 For the purpose of this analysis, the funds from the following countries are classified as Middle Eastern funds: Kuwait, 
Libya, Oman, Qatar, UAE. 
60
 The Truman Scoreboard is described in Truman (2008). It contains 33 elements, and is grouped into four categories: 
(1) fund structure (objectives, fiscal treatment, separate from the country‟s international reserves or not) (2) fund 
governance (roles of the government and the managers, whether the fund follows guidelines for corporate responsibility 
and ethical investment behavior) (3) accountability and transparency of the fund in relation to its investment strategy, 
investment activity, reporting, and audits (4) behavior of the fund in managing its portfolio and in the use of derivatives 
and leverage. The maximum score that a SWF can obtain is 100, the minimum score is 0. 
x 100 




Summary statistics of the explanatory variables will be reported. The F-statistic in the 
regression shows how well the models can predict the 3-day CARs. The coefficient of 
determination, R
2
, shows the proportion of the variability of the response variable that 
is fitted by the model. The adjusted R
2
 adjusts for the number of explanatory 
variables in the model.  In order to correct for any potential heteroskedasticity, p-
values of the coefficients based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors are reported.  
The second set of regressions will set the 6-month CMAR, 1-year CMAR, 2-year 




For all the regressions, results are shown with and without year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects. Both the year fixed effects and the industry fixed effects are 
added as robustness test to see whether the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
are significantly affected if dummy variables for individual years and individual 
industries are added.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the different hypotheses that are tested in this 
paper. It also describes the methodologies of calculating the announcement period 
abnormal return and the long-run abnormal returns. In addition, it provides a 
description of all explanatory variables used in the regressions.  
The next chapter will present the empirical findings. 
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 Long-run cross-sectional regressions where the 5-year CMAR is the dependent variable are not conducted due to the 
small sample size (there are 60 observations for the SWF sample and only 20 observations for the HF sample). However, 





Empirical Findings and Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical findings. Section 5.2 shows the summary statistics 
of the SWF and HF samples analyzed. Section 5.3 presents the results for the 3-day [-
1, +1] announcement window CARs. Results for the long-run abnormal returns can 
be found in section 5.4. Section 5.5 shows the results for the analysis of the crisis 
years 2007 and 2008. SWF and HF investments in financial companies are analyzed 
separately from investments in non-financial companies. Section 5.6 presents the 
summary statistics of the target firm characteristics. The cross-sectional regressions 
with 3-day CARs and long-run CMARs as dependent variables are presented in 
section 5.7. Section 5.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Summary Statistics 
The following Tables show the summary statistics of the data samples for SWF 
investments and HF investments. Table 3 presents the annual distribution of the 

















Table 3: Annual distribution of cross-border investments 
This Table lists the sample of 207 cross-border SWF investments and the sample of 144 cross-border HF investments in 
publicly traded companies between 1990 and 2009. It shows the number of investments, mean (median) investment value 
as well as mean (median) percentage stake acquired for each year. „Observations‟ shows the number of investments for 




Panel A. Annual distribution of cross-border investments by SWFs 
 
Year Number of 
Investments 
Mean (Median) Investment Value 
(in $ million) 
Mean (Median) percentage 
stake acquired 
Observations 
1990 - - (-) - (-) -/- 
1991 4 130.32 (55.77) 9.15 (3.25) 4/4 
1992 2 185.53 (185.53) 17.95 (17.95) 2/2 
1993 3 5.77 (5.77) 5.05 (5.05) 1/2 
1994 7 15.61 (14.73) 3.54 (3.40) 6/6 
1995 4 24.59 (28.30) 10.25 (10.25) 3/2 
1996 6 46.00 (23.57) 7.68 (7.85) 4/4 
1997 4 33.92 (33.92) 9.15 (7.20) 2/4 
1998 5 1,082.35 (265.58) 14.30 (15.65) 5/4 
1999 8 101.51 (47.36) 10.30 (7.50) 7/4 
2000 8 104.76 (70.00) 19.47 (16.70) 7/7 
2001 5 36.69 (38.00) 35.25 (20.50) 5/4 
2002 9 15.06 (3.88) 26.09 (22.10) 5/8 
2003 9 104.12 (98.06) 17.24 (9.65) 7/8 
2004 14 76.54 (17.44) 16.52 (6.70) 7/13 
2005 17 156.44 (44.43) 21.82 (14.80) 11/13 
2006 18 595.99 (91.18) 37.93 (22.50) 13/18 
2007 32 1,910.14 (478.87) 22.92 (12.00) 22/29 
2008 26 1,315.76 (444.60) 21.81 (17.00) 16/24 
2009 26 1,467.53 (571.00) 20.66 (15.40) 15/20 
Total 207 729.15 (89.86) 20.90 (13.40) 143/177 
 
Panel B. Annual distribution of cross-border investments by HFs 
 
Year Number of 
Investments 
Mean (Median) Investment Value 
(in $ million) 
Mean (Median) percentage 
stake acquired 
Observations 
1990 - - (-) - (-) -/- 
1991 1 34.05 (34.05) 5.30 (5.30)  1/1 
1992 1 2.31 (2.31) 2.90 (2.90) 1/1 
1993 2 4.32 (4.32) 11.10 (11.10) 2/2 
1994 1 8.30 (8.30) 8.00 (8.00) 1/1 
1995 2 5.98 (5.98)  6.90 (6.90) 2/2 
1996 4 46.87 (7.79) 5.65 (4.30) 4/4 
1997 4 50.26 (50.26) 20.78 (13.65) 2/4 
1998 4 2.35 (2.35) 5.38 (5.10) 2/4 
1999 3 76.35 (76.35) 34.40 (20.30) 1/3 
2000 2 27.75 (27.75) 11.40 (11.40) 1/2 
2001 - - (-) - (-) -/- 
2002 2 - (-) 12.40 (12.40) 0/2 
2003 3 - (-) 8.87 (10.00) 0/3 
2004 7 9.88 (6.20) 21.83 (23.20) 4/7 
2005 13 60.53 (17.50) 17.89 (13.70) 11/12 
2006 30 63.28 (26.56) 12.16 (8.90) 20/27 
2007 36 76.81 (41.22) 11.88 (5.90) 14/30 
2008 16 23.32 (7.74) 23.28 (11.00) 8/16 
2009 13 191.36 (9.56) 16.53 (11.40) 7/12 
Total 144 61.13 (15.49) 14.89 (9.30) 81/133 
 
Although the sample period runs from 1990 to 2009, both SWFs and HFs did not 
show much activity in the 1990s. In fact, activity only started to pick up in recent 
years, with most of the SWF and HF investments occurring after 2005. The year that 
experienced the highest number of cross-border investments for both SWFs and HFs 
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 Not every transaction in the SDC database contains information on investment value and percentage stake acquired. 
„Observations‟ shows for how many transactions information on investment value (and percentage stake acquired, 
respectively) exists.  




was 2007. After the global financial crisis in 2007/2008, the number of transactions 
by SWFs diminished, mainly due to a slowdown in inflows from their sovereign 
governments
63
 (Balin, 2010).  HFs show a similar trend of a reduced number of 
transactions for that time period. Overall, the size of the investment is much larger for 
SWFs with a mean investment value of USD 729.15 million (median: USD 89.86 
million) vs. HFs with a mean investment value of USD 61.13 million (median: USD 
15.49 million). This is to be expected as most SWFs are much larger in size compared 
to HFs. However, judging from the mean (median) percentage acquired, both SWFs 
and HFs do not acquire majority stakes, but seem to take on minority stakes in the 




Table 4, Panel A presents the individual SWFs and shows their investment activities. 
In Panel B, the investment activities of the most active individual HFs and the 
Investor Group are displayed separately (the not so active HFs are grouped under 
„Others‟). With more than 70 HFs in the sample, the number of HFs is much larger 
than the number of SWFs. As most of the HFs in the sample only undertook one 
investment during the sample period, we only display a HF individually if it 
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 Both lower oil prices and a slowdown in global trade led to a decrease in current account surpluses of the sovereign 
governments which consequently led to a slowdown in inflows for the SWFs. Other reasons that Balin (2010) highlights 
were fiscal stimulus measures in Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states that constrained the inflows into funds as well as 
central banks re-evaluating and increasing their reserve targets (which led to a larger proportion of foreign exchange 
inflows being held as traditional reserves assets and not being allocated to SWFs).     
64
 Brav et al. (2008) come to a similar conclusion for activist HFs in their analysis of 13D filings during 2001 and 2006. 
They report a median ownership stake of 9.1 percent for their entire sample and conclude that HFs do not typically seek 
control in target companies. Furthermore, they report that HFs typically prefer to invest in smaller stocks in order to be 
able to gain a sizeable stake. 
65
 Approximately 21 percent of the HF investments in the sample are conducted by „Investor Groups‟. These are groups 
of two or more institutional investors, whereby at least one hedge fund is involved.    




Table 4: Investment activities  
This Table lists the investment activities of SWFs and HFs. The investment activities of the most active HFs and the 
Investor Group are displayed separately, all other HFs are summarized under „Others‟. The Table shows in how many 
countries they invest as well as the mean (median) investment value and mean (median) percentage stake acquired. 
„Obs.‟ shows the number of investments for which data on investment value and percentage stake acquired are available. 
 
Panel A. Investments by individual SWFs 
 












Australia Future Fund Management Agency 1 1 - (-) 8.70 (8.70) 0/1 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 2 2 77.56 (77.56) 13.40 (13.40) 2/1 
China China Investment Corporation (CIC) 19 7 1,195.97 (717.91) 28.26 (19.00) 11/15 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary Authority 1 1 4,688.88 (4,688.88) 8.90 (8.90) 1/1 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) 1 1 2,000 (2,000) - (-) 1/0 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 5 3 160.95 (172.64)  19.15 (19.30) 3/5 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Bhd 6 3 187.52 (186.15) 17.10 (13.20) 5/5 
Oman Oman Investment Fund 2 2 39.86 (39.86) 15.70 (15.70) 2/2 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority  10 6 4,226.32 (3,379.62) 17.13 (18.50) 4/8 
Singapore GIC 48 14 534.71 (37.46) 16.56 (10.30) 38/41 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 74 21 505.51 (86.93) 26.33 (14.80) 50/67 
South Korea Korea Investment Corporation  1 1 2,000 (2,000) 8.50 (8.50) 1/1 
UAE–Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 12 7 1,007.56 (65.15) 6.57 (4.45) 9/12 
UAE–Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment Co.  7 5 1,564.50 (935.71) 19.73 (19.20) 4/6 
UAE–Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company 5 4 211.66 (107.77) 13.06 (14.50) 4/5 
UAE-Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai
66
 5 3 829.53 (829.53) 64.00 (64.00) 2/2 
UAE–Dubai Dubai World (Istithmar) 6 5 104.50 (36.04) 36.04 (12.80) 4/4 
UAE-RAK Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority 1 1 5.82 (5.82) 8.30 (8.30) 1/1 
 
Panel B. Investments by most active HFs and Investor Group 
 





Mean (Median)  






Isle of Man Laxey Partners Ltd 7 5 28.65 (25.20) 10.23 (6.7) 3/7 
Bermuda Everest Capital Ltd 4 2 11.95 (7.90) 10.63 (10.15) 4/4 
U.K. RAB Capital PLC 4 2 12.70 (12.70) 20.00 (20.00) 1/1 
U.S. Pardus Capital Management LP 4 1 - (-) 7.50 (6.00) 0/4 
Cyprus Clearwater Capital Partners Ltd 3 1 3.27 (3.27) 14.13 (14.50) 2/3 
U.K. Centaurus Capital Ltd 3 3 - (-) 5.20 (5.10) 0/3 
U.K. Children‟s Investment Fund Mgmt 3 2 107.17 (107.17) 15.70 (8.30) 2/3 
U.S. Alpine Associated LP 3 3 12.54 (2.31) 2.83 (2.90) 3/3 
U.S. Evolution Master Fund Ltd SPC 3 2 8,12 (7.20) 11.07 (7.70) 3/3 
U.S. Farallon Capital Management LLC 3 2 22.91 (22.91) 23.90 (33.00) 2/3 
U.S. Och-Ziff Capital Management LLC 3 2 - (-) 41.97 (14.40) 0/3 
U.S. Soros Fund Management LLC 3 2 5.30 (5.30) 5.30 (5.00) 1/3 
Diverse Investor Group 31 16 102.53 (54.25) 19.08 (12.60) 24/28 
Diverse Others 70 27 58.10 (10.06) 14.17 (8.90) 36/65 
 
As shown in Panel A of Table 4, there are 18 SWFs in the sample. The five most 
active SWFs in terms of number of investments are Temasek Holdings, the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), the China Investment 
Corporation (CIC), the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and the Qatar 
Investment Authority. These five SWFs account for almost 79 percent of the total 
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 The investments were undertaken by Dubai International Capital and Dubai International Financial Center. They both 
belong to the Investment Corporation of Dubai.  




number of investments in the sample. At the country level, Singapore and the UAE 
are most active, with a total of 122 investments (59 percent of the total number of 
investments) and 36 investments (17 percent), respectively. The sizes of the 
investments vary substantially, ranging from USD 5.8 million to USD 4.69 billion.  
Panel B of Table 4 shows the investments conducted by individual HFs. Like SWFs, 
HFs also have a great variation in the size of their investments, ranging from USD 3.2 
million to USD 107.2 million. Most of the HFs are based in the U.S. (59 percent of 
the sample), the U.K. (19.4 percent) and Offshore Financial Centers
67
 (14.5 percent).  
 
Table 5 provides an overview of the investment activities of SWFs and HFs sorted by 
target country. Both SWFs and HFs invest in a variety of countries, however, their 
focus is different. Most SWFs in our sample are based in Asia or the Middle East, 
and, correspondingly, almost 50 percent of the number of their investments are in the 
Asian region. A further one third of the number of their investments is in Anglo-
Saxon countries
68
. Investments in Continental Europe, Africa and Latin America only 
account for a small fraction. The HFs, on the other hand, are mainly located in the 
U.S. and the U.K.. Almost 30 percent of the number of their investments are in 
Continental Europe. Anglo-Saxon countries account for almost 33 percent of the total 
number of investments. Investments in Asia amount to around 34 percent of the 
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 For the purpose of this analysis, the following countries are counted as Offshore Financial Centers: Bahamas, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman, and Isle of Man. 
68
 The following countries are counted as Anglo-Saxon countries for the purpose of this analysis: United States (U.S.), 
United Kingdom (U.K.), Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Ireland. 




Table 5: Target countries  
This Table lists the sample of 207 cross-border SWF investments and 144 cross-border HF investments in publicly traded 
companies between 1990 and 2009. It shows which countries the target companies are from as well as the mean (median) 
investment value and the mean (median) percentage stake acquired. „Observations‟ shows the number of investments for 
which data on investment value and percentage stake acquired are available.  
Panel A. Target countries of SWF investments  




Mean (Median) Investment Value 
(in $ million) 
Mean (Median) percentage 
stake acquired 
Observations 
Algeria 1 - (-) 20.00 (20.00) 0/1 
Argentina 1 347.64 (347.64) 100.00 (100.00) 1/1 
Australia 20 621.42 (38.93) 34.34 (15.80) 16/17 
Austria 2 93.68 (93.68) 9.45 (9.45) 2/2 
Bahamas 1 333.41 (333.41) 15.70 (15.70) 1/1 
Bermuda 1 36.13 (36.13) 3.30 (3.30) 1/1 
Brazil 1 - (-) 80.00 (80.00) 0/1 
Canada 2 999.13 (999.13) 21.20 (21.20) 2/2 
China 6 51.68 (55.93) 24.72 (29.10) 4/5 
Egypt 2 - (-) 7.80 (7.80) 0/2 
Finland 1 191.84 (191.84) 40.00 (40.00) 1/1 
France 2 - (-) 22.70 (22.70) 0/1 
Germany 5 9,569.48 (9,569.48) 15.73 (13.50) 3/4 
Hong Kong 21 502.33 (142.60) 13.12 (10.00) 18/21 
India 24 74.40 (48.90) 12.35 (8.40) 16/22 
Indonesia 6 177.37 (235.80) 27.60 (25.65) 3/4 
Italy 5 47.41 (47.41) 12.10 (5.00) 2/3 
Japan 4 397.33 (405.07) 13.95 (15.00) 3/4 
Luxembourg 1 - (-) 20.00 (20.00) 1/1 
Malaysia 12 216.05 (47.36) 26.63 (15.40) 7/11 
Monaco 1 576.54 (576.54) 28.10 (28.10) 1/1 
Netherlands 3 8.79 (8.79) 12.85 (12.85) 1/2 
New Zealand 2 104.10 (104.10) 12.50 (12.50) 2/2 
Pakistan 1 339.11 (339.11) 63.40 (63.40) 1/1 
Philippines 3 121.00 (118.43) 5.50 (5.00) 3/3 
Singapore 3 234.70 (234.70) 18.90 (18.90) 2/2 
South Korea 3 79.74 (15.42) 13.60 (12.00) 3/3 
Spain 2 4,371.85 (4,371.85) 22.75 (22.75) 1/2 
Sweden 1 11.05 (11.05) 100.00 (100.00) 1/1 
Switzerland 3 5,048.79 (5,948.79) 16.50 (16.50) 2/2 
Taiwan 5 182.86 (123.60) 21.33 (20.00) 3/4 
Thailand 13 237.62 (31.86) 23.02 (17.00) 10/9 
U.K. 23 1,093.53 (305.90) 23.48 (11.60) 15/19 
U.S. 24 1,650.05 (125.00) 13.97 (8.80) 19/21 
Vietnam 2 38.00 (28.00) - (-) 1/0 
Total 207    
 
Panel B. Target countries of HF investments 




Mean (Median) Investment Value 
(in $ million) 
Mean (Median) percentage 
stake acquired 
Observations 
Argentina 1 - (-) 4.40 (4.40) 0/1 
Australia 8 2.21 (0.80) 9.90 (9.10) 7/8 
Bermuda 1 3.96 (3.96) 5.20 (5.20) 1/1 
British Virgin 1 10.72 (10.72) 13.50 (13.50) 1/1 
Canada 17 27.72 (3.01) 13.26 (8.35) 8/14 
Cayman 1 12.01 (12.01) 22.60 (22.60) 1/1 
China 2 132.51 (132.51) 24.40 (24.40) 1/2 
Cyprus 2 62.61 (62.61) 17.50 (17.50) 2/2 
Denmark 2 - (-) 9.45 (9.45) 0/2 
Dominican Republic 1 27.75 (27.75) 15.50 (15.50) 1/1 
France 11 10.27 (10.27) 11.99 (7.00) 1/11 
Germany 7 340.92 (340.92) 15.13 (11.40) 1/6 
Hong Kong 12 34.75 (17.33)  8.06 (6.65) 12/12 
India 13 73.00 (30.00) 18.63 (13.90) 11/12 
Isle of Man 1 22.29 (22.29) 38.10 (38.10) 1/1 
Israel 2 2.45 (2.45) 8.65 (8.65) 1/2 
Japan 10 35.04 (17.45) 19.41 (6.55) 8/10 
Malaysia 1 11.20 (11.20) 9.10 (9.10) 1/1 
Netherlands 6 503.16 (503.16) 22.62 (9.50) 1/6 
New Zealand 1 12.28 (12.28) 6.00 (6.00) 1/1 
Philippines 1 - (-) 17.10 (17.10) 0/1 
Russia 3 - (-) 14.00 (17.00) 0/3 
Singapore 4 84.75 (72.47) 20.03 (24.70) 4/3 
South Africa 1 1,277.10 (1,277.10) 11.30 (11.30) 1/1 
South Korea 2 10.42 (10.42) 12.45 (12.45) 2/2 
Sweden 1 - (-) 8.40 (8.40) 0/1 
Switzerland 7 59.51 (59.51) 7.27 (5.80) 1/7 
Thailand 3 73.00 (73.00) 44.17 (50.00) 2/3 
Turkey 1 - (-)  5.00 (5.00) 0/1 
U.K 12 36.48 (9.56) 20.17 (9.55) 5/10 
U.S. 9 9.26 (5.25) 8.97 (9.25) 6/6 
Total 144    




Table 6 show the SWF and HF investments sorted by different industries
69
. A large 
number of SWF investments (24 percent of the total number) and HF investments (17 
percent of the total number) are in financial companies. Other popular sectors of 
SWFs and HFs include real estate, oil and petroleum products, construction and 
construction materials, machinery and business equipment, as well as automobiles. 
Another large industry in the SWF sample is transportation. 
Table 6: Target industries  
This Table lists the sample of 207 cross-border SWF investments and 144 cross-border HF investments in publicly traded 
companies between 1990 and 2009. It shows which industries the target companies belong to as well as the mean 
(median) investment value and the mean (median) percentage stake acquired. „Obs.‟ shows the number of investments 
for which data on investment value and percentage stake acquired are available.  
 
Panel A. Target industries of SWF investments 
 









Automobiles 9 1,947.72(36.99) 7.93(5.00) 5/9 
Chemicals 2 0.069 (0.069) 19.80(19.80) 1/1 
Consumer Durables 2 273.29(273.29) 7.25(7.25) 2/2 
Construction  and Construction Materials 10 101.86(122.59) 18.09(14.40) 6/10 
Drugs, Soap, Perfums, Tobacco 2 98.06(98.06) 20.20(20.20) 1/2 
Financials 49 1,855.65 (304.39) 20.18 (10.00) 30/39 
Food 5 299.15 (29.00) 10.30 (9.20) 3/3 
Machinery and Business Equipment 9 132.37(23.48) 20.70(10.50) 8/8 
Mining and Minerals 5 668.03 (500.00) 14.92 (15.80) 3/5 
Oil and Petroleum Products 9 920.51 (115.25) 15.91(17.60) 7/7 
Real Estate  22 210.59(55.53) 22.28(20.00) 16/17 
Retail Stores 2 -(-) 18.35(18.35) 0/2 
Transportation 17 613.12(106.80) 20.65(20.00) 10/14 
Textiles, Apparel and Footware 3 27.06(27.06) 20.55(20.55) 1/2 
Utilities 6 1,981.73(571.00) 43.95(30.00) 5/4 
Others 53 160.15 (45.13) 24.74 (12.00) 44/51 
Unclassified 2 717.91(717.91) 20.10(20.10) 1/1 
Total 207    
 
Panel B. Target industries of HF investments 
 









Automobiles 5 30.11(8.17) 9.76(10.00) 3/5 
Chemicals 1 -(-) 5.10(5.10) 0/1 
Consumer Durables 3 2.31 (2.31) 5.17 (5.60) 1/3 
Construction and Construction Materials 6 9.81 (2.58) 13.42 (7.00) 4/5 
Drugs, Soap, Perfums, Tobacco 8 5.19(3.96) 7.59(5.20) 5/7 
Financials 24 40.60 (25.22) 17.80 (16.00) 15/23 
Machinery and Business Equipment 8 64.59(59.51) 19.66(5.05) 3/8 
Mining and Minerals 9 213.76(1.24) 15.23(10.30) 6/8 
Oil and Petroleum Products 7 38.04 (20.94) 9.14 (7.30) 4/5 
Real Estate 8 53.77(46.73) 24.54(14.10) 8/8 
Retail Stores 13 154.14 (125.21) 13.03 (8.20) 5/12 
Steel Works 2 30.87(30.87) 23.85 (23.85) 1/2 
Textiles, Apparel and Footware 3 46.41 (40.25) 5.43 (5.90) 3/3 
Transportation 4 14.99(14.99) 13.58(9.40) 2/4 
Utilities 3 7.20 (7.20) 9.30 (5.50) 1/3 
Others 39 61.47 (12.49) 15.49 (9.40) 20/35 
Unclassified 1 -(-) 15.00(15.00) 0/1 
Total 144    
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more detail in Section 3.4 and in the appendix).  




5.3 Announcement Period Abnormal Return  
This section analyzes the short-term abnormal returns for the 3-day window [-1, +1]. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the target companies are calculated using 
the local market index return model as described in Section 4.3. Figures 1 and 2 show 
the histograms for the frequency distributions of the CARs for SWF investments and 
HF investments
70
, respectively. As displayed in the histograms, the CARs of the HF 
sample are more widely dispersed than the CARs of the SWF sample.  
Figures 1 and 2: Frequency distribution of CARs for the [-1, +1] announcement window 
Figures 1 and 2 show the frequency distribution of CARs for the sample of cross-border SWF investments (207 
observations) and the sample of cross-border HF investments (144 observations) during the time period from 1990 to 
2009. The CARs are calculated for the 3-day announcement window [-1, +1] by using a local market index return model 
that was estimated by using daily stock and local market index returns over the period of 1 year prior to the 
announcement date [-365, -2].   
 

















































Summary statistics of the CARs for the SWF and HF investments are presented in 
Table 7. Results are presented for the full sample, as well as for the subsamples. For 
SWFs, the subsamples are „Direct‟ vs „Subsidiary‟ and „Direct Acquirer‟ vs „Indirect 
Acquirer‟.  For HFs, the subsamples are „Direct‟ vs „Subsidiary‟ and „Investor Group‟ 
vs „Excluding Investor Group‟. In order to test whether outliers affect the results, the 
full sample was also winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent level. As results do 
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 For the HF sample, a few observations do not show any stock price movement during the 3-day period and result in a 
3-day return of 0. These are often penny stocks that do not trade very frequently.  








Table 7: CARs for the [-1, +1] announcement window   
Panels A and B show the CARs for the full sample of cross-border SWF investments (207 observations) and for the full sample 
of cross-border HF investments (144 observations) during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The CARs are calculated for the 3-
day announcement window [-1, +1] by using a local market index return model that was estimated by using daily stock and local 
market index returns over the period of 1 year prior to the announcement date [-365, -2].  „Direct‟ investments are transactions in 
which the target company is a publicly traded company. „Subsidiary‟ investments are transactions in which the target company is 
not publicly traded, but either the immediate or ultimate parent of the target company is publicly traded. „Direct Acquirer‟ shows 
all transactions in which the SWF is the direct acquirer. „Indirect Acquirer‟ shows all transactions in which the SWF is shown as 
either the immediate or ultimate parent of the acquirer. „Excl. Investor Group‟ shows all transactions where the acquirer is not 
presented as an „Investor Group‟. „Investor Group‟ shows all transactions where the acquirer is presented as an „Investor Group‟. 
The t-statistic tests whether the mean equals zero. „Sign test‟ shows the results of the Sign test with p-values included in 
brackets. The Sign test is a non-parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. „W. signed rank test‟ 
shows the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test with p-values included in brackets. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is a non-
parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. The difference between the Sign test and the Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank test is that the Sign test does not require the assumption that the distribution is symmetric. „Positive (Negative) 
CAR‟ is the total number of observations that have a positive (negative) CAR. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Panel C shows the results of the independent samples t-test and the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test that show whether there is a significant difference between the 3-day CARs of SWF and HF 
investments. The independent samples t-test determines whether the mean of the two samples is significantly different. For the 
independent samples t-test, t-statistics and p-value are displayed. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the non-parametric 
equivalent of the independent samples t-test and determines whether the median of the two samples is significantly different. For 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, z-value and p-value are displayed.  
 
Panel A. Announcement window [-1, +1] CARs for the sample of cross-border SWF investments  
 
 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 207 165 42 118 89 
Mean 1.59% 1.18% 3.16% 1.17% 2.13% 
t-statistic 3.09*** 2.34** 2.03** 1.61* 3.05*** 
Standard Deviation 7.38% 6.51% 10.06% 7.93% 6.60% 
Median 1.39% 1.43% 0.92% 0.87% 1.97% 




















Positive (Negative) CAR 127 (80) 100 (65) 27 (15) 64 (54) 63 (26) 
 
Panel B. Announcement window [-1, +1] CARs for the sample of cross-border HF investments 
 
 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 144 130 14 113 31 
Mean 2.89% 3.38% -1.68% 2.57% 4.06% 
t-statistic 3.44*** 3.90*** -0.58 2.58** 2.87*** 
Standard Deviation 10.07% 9.89% 10.91% 10.59% 7.89% 
Median 0.54% 0.62% -1.51% 0.36% 1.58% 




















Positive (Negative) CAR 78 (66) 73 (57) 5 (9) 58 (55) 20 (11) 
 
Panel C. Test results for difference tests between 3-day CARs of SWF and HF investments 
 
Test No. of observations t-statistics z-value p-value 
Independent samples t-test 351 1.40  0.1623 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 351  0.2465 0.8053 
                                                 
71 For reference, the 3-day CAR results after winsorizing at the 1 percent and 99 percent level are as follows: 
 
SWF sample Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 204 163 41 116 88 
Mean 1.59% 1.46% 2.11% 0.99% 2.37% 
t-statistic 3.57*** 3.08*** 1.80* 1.68* 3.56*** 
Median 1.39% 1.50% 0.71% 0.87% 1.99% 
Sign test (p-value) 0.0010*** 0.0047*** 0.1173 0.4035 <0.0001*** 
W. signed rank test (p-value) 0.0003*** 0.0015*** 0.0744* 0.1194 0.0001*** 
HF sample Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 142 129 13 111 31 
Mean 2.75% 2.96% 0.70% 2.39% 4.06% 
t-statistic 3.86*** 3.87*** 0.39 2.90*** 2.87*** 
Median 0.54% 0.61% -1.28% 0.36% 1.58% 
Sign test (p-value) 0.3560 0.2176 0.5811 0.8496  0.1496 
W. signed rank test (p-value) 0.0042*** 0.0021*** 0.7869 0.0670* 0.0085*** 
 




The results show that both HF investments and SWF investments achieve positive 
abnormal returns during the 3-day announcement window [-1, +1]. For the SWF 
investments, the mean and median of the full sample (1.59 percent and 1.39 percent, 
respectively) are statistically significant at the 1 percent level which supports 
Hypothesis I. On average, the market responds positively to announcements of SWF 
investments. This result is similar to Dewenter et al. (2010) who report a mean CAR 
for the 3-day [-1, +1] event window of 1.52 percent
72
. Bortolotti et al. (2009) report a 
mean CAR for the 3-day [-1, +1] event window of 2.91 percent (median: 0.37 
percent). Kotter & Lel (2010) examine cross-border SWF investments and report an 
average 3-day CAR [-1, +1] of 1.78 percent.   
For the HF investments, the mean CAR (2.89 percent) is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level under the t-statistics. The median CAR (0.54 percent) is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level under the Wilcoxon signed rank test
73
. This supports 




In the next step, it is tested whether the CARs of the HF sample are significantly 
higher than the CARs of the SWF sample.  The wider dispersion of the CARs in the 
HF sample as highlighted in Figure 2 is manifested in a higher standard deviation 
(10.07 percent for HFs vs 7.38 percent for SWFs). We note that the number of 
transactions with positive CARs to the number of transactions with negative CARs is 
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 Although the analysis conducted by Dewenter et al. (2010) looks at stock price reactions for investments both in the 
home country and abroad, they mention that stock price reactions for investments in foreign targets differ insignificantly 
from investments in the home country in their sample.     
73
 In the HF sample are a few observations that do not show frequent stock price movements (often penny stocks) and 
consequently show a result of 0 in the calculation of the 3-day return. If these stocks are excluded from the sample, the 
sample size reduces to 131 observations and the mean (median) of the sample increase to 3.23 percent (1.18 percent) 
with a t-statistics of 3.52, indicating significance at the 1 percent level. The Sign test shows a p-value of 0.0802 and the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test shows a p-value of 0.017, indicating significance as well. 
74
 Reasons for positive abnormal announcement returns can be the expectation of active monitoring or the reduction of 
agency costs (for details, see: Mietzner et al. (2008)). 




127/80 for the SWF sample and 78/66 for the HF sample. Both the independent 
sample t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are conducted in order to test 
Hypothesis III. The results are shown in Table 7, Panel C. The announcement period 
abnormal returns for HF investments are on average not higher than for SWF 
investments which leads us to reject Hypothesis III.   
In the next step, we look at the first subsample of SWF investments, „Direct‟ vs 
„Subsidiary‟. Dewenter et al. (2010) report higher average abnormal returns for the 
direct investments in their clean sample. They conclude that the impact of direct 
investments should be greater than the impact of subsidiary investments because the 
effects of subsidiary investments are indirect and weaker. However, in our analysis 




Next, results for the subsamples „Direct Acquirer‟ and „Indirect Acquirer‟ are 
examined. As discussed, if the SWF is not the direct acquirer, it is difficult to 
determine how much influence the SWF has on the investment decision. It is 
expected that the SWF has less influence on the investment choice when it is the 
indirect acquirer (immediate or ultimate parent of the acquirer). As some of the 
transactions where a SWF is the indirect acquirer could be strategic acquisitions 
between two companies rather than investment choices of the SWF
76
, the 
announcement period CARs for those transactions should be similar to announcement 
period CARs of corporate-led cross-border acquisitions. Karolyi and Liao (2010) 
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 Both independent samples t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the full sample and the winsorized sample are 
conducted to see whether the 3-day CARs of the subsamples „Direct‟ and „Subsidiary‟ are significantly different. 
However, the resulting p-values are insignificant. 
76
 Another example should illustrate this: On 19 November 2007 it was announced that Bank of China Hong Kong 
(Holdings) Ltd. would acquire a stake in Bank of East Asia Ltd. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) is listed as the 
acquirer immediate parent. However, such a transaction could be a strategic acquisition among financial companies, and 
not an investment choice of the SWF.  




report that reactions to announcements of corporate-led cross-border acquisitions and 
reactions to announcements by non-SWF government-controlled acquirers are larger 
than reactions to SWF investment announcements
77
. The tests we conducted show 
that the median abnormal returns are larger and statistically significant when the 
SWFs are indirect acquirers, which is in line with their findings
78
.  
For the HF sample, we also analyze whether the 3-day CAR returns are significantly 
different for the subsamples „Direct‟ and „Subsidiary‟. The results do not show a 
significant difference, but we need to highlight that the sample size for subsidiary 
investments is very small (only 14 observations) which makes it more difficult to 
obtain reliable test results.  
In addition, we analyze whether there exist differences when the HF is the only 
acquirer versus when it is part of an „investor group‟. We expect the announcement 
period abnormal return by Investor Groups to be higher than those by individual HFs 
if Investor Groups are considered as „activists‟ by the market. However, there is no 
significant difference in our sample.  
An analysis was conducted by adding a global market index
79
 to the local regression 
model as described in section 4.3. The results obtained are very similar to the results 
obtained when only a local market index is used as the benchmark, indicating that the 
return model including only a local market index is already a good fit
80
.  
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 Karolyi and Liao (2010) calculate cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs) to announcements of cross-border 
acquisitions led by SWFs, other non-SWF government-controlled acquirers and corporate acquirers. For SWFs, they 
report mean [-1, +1] CMARs of 1.52 percent (median: 0.85 percent). For non-SWF government-controlled acquirers, 
they report mean [-1, +1] CMARs of 6.10 percent (median: 1.09 percent). Comparing corporate acquirers to government 
acquirers, they report a mean (median) [-1, +1] CMAR of 15.76 percent (5.79 percent) vs 11.56 percent (2.09 percent) 
for majority stakes, and 5.34 percent (1.41 percent) vs 6.02 percent (1.00 percent) for minority stakes. 
78
 The p-values for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are significant at the 10 percent level under both the full sample 
and the winsorized sample. 
79
 For the purpose of the analysis, the MSCI World Index was used to represent the global market index. 
80
 The results for the extended return model are available upon request. 




5.4 Long-Run Abnormal Returns  
In this section, we examine 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, and 5-year abnormal 
returns of the target companies by using the method in Dewenter et al. (2010). We 
calculate the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs) as the sum of market-
adjusted returns (MARs) over the period under consideration (as described in Section 
4.4).  First, the CMARs for the pre-event period [-365, -2] are presented in Table 8. 
The mean (median) value for the SWF sample is 16.01 percent (7.54 percent)
81
, the 
mean (median) value for the HF sample is 26.74 percent (8.66 percent). As results do 




The results show that both SWFs and HFs tend to focus on „outperformers‟ - 
companies that have shown a positive abnormal return relative to their local 
benchmarks in the year prior to the investment. Results are significant for both 
samples. Bernstein et al. (2009) analyze the private equity investment strategies of 
SWFs and report that SWFs tend to „trend chase‟ in that they tend to invest in 
companies which display high equity values already because of their outperformance 
in the prior year. Our results are consistent with this finding. In fact, the HFs also 
seem to engage in „trend chasing‟. These results hold for all subsamples as well, 
though not all of them are statistically significant.  
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 For comparison, Dewenter et al. (2010) report an average CMAR over the period [-250, -2] of 13.1 percent for their 
SWF sample.  
82
 Winsorizing the sample at the 1 percent and 99 percent level reduces the SWF sample size to 195, with a mean result 
of 15.99 percent (t-statistic: 3.57***) and a median result of 7.79 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.0314**, p-value W. signed 
rank test: 0.0030***). The HF sample reduces to 132 observations, with a mean result of 27.83 percent (t-statistic: 
2.94***) and a median result of 9.03 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.0978*, p-value W. signed rank test: 0.0136**) 




Table 8: CMARs for the pre-announcement window [-365, -2]  
This Table shows the CMARs for the full sample of cross-border SWF investments (198 observations) and for the full 
sample of cross-border HF investments (134 observations) during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The CMARs for 
the pre-announcement window [-365, -2] are obtained by calculating the market-adjusted returns (MARs) every day over 
the period and summing them up. Local market indices are used as benchmark in order to calculate the MARs. „Direct‟ 
investments are transactions in which the target company is a publicly traded company. „Subsidiary‟ investments are 
transactions in which the target company is not publicly traded, but either the immediate or ultimate parent of the target 
company is publicly traded. „Direct Acquirer‟ shows all transactions in which the SWF is the direct acquirer. „Indirect 
Acquirer‟ shows all transactions in which the SWF is shown as either the immediate or ultimate parent of the acquirer. 
„Excl. Investor Group‟ shows all transactions where the acquirer is not presented as an „Investor Group‟. „Investor 
Group‟ shows all transactions where the acquirer is presented as an „Investor Group‟. The t-statistic tests whether the 
mean equals zero. „Sign test‟ shows the results of the Sign test with p-values included in brackets. The Sign test is a non-
parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. „W. signed rank test‟ shows the results of the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test with p-values included in brackets. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is a non-parametric test of 
significance that tests whether the median equals zero. The difference between the Sign test and the Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test is that the Sign test does not require the assumption that the distribution is symmetric. „Positive (Negative) 
CMAR‟ is the total number of observations that have a positive (negative) CMAR. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. CMARs for the pre-announcement window [-365, -2] for the sample of cross-border SWF investments  
 
 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 198 158 40 113 85 
Mean 16.01% 19.01% 4.13% 13.21% 19.72% 
t-statistic 3.61*** 3.79*** 0.45 2.39*** 2.71*** 
Standard Deviation 62.36% 63.09% 58.65% 58.69% 67.11% 
Median 7.54% 10.59% 3.24% 7.28% 11.21% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 114 (84) 92 (66) 22 (18) 63 (51) 52 (33) 
 
 
Panel B. CMARs for the pre-announcement window [-365, -2] for the sample of cross-border HF investments  
 
 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 134 122 12 103 31 
Mean 26.74% 26.60% 28.16% 20.60% 47.14% 
t-statistic 2.85*** 2.66*** 1.13 1.88* 2.68*** 
Standard Deviation 108.44% 110.65% 86.52% 111.14% 97.84% 
Median 8.66% 7.24% 26.54% 5.27% 22.50% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 76 (58) 69 (53) 7 (5) 57 (47) 19 (12) 
 
 
For illustration purposes, Figures 3 and 4 show the frequency distributions of the 




















Figures 3 and 4: Frequency distribution of CMARs for the [-365, -2] pre-announcement window  
Figures 3 and 4 show the frequency distribution of pre-announcement window CMARs for the sample of cross-border 
SWF investments (198 observations) and for the sample of cross-border HF investments (134 observations) during the 
time period from 1990 to 2009. The CMARs for the pre-announcement window [-365, -2] are obtained by calculating the 
market-adjusted returns (MARs) every day over the period and summing them up. Local market indices are used as 
benchmark in order to calculate the MARs.  
 















































Similar to the 3-day CAR histograms, we observe a much wider dispersion of the pre-
announcement CMARs for the HF sample which is displayed in a higher standard 
deviation (108.44 percent vs 62.36 percent for the SWF sample).   
Next, the CMARs for the post-announcement windows 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 
years and 5 years are calculated. These are shown in Table 9. Panel A reports the 
results for the SWF sample and Panel B reports the results for the HF sample. As 
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 For reference, winsorizing the SWF sample at the 1 percent and 99 percent level reduces the sample size to 199 for the 6-month period, 
with a mean result of -5.96 percent (t-statistic: -2.51**) and a median result of -3.36 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.0650*, p-value W. 
signed rank test: 0.0171**). For the 1-year period, sample size is 189, mean result is -7.72 percent (t-stat.: -2.10**) and median result is -
4.11 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.2444, p-value W. signed rank test: 0.0835*). For the 2-year period, sample size is 170, mean result is -
6.37 percent (t-stat.: -1.31) and median result is -2.82 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.4901, p-value W. signed rank test: 0.3688). For the 3-
year period, sample size is 142, mean result is -0.88 percent (t-stat.: -0.15) and median result is 3.57 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.6749, p-
value W. signed rank test: 0.9362). For the 5-year period, sample size is 94, mean result is 25.60 percent (t-stat.: 2.71***) and median 
result is 9.35 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.2564, p-value W. signed rank test: 0.0201**). For the HF sample, sample size reduces to 136 
for the 6-month period, with a mean result of -3.27 percent (t-stat.: -0.89) and a median result of -2.58 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.3456, 
p-value W. signed rank test: 0.1840). For the 1-year period, sample size is 129, mean result is -7.33 percent (t-stat.: -0.99) and median 
result is -6.26 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.0523*, p-value W. signed rank test: 0.0629*). For the 2-year period, sample size is 116, mean 
result is -19.73 percent (t-stat.: 1.69*) and median result is -6.94 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.4035, p-value W. signed rank test: 0.8998). 
For the 3-year period, sample size is 96, mean result is 47.52 percent (t-stat.: 2.32**) and median result is 11.35 percent (p-value Sign 
test: 0.9188, p-value W. signed rank test: 0.1149). For the 5-year period, sample size is 37, mean result is 115.56 percent (t-stat.: 
3.42***) and median result is 63.20 percent (p-value Sign test: 0.0016***, p-value W. signed rank test: 0.0076***). 




Table 9: CMARs for the post-announcement windows  
This Table shows the post-announcement window CMARs for the full sample of cross-border SWF investments and for the full 
sample of cross-border HF investments during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The CMARs for the post-announcement 
windows are obtained by calculating the market-adjusted returns (MARs) every day over the period and summing them up. 
Local market indices are used as benchmark in order to calculate the MARs. „Direct‟ investments are transactions in which the 
target company is a publicly traded company. „Subsidiary‟ investments are transactions in which the target company is not 
publicly traded, but either the immediate or ultimate parent of the target company is publicly traded. „Direct Acquirer‟ shows all 
transactions in which the SWF is the direct acquirer. „Indirect Acquirer‟ shows all transactions in which the SWF is shown as 
either the immediate or ultimate parent of the acquirer. „Excl. Investor Group‟ shows all transactions where the acquirer is not 
presented as an „Investor Group‟. „Investor Group‟ shows all transactions where the acquirer is presented as an „Investor Group‟. 
The t-statistic tests whether the mean equals zero. „Sign test‟ shows the results of the Sign test with p-values included in 
brackets. The Sign test is a non-parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. „W. signed rank test‟ 
shows the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test with p-values included in brackets. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is a non-
parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. The difference between the Sign test and the Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank test is that the Sign test does not require the assumption that the distribution is symmetric. „Positive (Negative) 
CMAR‟ is the total number of observations that have a positive (negative) CMAR. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. CMARs for the post-announcement windows for the sample of cross-border SWF investments  
 
Window [+2, +182] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 202 160 42 118 84 
Mean -6.36% -7.72% -1.21% -7.46% -4.82% 
t-statistic -2.68*** -2.73*** -0.33 -2.40** -1.31 
Standard Deviation 33.68% 35.79% 23.67% 33.76% 33.72% 
Median -3.74% -5.35% -0.68% -4.75% -3.24% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 86 (116) 66 (94) 20 (20) 53 (65) 33 (51) 
Window [+2, +365] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 191 152 39 110 81 
Mean -7.50% -9.38% -0.17% -9.44% -4.87% 
t-statistic -2.06** -2.23** -0.02 -2.13** -0.79 
Standard Deviation 50.31% 51.97% 43.08% 46.50% 55.26% 
Median -4.11% -5.48% -3.27% -5.06% -3.27% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 87 (104) 69 (83) 18 (21) 50 (60) 37 (41) 
Window [+2, +730] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 172 136 36 98 74 
Mean -5.44% -7.87% 3.71% -9.12% -0.57% 
t-statistic -1.11 -1.39 0.39 -1.46 -0.07 
Standard Deviation 64.42% 66.08% 57.66% 62.01% 67.59% 
Median -2.82% -3.90% 4.20% -5.21% -0.10% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 81 (91) 61 (75) 20 (16) 44 (54) 37 (37) 
Window [+2, +1095] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 144 112 32 82 62 
Mean 0.15% -3.50% 12.94% 0.61% -0.45% 
t-statistic 0.03 -0.52 1.04 0.08 -0.05 
Standard Deviation 71.34% 71.43% 70.65% 66.70% 77.62% 
Median 3.58% -1.99% 10.67% 2.28% 4.40% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 75 (69) 55 (57) 20 (12) 42 (40) 33 (29) 
Window [+2, +1825] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 95 75 20 50 45 
Mean 28.10% 21.38% 53.32% 12.50% 45.37% 
t-statistic 2.91*** 2.26** 1.83* 1.36 2.61** 
Standard Deviation 94.22% 81.86% 130.27% 65.32% 116.76% 
Median 11.20% 6.71% 23.61% 8.96% 22.08% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 54 (41) 41 (34) 13 (7) 29 (21) 25 (20) 




Panel B. CMARs for the post-announcement windows for the sample of cross-border HF investments  
 
Window [+2, +182] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 138 124 14 107 31 
Mean -2.63% -2.31% -5.45% -6.13% 9.46% 
t-statistic -0.72 -0.60 -0.43 -1.56 1.08 
Standard Deviation 43.02% 42.70% 47.39% 40.76% 48.86% 
Median -2.36% -3.08% 1.78% -5.09% 3.31% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 64 (74) 56 (68)  8 (6) 45 (62) 19 (12) 
Window [+2, +365] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 131 118 13 103 28 
Mean -6.68% -6.05% -12.45% -9.97% 5.41% 
t-statistic -0.92 -0.81 -0.42 -1.19 0.37 
Standard Deviation 83.42% 80.85% 107.80% 85.00% 77.58% 
Median -6.26% -6.49% -0.19% -11.53% -2.55% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 54 (77) 48 (70) 6 (7) 44 (59) 10 (18) 
Window [+2, +730] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 117 106 11 90 27 
Mean 20.49% 19.43% 30.74% 26.57% 0.21% 
t-statistic 1.76* 1.58 0.82 1.86* 0.013 
Standard Deviation 125.75% 126.45% 124.11% 135.69% 83.49% 
Median -6.81% -6.94% 1.02% -4.23% -9.41% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 54 (63) 48 (58) 6 (5) 44 (46) 10 (17) 
Window [+2, +1095] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 97 88 9 74 23 
Mean 48.17% 47.01% 59.45% 64.35% -3.89% 
t-statistic 2.37** 2.21** 0.82 2.52** -0.18 
Standard Deviation 199.85% 199.25% 217.67% 219.26% 105.13% 
Median 16.43% 18.10% -21.61% 21.55% -25.35% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 50 (47) 46 (42) 4 (5) 42 (32) 8 (15) 
Window [+2, +1825] Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 37 34 3 27 10 
Mean 115.56% 117.66% 91.72% 150.58% 20.97% 
t-statistic 3.42*** 3.20*** 5.07** 3.50*** 0.63 
Standard Deviation 205.78% 214.66% 31.33% 223.83% 105.03% 
Median 63.20% 63.16% 89.39% 83.51% -3.14% 




















Positive (Negative) CMAR 27 (10) 24 (10) 3 (0) 22 (5) 5 (5) 
 
The target companies of the SWF investments on average display negative CMARs in 
the 6-month and 1-year periods after the investment took place
84
. For the HF 
investments, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the target companies display zero 
mean CMARs in the 6-month and 1-year periods after the investment. HF 
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 In addition to the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs), the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the 
post-announcement periods 6-month, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years and 5 years were calculated. As results are similar to the 
CMAR results, the BHARs are not reported here, however, they are available upon request.  




investments start to display positive mean CMARs in year 2 and show positive mean 
CMARs in years 3 and 5, whereas SWF investments only start to display positive 
mean CMARs in year 5. The negative CMARs in the SWF sample in  the 6-month 
and 1-year period after the investment, followed by positive CMARs in year 5, are 
similar to findings in other papers. For example, Dewenter et al. (2010) report 
CMARs insignificantly different from zero in the year following the announcement 
date, but significantly positive CMARs for the 3-year and 5-year periods
85
. Bortolotti 
et al. (2009) also analyze the long-term abnormal returns using a local index as 
benchmark and find negative abnormal returns in the first two years after a SWF 
investment. They find that the performance is worse for investments in foreign 
targets
86
 compared to investments in targets that are located in the country in which 
the SWF is based. 
In order to determine whether Hypothesis IV holds, both the independent samples t-
test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are conducted for the 6-month CMARs, 1-
year CMARs, 2-year CMARs, 3-year CMARs, and 5-year CMARs. Results,  
displayed in Table 10, indicate that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the CMARs of SWF investments and HF investments in the year after the 
announcement. The results lead us to reject Hypothesis IV for the initial periods after 
the investment took place (6 months and 1 year). For these two periods, SWFs did 
significantly worse than the market while HFs were not able to achieve returns that 
are higher than the market returns. When looking at the 2-year, 3-year and 5-year 
CMARs, the results of the independent samples t-test indicate that the mean CMARs 
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 Both the t-statistics and the Wilcoxon signed rank test are reported. For both the 3-year and 5-year periods, the t-
statistics is statistically significant. However, the Wilcoxon signed rank test is only statistically significant for the 5-year 
period. 
86
 Bortolotti et al. (2009) obtain significant results for the explanatory variable „foreign target‟ in their cross-sectional 
regressions, but do not report long-term abnormal returns for foreign targets only. 




of the HF investments are significantly higher than the mean CMARs of the SWF 
investments, leading us to conclude that Hypothesis IV cannot be rejected. On 
average, mean CMARs of HF investments are significantly higher than the CMARs 
of SWF investments, suggesting that HF investments outperform SWF investments in 
the long-run from year 2 onwards. Other papers (for example, Bortolotti et al., 2009) 
suggest that the reason for the negative performance of SWF investments in the long-
run is that SWFs are passive investors and their lack of monitoring increases agency 
costs. HFs, on the other hand, are widely considered to be active investors of the 
companies they invest in. This could be a reason why HF investments show on 
average a significantly higher abnormal CMAR from year 2 onwards.   
Table 10: Test results for difference tests between long-run CMARs of SWF and HF investments   
This Table shows the results of the independent samples t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test that show whether 
there is a significant difference between the 6-month CMARs (1-year CMARs, 2-year CMARs, 3-year CMARs, and 5-
year CMARs, respectively) of the SWF and HF investments. The independent samples t-test determines whether the 
mean of the two samples is significantly different. For the independent samples t-test, t-statistics and p-value are 
displayed. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the non-parametric equivalent of the independent samples t-test and 
determines whether the median of the two samples is significantly different. For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, z-
value and p-value are displayed.  
 
Test No. of observations t-statistics z-value p-value 
6-month CMARs      
Independent samples t-test 340 0.90  0.3711 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 340  0.6455 0.5186 
1-year CMARs     
Independent samples t-test 322 0.11  0.9129 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 322  -0.5179 0.6045 
2-year CMARs     
Independent samples t-test 289 2.30  0.0222** 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 289  0.5284 0.5972 
3-year CMARs     
Independent samples t-test 241 2.65  0.0087*** 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 241  1.3632 0.1728 
5-year CMARs     
Independent samples t-test 132 3.35  0.0011*** 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 132  2.5585 0.0105** 
 
However, given the insignificant results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the 
medians in years 2 and 3 and small sample sizes for the 5-year period, the results 




need to be treated with caution
87
. A discussion of the subsamples is omitted here as 
most of the results are not statistically significant.  
One interesting observation is that the HF subsample „Investor Group‟ displays 
significantly higher CMARs over the 6-month period, but significantly lower CMARs 
over the long-term (3 years and 5 years) than the subsample „Excluding Investor 
Groups‟. Results are displayed in table 11. An interpretation is that the market has 
higher expectations about the activism of Investor Group than about the activism of 
an individual HF. If, however, the Investor Group does not appear to push for certain 
activities (e.g. takeover, asset sale) in the months after the investment, the market 
responds accordingly, resulting in lower CMARs in the long-run
88
.   
Table 11: Test results for difference tests between long-run CMARs of HF investments (Investor Group vs Excl. 
Investor Group)   
This Table shows the results of the independent samples t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test that show whether 
there is a significant difference between the 6-month CMARs (1-year CMARs, 2-year CMARs, 3-year CMARs, and 5-
year CMARs, respectively) of HF investments conducted by Investor Groups and individual HFs (Excl Investor Group). 
The independent samples t-test determines whether the mean of the two samples is significantly different. For the 
independent samples t-test, t-statistics and p-value are displayed. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the non-
parametric equivalent of the independent samples t-test and determines whether the median of the two samples is 
significantly different. For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, z-value and p-value are displayed.  
 
Test No. of observations t-statistics z-value p-value 
6-month CMARs      
Independent samples t-test 138 -1.79  0.0756* 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 138  1.7397 0.0819* 
1-year CMARs     
Independent samples t-test 131 -0.86  0.3890 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 131  0.6036 0.5461 
2-year CMARs     
Independent samples t-test 117 0.96  0.3415 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 117  -0.8054 -0.4206 
3-year CMARs     
Independent samples t-test 97 1.44  0.1537 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 97  -1.8448 0.0651* 
5-year CMARs     
Independent samples t-test 37 1.75  0.0890* 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 37  -2.1375 0.0326* 
 
For illustration purposes, figures 5 and 6 present the histograms of the post-
announcement CMARs for the full sample for the window [+2, +365].  
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 This study assumes that investments are held long-term as information on potential divestments of SWFs or HFs was 
not available. It also implicitly assumes that all the HFs were still in existence years after the investments. These 
assumptions, coupled with small sample sizes on a 5 year horizon, make an interpretation of the 5-year results difficult.  
88
 Greenwood & Schor (2009) report positive long-run abnormal returns for target companies of activist HFs, but only if 
the activist HF pushes for a takeover of the target company. For other activities they report that long-run abnormal 
returns of the target companies are not significantly different from zero 




Figures 5 and 6: Frequency distribution of CMARs for the [+2, +365] post-announcement window  
Figures 5 and 6 show the frequency distribution of post-announcement window CMARs for the sample of cross-border 
SWF investments (191 observations) and the sample of cross-border HF investments (131 observations) during the time 
period from 1990 to 2009. The CMARs for the post-announcement window [+2, +365] are obtained by calculating the 
market-adjusted returns (MARs) every day over the period and summing them up. Local market indices are used as 
benchmark in order to calculate the MARs.  
 














































The 1-year CMARs of the HF sample appear to be more widely dispersed than the 1-
year CMARs of the SWF sample. This is reflected by the much higher standard 
deviation of the HF sample for the 1-year window (83.42 percent vs 50.31 percent for 
the SWF sample). In contrast to the SWF sample, some of the observations in the HF 
sample display very high positive CMARs.   
 
5.5 Analysis of Investments during the crisis years 2007 and 2008  
SWFs have been in the news in recent years because of their involvement during the 
financial crisis in 2007 and 2008. During that time, they acted as „White Knights‟ and 
invested large sums in financial companies in distress. However, some of the 
investments were not profitable and led to estimated losses of between 20 to 25 
percent of their assets as of December 2008
89
. SWFs were criticized for these 
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 For more details, refer to: “Sovereign wealth funds rethink their priorities”, Global Investor Magazine, 29 December 
2008 






. In this section, we first analyze how SWF and HF investments made 
during the crisis years 2007 and 2008 performed compared to investments made 
during other times.  Hypothesis V posits investments made during crisis periods 
inspire confidence in investors and will thus be accompanied by higher 
announcement period abnormal returns than other investments. Table 12 displays the 
results for the 3-day CARs for both SWF and HF investments made during the crisis 
years 2007 and 2008. The 3-day CARs excluding the crisis years 2007 and 2008 are 
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 Balin (2010) states that following large losses in their portfolios due to investments in firms like Merrill Lynch during 
the global financial crisis, SWFs came increasingly under pressure from their governments. In a response, they have 
moved away from investments in those firms hit by the crisis.      




Table 12: CARs for the [-1, +1] announcement window (crisis years 2007 and 2008 separately) 
Panels A and B show the CARs for the full sample of cross-border SWF investments (207 observations) and for the full sample of cross-
border HF investments during the time period 2007 and 2008 and 1990 to 2009 (excluding 2007 and 2008). The CARs are calculated for 
the 3-day announcement window [-1, +1] by using a local market index return model that was estimated by using daily stock and local 
market index returns over the period of 1 year prior to the announcement date [-365, -2].  „Direct‟ investments are transactions in which 
the target company is a publicly traded company. „Subsidiary‟ investments are transactions in which the target company is not publicly 
traded, but either the immediate or ultimate parent of the target company is publicly traded. „Direct Acquirer‟ shows all transactions in 
which the SWF is the direct acquirer. „Indirect Acquirer‟ shows all transactions in which the SWF is shown as either the immediate or 
ultimate parent of the acquirer. . „Excl. Investor Group‟ shows all transactions where the acquirer is not presented as an „Investor Group‟. 
„Investor Group‟ shows all transactions where the acquirer is presented as an „Investor Group‟. The t-statistic tests whether the mean 
equals zero. „Sign test‟ shows the results of the Sign test with p-values included in brackets. The Sign test is a non-parametric test of 
significance that tests whether the median equals zero. „W. signed rank test‟ shows the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test with p-
values included in brackets. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is a non-parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals 
zero. The difference between the Sign test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is that the Sign test does not require the assumption that 
the distribution is symmetric. „Positive (Negative) CAR‟ is the total number of observations that have a positive (negative) CAR. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Panels C and D show the results of the 
independent samples t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Panel C shows whether there is a significant difference between the 3-
day CARs of investments during the years 2007 and 2008 and the 3-day CARs of investments during other years. The results are shown 
for both SWF and HF samples, respectively. Panel D shows whether the 3-day CARs of SWF investments are significantly different from 
the 3-day CARs of HF investments during the crisis period as well as during the whole period excluding the crisis period. The 
independent samples t-test determines whether the means of the two samples are significantly different. For the independent samples t-
test, t-statistics and p-value are displayed. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the non-parametric equivalent of the independent samples 
t-test and determines whether the medians of the two samples are significantly different. For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, z-value 
and p-value are displayed.  
 
Panel A. Announcement window [-1, +1] CARs for the sample of cross-border SWF investments (years 2007 and 2008, full period 
excluding 2007 and 2008) 
Years 2007/2008 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 58 46 12 34 24 
Mean 3.06% 1.45% 9.26% 3.76% 2.06% 
t-statistic 2.50** 1.53* 2.11* 2.07** 1.40 
Standard Deviation 9.33% 6.45% 15.12% 10.60% 7.24% 
Median 2.14% 1.76% 4.36% 1.76% 2.75% 




















Positive (Negative) CAR 39 (19) 29 (17) 10 (2) 21 (13) 18 (6) 
Negative CAR 19 17 2 13 6 
Excl. 2007/2008 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
No. of observations 149 119 30 84 65 
Mean 1.01% 1.08% 0.73% 0.12% 2.16% 
t-statistic 1.92* 1.80* 0.68 0.18 2.72*** 
Standard Deviation 6.42% 6.55% 5.93% 6.33% 6.40% 
Median 1.03% 1.38% 0.44% 0.27% 1.82% 




















Positive (Negative) CAR 88 (61) 71 (48) 17 (13) 43 (41) 45 (20) 
 
Panel B. Announcement window [-1, +1] CARs for the sample of cross-border HF investments (years 2007 and 2008, full period 
excluding 2007 and 2008) 
Years 2007/2008 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 52 43 9 44 8 
Mean 3.27% 3.49% 2.25% 3.43% 2.43% 
t-statistic 2.89*** 2.70*** 0.96 2.61** 1.54 
Standard Deviation 8.12% 8.72% 6.99% 8.71% 4.46% 
Median 1.19% 1.54% -1.05% 0.99% 1.37% 




















Positive (Negative) CAR 31 (21) 27 (16) 4 (5) 26 (18) 5 (3) 
Excl. 2007/2008 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Excl. Investor Group Investor Group 
No. of observations 92 87 5 69 23 
Mean 2.67% 3.33% -8.76% 2.02% 4.62% 
t-statistic 2.32** 2.94*** -1.41 1.44 2.53** 
Standard Deviation 11.03% 10.58% 13.85% 11.67% 8.78% 
Median 0.23% 0.36% -4.30% -0.11% 2.64% 




















Positive (Negative) CAR 47 (45) 46 (41) 1 (4) 32 (37) 15 (8) 
 




Panel C. Test results for difference tests between 3-day CARs (crisis years vs non-crisis years) 
 
Test No. of observations t-statistics z-value p-value 
SWF sample     
Independent samples t-test 207 -1.80  0.0728* 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 207  1.3009 0.1933 
HF sample     
Independent samples t-test 144 -0.34  0.7330 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 144  0.6218 0.5341 
 
Panel D. Test results for difference tests between 3-day CARs of SWF and HF investments (crisis-years and non-crisis years) 
 
Test No. of observations t-statistics z-value p-value 
SWF sample vs HF sample (2007/2008 period only) 
Independent samples t-test 110 0.13  0.8996 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 110  -0.1227 0.9023 
SWF sample vs HF sample (excl. 2007/2008 period) 
Independent samples t-test 241 1.48  0.1404 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 241  0.2387 0.8113 
 
 
In order to test Hypothesis V (whether announcement period abnormal returns are 
significantly higher in 2007 and 2008 than during other times), both the independent 
sample t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are conducted. Results are 
displayed in Table 12, Panel C.  
For the SWF sample, Hypothesis V(a) can be supported under the independent 
sample t-test. On average, the market values investments by SWFs during the crisis 
period 2007 and 2008 more than those made during the rest of the sample period. It is 
interesting to see that the positive announcement period abnormal returns of the 
„Direct Acquirer‟ subsample that were reported in Table 7 are mainly driven by the 
results during the financial crisis period. During the crisis, the „Direct Acquirer‟ 
subsample reports very high positive abnormal returns, suggesting that SWFs are 
indeed valued during crisis periods. When the crisis years are removed, however, 
announcement period returns are not significantly different from zero
91
.  
For the HF sample, Hypothesis V(b) cannot be supported. The announcement period 
abnormal returns are not significantly higher during the crisis period than during other 
periods, indicating that despite uncertainty, the market does not value HF investments 
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 Both independent samples t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test were conducted to see whether results for the 
subsample „Direct Acquirer‟ are significantly different during the crisis years of 2007 and 2008. The independent 
samples t-test shows p-values significant at the 5 percent level. 




higher during times of crisis. One possible explanation could be that SWFs were seen 
as more stable investors with longer time horizons than HFs and that this was valued 
positively in times of uncertainty. Fernandes (2011) states that contrary to other 
institutional investors, SWFs do not have liabilities, allowing them to make long-term 
investments without worrying about short-term demands for liquidity. Balin (2010) 
states that mutual funds and insurance companies had to regularly liquidate holdings 
during the time of the global financial crisis and saw a spike in redemptions. SWFs, 
on the other hand, had more discretion over the timing of their position liquidation
92
. 
It is possible that HFs faced liquidation pressures similar to mutual funds during the 
crisis period. Given that SWF investments display significantly higher average 
abnormal returns during the crisis years 2007/2008 and HF investments do not, we 
would like to know whether announcement period returns between the two samples 
are significantly different during the crisis period (and during the full sample period 
excluding the crisis period). Results are displayed in Table 12, Panel D. As shown in 
the table, announcement period returns between the two samples are not significantly 
different, neither for the crisis period nor for the sample period excluding the years 
2007 and 2008. This indicates that our overall results (that 3-day CARs for the SWF 
and the HF sample are not significantly different) are not affected by the crisis period.  
Given that SWF investments on average display higher returns during the crisis 
period of 2007 and 2008 and a large proportion of these investments were in financial 
companies, we want to analyze financial targets in the SWF sample separately. In a 
first step, however, we look at financial targets of SWF investments vs non-financial 
targets of SWF investments during the time period from 1990 to 2009. Table 13 
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 It should be highlighted that Balin (2010) also states that SWFs have moved towards shorter time horizons following 
the losses incurred during the global financial crisis and now take into account more frequent sovereign payouts as well.     




shows the results for the 3-day CARs and the long-term performance CMARs for 
financial targets and non-financial targets.  
Table 13: SWF investments in financial companies and non-financial companies  
This Table shows the CARs and CMARs for the full sample of cross-border SWF investments in financial companies (49 
investments) and in non-financial companies (158 investments) during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The CARs are 
calculated for the 3-day announcement window [-1, +1] by using a local market index return model that was estimated by 
using daily stock and local market index returns over the period of 1 year prior to the announcement date [-365, -2]. The 
CMARs are calculated for the pre- and post-announcement windows ([-365, -2], [+2, +182], [+2, +365], [+2, +730], [+2, 
+1095], [+2, +1825]). In order to determine the CMARs, the market-adjusted returns (MARs) are calculated every day 
over the period and then summed up. Local market indices are used as benchmark in order to calculate the MARs. The t-
statistic tests whether the mean equals zero. „Sign test‟ shows the results of the Sign test with p-values included in 
brackets. The Sign test is a non-parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. „W. signed rank 
test‟ shows the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test with p-values included in brackets. The Wilcoxon signed rank 
test is a non-parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. The difference between the Sign 
test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is that the Sign test does not require the assumption that the distribution is 
symmetric. „Positive (Negative) CAR (CMAR)‟ is the total number of observations that have a positive (negative) CAR 
(CMAR). The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. CARs and CMARs for the sample of cross-border SWF investments in financial companies  
 
SWFs (Financials) 3-day CAR [-365, -2] [+2, +182] [+2, +365] [+2, +730] [+2, +1095] [+2, +1825] 
No. of observations 49 46 48 47 44 33 15 
Mean 0.88% -10.23% 0.25% 5.62% 4.87% 12.17% 31.11% 
t-statistic 0.88 -1.61 -0.05 0.89 0.64 1.49 2.05* 
Standard Deviation 7.02% 42.96% 33.02% 43.04% 50.48% 47.00% 58.76% 
Median 0.25% -0.96% 2.20% 4.95% -3.51% 10.79% 26.94% 




























Positive (Negative) CAR (CMAR) 26 (23) 22 (24) 21 (27) 27 (20) 20 (24) 20 (13) 10 (5) 
 
Panel B. CARs and CMARs for the sample of cross-border SWF investments in non-financial companies  
 
SWFs (Non-financials) 3-day CAR [-365, -2] [+2, +182] [+2, +365] [+2, +730] [+2, +1095] [+2, +1825] 
No. of observations 158 152 154 144 128 111 80 
Mean 1.80% 23.94% -8.27% -11.78% -8.99% -3.42% 27.54% 
t-statistic 3.02*** 4.53*** -3.04*** -2.73*** -1.49 -0.47 2.47** 
Standard Deviation 7.50% 65.20% 33.77% 51.89% 68.38% 76.93% 99.74% 
Median 1.71% +12.36% -5.65% -8.31% -1.80% -3.89% 7.26% 




























Positive (Negative) CAR (CMAR) 101 (57) 92 (60) 65 (89) 60 (84) 61 (67) 55 (56) 44 (36) 
 
As seen in Table 13, financial companies show some differences in CAR and CMAR 
results compared to non-financial companies. The mean (median) 3-day CAR is 0.88 
percent (0.25 percent)
93
 for the financial targets, and 1.80 percent (1.71 percent) for 
the non-financial targets.  The 3-day CAR results are only significantly positive for 
                                                 
93 Mietzner et al. (2008) report a higher mean 3-day CAR of 1.50 percent in their analysis on financial companies. 
However, their sample period stretches from May 1991 to June 2008. If all transactions after June 2008 are 
excluded in the analysis, mean 3-day CAR for financial companies increases to 1.17 percent.  




the sample of non-financial targets
94
. It is observed that financial targets do not 
outperform local benchmarks during the pre-announcement period, in contrast to the 
sample of non-financial companies. The mean (median) CMARs for the pre-
announcement period [-365, -2] are insignificant for the financial companies. In 
contrast, the mean (median) CMARs for the pre-announcement period [-365, -2] are 
+23.94 percent (+12.36 percent) for the non-financial companies and significantly 
positive. Long-term returns for the financial targets are not significantly different 
from zero in the first three years. Only in year 5 are abnormal returns significantly 
positive. The sample of non-financial companies shows significant negative long-
term returns in the first year after the investment and significantly positive long-run 
returns only in year 5. 
As almost half of all the SWF investments in financial companies happened during 
the years 2007 and 2008, a separate study is conducted for these two years. Panel A 
of Table 14 presents the results for SWF investments in financial companies for 2007 
and 2008. Panel B of Table 14 presents the corresponding results for non-financial 
companies for 2007 and 2008.  It is noteworthy that during these two years, more 
than 40 percent of the total number of SWF transactions were investments in financial 





                                                 
94 Both independent samples t-test and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are conducted to see whether the 3-day 
CARs of financial companies are significantly different from the 3-day CARs of non-financial companies for the 
whole sample period. Unreported results show that they are not significantly different.  




Table 14: SWF investments in financial companies and in non-financial companies during 2007 and 2008 
Panels A and B show the CARs and CMARs for the full sample of cross-border SWF investments in financial companies 
(25 investments) and in non-financial companies (33 investments) during the time period from 2007 to 2008. The CARs 
are calculated for the 3-day announcement window [-1, +1] by using a local market index return model that was 
estimated by using daily stock and local market index returns over the period of 1 year prior to the announcement date [-
365, -2]. The CMARs are calculated for the pre- and post-announcement windows ([-365, -2], [+2, +182], [+2, +365], 
[+2, +730], [+2, +1095]). In order to determine the CMARs, the market-adjusted returns (MARs) are calculated every 
day over the period and then summed up. Local market indices are used as benchmark in order to calculate the MARs. 
The t-statistic tests whether the mean equals zero. „Sign test‟ shows the results of the Sign test with p-values included in 
brackets. The Sign test is a non-parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. „W. signed rank 
test‟ shows the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test with p-values included in brackets. The Wilcoxon signed rank 
test is a non-parametric test of significance that tests whether the median equals zero. The difference between the Sign 
test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is that the Sign test does not require the assumption that the distribution is 
symmetric. „Positive (Negative) CAR (CMAR)‟ is the total number of observations that have a positive (negative) CAR 
(CMAR). The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Panel C shows 
the results of the independent samples t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test that show whether there is a 
significant difference between the CARs (CMARs) of financial targets and non-financial targets during the years 2007 
and 2008. The independent samples t-test determines whether the means of the two samples are significantly different. 
For the independent samples t-test, t-statistics and p-value are displayed. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the non-
parametric equivalent of the independent samples t-test and determines whether the median of the two samples is 
significantly different. For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, z-value and p-value are displayed 
 
Panel A. CARs and CMARs for the sample of cross-border SWF investments in financial companies during 2007/2008 
 
SWFs ( 2007-2008) 3-day CAR [-365, -2] [+2, +182] [+2, +365] [+2, +730] [+2, +1095] 
No. of observations 25 24 24 24 24 14 
Mean 1.49% -30.40% -2.63% 3.95% 2.11% 5.52% 
t-statistic 0.81 -3.42*** -0.29 0.36 0.18 0.40 
Standard Deviation 9.20% 43.50% 44.27% 53.66% 59.17% 51.41% 
Median 0.25% -27.40% -0.31% -3.01% -8.15% 7.71% 
























Positive  (Negative) CAR (CMAR) 14 (11) 8 (16) 9 (15) 11 (13) 10 (14) 8 (6) 
 
Panel B. CARs and CMARs for the sample of cross-border SWF investments in non-financial companies during 
2007/2008 
 
SWFs (2007-2008) 3-day CAR [-365, -2] [+2, +182] [+2, +365] [+2, +730] [+2, +1095] 
No. of observations 33 33 32 32 31 16 
Mean 4.24% 21.39% -8.71% -12.21% -0.89% 9.66% 
t-statistic 2.60** 2.01* -1.36 -1.38 -0.08 0.72 
Standard Deviation 9.38% 61.02% 36.34% 50.01% 61.14% 53.46% 
Median 3.00% 11.21% -8.20% -10.99% 12.76% 7.77% 
























Positive  (Negative) CAR (CMAR) 25 (8) 20 (13) 13 (19) 14 (18) 18 (13) 9 (7) 
 
Panel C. Test results for difference tests between CARs (CMARs) of SWF investments (financials vs non-financials 
during crisis period)   
 
Test t-statistics z-value p-value 
3-day CARs    
Independent samples t-test 1.12  0.2691 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test  -1.5231 0.1277 
Pre-event CMARs [-365, -2]    
Independent samples t-test 3.55  0.0008*** 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test  -3.0630 0.0022*** 
Post-event CMARs [+2, +182]    
Independent samples t-test -0.56  0.5752 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test  -0.2070 0.8360 
Post-event CMARs [+2, +365]    
Independent samples t-test -1.16  0.2513 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test  0.2898 0.7720 
Post-event CMARs [+2, +730]    
Independent samples t-test -0.18  0.8552 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test  -0.5007 0.6166 
Post-event CMARs [+2, +1095]    
Independent samples t-test 0.22  0.8309 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test  -0.1455 0.8843 




As can be seen in Table 14, financial companies show a significant underperformance 
in relation to their local benchmarks in the year prior to the investment. On the 
contrary, non-financial target companies outperform their local benchmarks prior to 
the investment suggesting that during crisis periods SWFs also prefer 
“outperformers” when they invest in non-financial companies. The pre-event CMARs 
of financial companies and non-financial companies in the SWF sample are also 
significantly different in the tests conducted (see Table 14, Panel C for details). For 
both financial and non-financial target companies we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
returns are normal in the years following the investment as, on average, long-run 
CMARs are not significantly different from zero.    
In order to determine whether the mean 3-day CARs for the financial companies are 
statistically different from the mean 3-day CARs of the non-financial companies 
during the years 2007 and 2008, both the independent samples t-test and the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are conducted. Results are shown in Table 14, Panel C. 
Both tests indicate that there is no significant difference between the mean 3-day 
CARs of financial companies and the mean 3-day CARs of non-financial companies 
for the time period 2007 and 2008. This leads us to reject Hypothesis VI. Despite the 
precarious situations of financial companies during these two years, announcement 
period abnormal returns were on average not higher than the announcement period 
abnormal returns of non-financial companies. 
We omit a separate analysis of investments in financial companies vs non-financial 
companies for the HF sample for the time period from 1990 to 2009 and separately 
for the crisis period 2007 and 2008 at this stage. Unlike SWFs, HFs do not appear to 
have invested disproportionately in financial companies during the crisis years of 




2007 and 2008. Only 15 percent of the total HF transactions were in financial 
companies (8 transactions out of a total of 52 transactions). Results of this analysis 
are available upon request
95
.   
 
5.6 Summary Statistics of Target Firm Characteristics 
Table 15 shows the summary statistics for the explanatory variables that are described 
in Section 4.5 and used in the cross-sectional regression. Mean, median, standard 
deviation and number of observations are reported. Panel A displays the explanatory 
variables for the SWF sample and Panel B displays the explanatory variables for the 
HF sample. Interesting to see is that SWFs tend to acquire smaller percentage stakes 
in the target companies when they act as direct acquirer. The mean stake acquired is 
13.83 percent vs 30.75 percent when they act as indirect acquirer. Also, SWFs rarely 
seek 100 percent ownership („full control‟) when they acquire companies directly. 
Most of the 100 percent ownership in the sample occurs when the SWF is indirect 
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 For the sample period from 1990 to 2009, we find that the 3-day CARs for HF investments in financial targets are not 
significantly different from zero, whereas the 3-day CARs of non-financial targets are significantly positive. Both 
independent samples t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test however show that the 3-day CARs of financial targets and 
non-financial targets are not significantly different. This is similar to the results of the SWF sample. Also, non-financial 
targets outperform local benchmarks during the pre-announcement period [-365, -2], whereas this is not the case for the 
financial targets. Long-term abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero until year 5 when they turn 
significantly positive, but long-term abnormal returns for non-financial targets are already significantly positive from 
year 2 onwards. This is in contrast to the long-run returns for non-financial targets in the SWF sample which show 
negative long-run abnormal returns in the first year and only positive long-run returns in year 5 (see Table 12 for details).    










 Full sample Direct Subsidiary Direct Acquirer Indirect Acquirer 
Share sought (No. of obs.) 177 142 35 103 74 
     Mean (Median) 20.90% (13.40%) 17.62% (10.00%) 34.22% (31.00%) 13.83% (9.90%) 30.75% (20.00%) 
     St.Dev. 22.96% 21.94% 22.45% 11.68% 30.18% 
      
Full control (No. of obs.) 207 165 142 118 89 
     Mean (Median) 4.35% (0%) 3.64% (0%) 7.14% (0%) 0.85% (0%) 8.99% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 20.44% 18.78% 26.07% 9.21% 28.76% 
      
Initial (No. of obs.) 207 165 142 118 89 
     Mean (Median) 80.19% (100%) 77.58% (100%) 90.48% (100%) 77.97% (100%) 83.15% (100%) 
     St.Dev. 39.95% 41.84% 29.71% 41.62% 37.65% 
      
ME SWF (No. of obs.) 207 165 142 118 89 
     Mean (Median) 26.09% (0%) 27.27% (0%) 21.43% (0%) 33.90% (0%) 15.73% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 44.02% 44.67% 41.53% 47.54% 36.61% 
      
SG SWF (No. of obs.) 207 165 142 118 89 
     Mean (Median) 60.39% (100%) 57.58% (100%) 71.43% (100%) 49.15% (0%) 75.28% (100%) 
     St.Dev. 49.03% 49.57% 45.72% 50.21% 43.38% 
      
OECD target (No. of obs.) 207 165 142 118 89 
     Mean 49.76% (0%) 50.30% (100%) 47.62% (0%) 56.78% (100%) 40.45% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 50.12% 50.15% 50.55% 49.75% 49.36% 
      
BRIC target (No. of obs.) 207 165 142 118 89 
     Mean (Median) 13.53% (0%) 13.94% (0%) 11.90% (0%) 14.41% (0%) 12.36% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 34.28% 34.74% 32.78% 35.27% 33.10% 
      
Finance target (No. of obs.) 207 165 142 118 89 
     Mean (Median) 23.67% (0%) 25.45% (0%) 16.67% (0%) 26.27% (0%) 20.22% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 42.61% 43.69% 37.72% 44.20% 40.40% 
     No. of observations 207 165 142 118 89 
      
Real Estate target (No. of obs.) 207 165 142 118 89 
     Mean (Median) 10.63% (0%) 9.09% (0%) 16.67% (0%) 13.56% (0%) 6.74% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 30.89% 28.84% 37.72% 34.38% 25.22% 
      
Truman (No. of obs.) 189 152 37 105 84 
     Mean (Median) 36.15 (41.00) 35.47 (41.00) 38.95 (45.00) 33.24 (41.00) 39.79 (45.00) 
     St.Dev. 13.29 13.83 10.51 14.04 11.35 
      
         Structure (No. of obs.) 189 152 37 105 84 
               Mean (Median) 51.01 (50.00) 50.66 (50.00) 52.43 (50.00) 50.34 (50.00) 51.83 (50.00) 
               St.Dev. 11.69 12.34 8.49 13.40 9.13 
      
         Governance (No. of obs.) 189 152 37 105 84 
               Mean (Median) 38.57 (50.00) 37.70 (50.00) 42.16 (50.00) 34.86 (50.00) 43.21 (50.00) 
               St.Dev. 18.38 19.24 13.97 19.81 15.30 
      
         Accountability & Transparency (No. of obs.) 189 152 37 105 84 
               Mean (Median) 39.50 (39.00) 38.26 (39.00) 44.59 (61.00) 33.52 (39.00) 46.98 (61.00) 
               St.Dev. 21.78 22.06 20.11 21.30 20.12 
      
         Behavior (No. of obs.) 189 152 37 105 84 
               Mean (Median) 7.55 (0) 7.77 (0) 6.65 (0) 8.91 (8.00) 5.85 (0) 
               St.Dev. 10.01 10.39 8.29 8.45 11.49 
      
LMTI (No. of obs.) 201 159 42 114 87 
     Mean (Median) 7.13 (6.00) 6.99 (6.00) 7.67 (8.50) 6.32 (6.00) 8.18 (10.00) 
     St.Dev. 2.61 2.61 2.56 2.48 2.39 
      
Market Capitalization (No. of obs.) 189 150 39 108 81 










     St.Dev. 41,525,866.50 38,232,302.00 52,466,820.07 39,664,607.00 44,120,622.59 
      
Leverage (No. of obs.) 197 156 41 111 86 
     Mean (Median) 0.2136 (0.1798) 0.2085 (0.1748) 0.2332 (0.1939) 0.2093 (0.1748) 0.2193 (0.1910) 
     St.Dev. 0.1829 0.1838 0.1806 0.1842 0.1822 
      
ROE (No. of obs.) 184 145 39 106 78 
     Mean (Median) 10.86% (11.85%) 10.07% (11.94%) 13.78% (11.10%) 10.51% (10.96%) 11.33% (13.58%) 
     St.Dev. 49.27% 54.24% 23.06% 57.05% 36.48% 
      
Dividend Yield (No. of obs.) 188 149 39 108 80 
     Mean (Median) 2.28% (1.54%) 2.41% (1.49%) 1.77% (1.71%) 2.34% (1.44%) 2.19% (1.74%) 
     St.Dev. 2.72% 2.94% 1.51% 2.99% 2.31% 
      
Pre-Event CMAR (No. of obs.) 198 158 40 113 85 
     Mean (Median) 16.01% (7.54%) 19.01% (10.59%) 4.13% (3.24%) 13.21% (7.28%) 19.72% (11.21%) 
     St.Dev. 62.36% 63.09% 58.65% 58.69% 67.11% 
Table 15: Summary statistics 
This Table shows the summary statistics for the full sample of SWF investments (207 observations) and for the full sample of HF investments (144 observations) during the time 
period from 1990 to 2009. „Direct‟ investments are transactions in which the target company is a publicly traded company. „Subsidiary‟ investments are transactions in which the 
target company is not publicly traded, but either the immediate or ultimate parent of the target company is publicly traded. „Direct Acquirer‟ shows all transactions in which the SWF 
is the direct acquirer. „Indirect Acquirer‟ shows all transactions in which the SWF is shown as either the immediate or ultimate parent of the acquirer. „Share sought‟ is the fraction of 
the target company‟s shares outstanding that the SWF/HF acquires. „Full control‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the SWF acquires 100% of the target company, otherwise it 
equals zero. „Initial‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is the first transaction of the SWF/HF in the target company, otherwise it equals zero.  „ME SWF‟ is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is from one of the Greater Middle Eastern countries, and set to 0 otherwise. „SG SWF‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is either the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) or Temasek, and set to 0 otherwise. „Investor Group‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the HF belongs to an Investor 
Group, and set to 0 otherwise. „US HF‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the HF is located in the US, and is set to 0 otherwise. „UK HF‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the 
HF is located in the UK, and set to 0 otherwise. „OECD target” is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in an OECD country, and set to 0 otherwise. 
„BRIC target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in Brazil, Russia, India or China, and set to 0 otherwise. „Finance target‟ is a dummy variable that is 
set to 1 if the target company is a financial company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Real Estate target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a real estate company, and 
set to 0 otherwise. „Truman‟ refers to the Truman Scoreboard and ranges from 0 to 100. „Structure‟, „Governance‟, „Accountability and Transparency‟ and „Behavior‟ refer to the four 
categories of the Truman Scoreboard, each ranging from 0 to 100.  „LMTI‟ refers to the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index and ranges from 0 to 10. „Market Capitalization‟ is 
defined as market price at year end times common shares outstanding. It is quoted in Thousand USD. „Leverage‟ is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. „ROE‟ is the 
return on equity, quoted in percent.  „Dividend Yield‟ is defined as dividend per share divided by share price. It is quoted in percent. „Pre-Event CMAR‟ is the cumulative market-
adjusted return for the time pre-announcement window [-365, -2], quoted in percent. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for SWF investments 




Panel B. Summary statistics for HF investments 
 
 Full sample Direct Subsidiary 
No. of observations 144 130 14 
Share sought (No. of obs.) 133 122 11 
     Mean (Median) 14.89% (9.30%) 14.51% (8.90%) 19.01% (15.00%) 
     St.Dev. 15.91% 16.18% 12.35% 
    
Initial (No. of obs.) 144 130 14 
     Mean (Median) 88.19% (100%) 86.92% (100%) 100.00% (100%) 
     St.Dev. 32.38% 33.85% 100.00% 
    
Investor Group (No. of obs.) 144 130 14 
     Mean (Median) 21.53% (0%) 20.00% (0%) 35.71% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 41.24% 40.15% 49.72% 
    
US HF (No. of obs.) 144 130 14 
     Mean (Median) 62.50% (100%) 60.00% (100%) 85.71% (100%) 
     St.Dev. 48.58% 49.18% 36.31% 
    
UK HF (No. of obs.) 144 130 14 
     Mean (Median) 18.75% (0%) 19.23% (0%) 14.29% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 39.17% 39.56% 36.31% 
    
OECD target (No. of obs.) 144 130 14 
     Mean (Median) 65.28% (100%) 68.46% (100%) 35.71% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 47.77% 46.65% 49.72% 
    
BRIC target (No. of obs.) 144 130 14 
     Mean (Median) 12.50% (0%) 8.46% (0%) 50.00% (50.00%) 
     St.Dev. 33.19% 27.94% 51.88% 
    
Finance target (No. of obs.) 144 130 14 
     Mean (Median) 16.67% (0%) 12.31% (0%) 57.14% (100%) 
     St.Dev. 37.40% 32.98% 51.36% 
    
Real Estate target (No. of obs.) 144 130 14 
     Mean (Median) 5.56% (0%) 5.38% (0%) 7.14% (0%) 
     St.Dev. 22.99% 22.66% 26.73% 
    
Market Capitalization (No. of obs.) 117 106 11 






     St.Dev. 12,372,978.50 3,775,680.33 35,156,841.50 
    
Leverage (No. of obs.) 119 109 10 
     Mean (Median) 0.1481 (0.1094) 0.1554 (0.1189) 0.0696 (0.0130) 
     St.Dev. 0.1591 0.1618 0.0994 
    
ROE (No. of obs.) 111 102 9 
     Mean (Median) 19.94% (6.79%) -20.88% (4.86%) 482.51% (19.79%) 
     St.Dev. 431.20% 151.24% 1416.29% 
    
Dividend Yield (No. of obs.) 115 104 11 
     Mean (Median) 1.76% (0%) 1.80% (0%) 1.32% (0.56%) 
     St.Dev. 4.31% 4.50% 1.64% 
    
Pre-Event CMAR (No. of obs.) 134 122 12 
     Mean (Median) 26.74% (8.66%) 26.60% (7.24%) 28.16% (26.54%) 
     St.Dev. 108.44% 110.65% 86.52% 
 
 
5.7 Cross-Sectional Regressions  
Cross-sectional regressions as described in Chapter 4.5 are conducted. Tables 16 and 
17 show the results for the SWF sample and the HF sample, respectively, where the 
3-day CARs [-1, +1] are used as dependent variable.  







VARIABLE  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Intercept 0.0005 0.0014 0.0266 0.0226 0.0610 0.0355 -0.0086 0.0496 0.1139 0.0524 0.2123 
 (0.9555) (0.9528) (0.3422) (0.3885) (0.1393) (0.4205) (0.8133) (0.3148) (0.1363) (0.4406) (0.0343)* 
Share Sought 0.0984 0.1185 0.1018 0.0821 0.0777 0.0780 0.0998 0.0514 0.0302 0.0473 -0.0040 
 (0.1913) (0.1768) (0.2432) (0.3294) (0.3633) (0.3727) (0.2439) (0.6234) (0.7375) (0.6032) (0.9750) 
Share Sought Square -0.0566 -0.1893 -0.1778 -0.1588 -0.1487 -0.1530 -0.1726 -0.0987 -0.1040 -0.1212 -0.0466 
 (0.4302) (0.1679) (0.1913) (0.2070) (0.2294) (0.2262) (0.1741) (0.4450) (0.3903) (0.3437) (0.7428) 
Full Control  0.1438 0.1489 0.1381 0.1459 0.1462 0.1375 0.1494 0.1620 0.1443 0.1491 
  (0.1015) (0.0909)* (0.0856)* (0.0726)* (0.0757)* (0.0884)* (0.0619)* (0.0640)* (0.0942)* (0.0937)* 
Initial  0.0183 0.0172 0.0181 0.0199 0.0200 0.0171 0.0005 0.0240 0.0194 -0.0107 
  (0.1506) (0.1754) (0.1817) (0.1662) (0.1673) (0.2105) (0.9759) (0.1066) (0.1727) (0.5333) 
Direct  -0.0140 -0.0168 -0.0159 -0.0187 -0.0187 -0.0130 -0.0235 -0.0177 -0.0152 -0.0302 
  (0.4400) (0.3551) (0.3671) (0.2967) (0.2936) (0.4538) (0.2347) (0.438) (0.4785) (0.2610) 
Direct Acquiror  -0.0042 -0.0066 -0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0021 0.0013 0.0089 -0.0008 0.0018 0.0095 
  (0.7416) (0.6057) (0.7716) (0.8366) (0.8714) (0.9236) (0.5321) (0.9591) (0.9053) (0.5630) 
ME SWF   -0.0178 -0.0258 -0.0496 -0.0150 -0.0130 -0.0499 -0.0666 -0.0184 -0.0538 
   (0.3335) (0.1754) (0.0692)* (0.5973) (0.5194) (0.0975)* (0.0301)** (0.4368) (0.0937)* 
SG SWF   -0.0231 -0.0172 -0.0136 -0.0018 -0.0231 -0.0128 -0.0104 -0.0243 0.0011 
   (0.1174) (0.2569) (0.3301) (0.9059) (0.1443) (0.4038) (0.4955) (0.1595) (0.9499) 
OECD target    0.0059 0.0053 0.0070 0.0026 0.0100 -0.0028 -0.0031 0.0164 
    (0.6171) (0.6624) (0.5660) (0.8278) (0.4949) (0.8387) (0.8182) (0.3255) 
BRIC target    -0.0264 -0.0250 -0.0241 -0.0241 -0.0282 -0.0132 -0.0195 -0.0030 
    (0.0473)** (0.0642)* (0.068)* (0.0618)* (0.1008) (0.4017) (0.1995) (0.8792) 
Finance Target    -0.0159 -0.0231 -0.0198 -0.0122  -0.0353 -0.0197  
    (0.2380) (0.0652)* (0.1298) (0.3687)  (0.0401)** (0.2859)  
Real Estate Target    -0.0009 -0.0056 -0.0025 0.0131  -0.0191 0.0032  
    (0.9684) (0.7874) (0.9048) (0.5495)  (0.3555) (0.8867)  
Crisis    0.0225 0.0187 0.0183 0.0189  0.0144 0.0196  
    (0.0835)* (0.1610) (0.1915) (0.1489)  (0.3759) (0.2227)  
Truman     -0.0009   -0.0009 -0.0017  -0.0018 
     (0.1452)   (0.1580) (0.0320)**  (0.0346)** 
Structure      -0.0006      
      (0.4059)      
Governance      0.0008      
      (0.1546)      
Accountability & Transparency      -0.0006      
     (0.1930)      
Behavior      -0.0001      
      (0.8931)      
LMTI       0.0036   0.0019  
       (0.1458)   (0.5428)  
Market Capitalization (log)         -0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0065 
         (0.9580) (0.6626) (0.0959)* 
Dividend Yield         -0.3188 -0.3667 -0.4957 
         (0.1700) (0.1262) (0.0719)* 
Leverage         0.0033 -0.0047 -0.0224 
         (0.9271) (0.8999) (0.5254) 
ROE         0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
         (0.9645) (0.9998) (0.6542) 
Pre-Event CMAR         -0.0241 -0.0175 -0.0441 
         (0.0615)* (0.1935) (0.0025)*** 
No. of Obs. 177 177 177 177 164 164 172 164 139 149 139 
Year FE No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry FE No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes 
R^2 0.0217 0.1113 0.1209 0.1573 0.1842 0.189 0.1609 0.3084 0.2151 0.1689 0.3790 
Adjusted R^2 0.0105 0.0799 0.079 0.0901 0.1076 0.0946 0.0861 0.0526 0.0897 0.0465 0.0478 
F-statistics 1.9300 3.55 2.89 2.34 2.4 2 2.15 1.21 1.7200 1.3800 1.1400 
  (0.148) (0.0025)*** (0.0049)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0145)** (0.0120)** (0.2129) (0.0424)** (0.1478) (0.2876) 
Table 16: Cross-sectional regressions on 3-day CAR[-1, +1] for SWF investments 
This Table shows the cross-sectional regressions for the full sample of cross-border SWF investments (207 observations) during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The dependent variable is the 3-day 
CAR [-1, +1]. „Share sought‟ is the fraction of the target company‟s shares outstanding that the SWF acquires. „Full control‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the SWF acquires 100% of the target 
company, otherwise it equals zero. „Initial‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is the first transaction of the SWF in the target company, otherwise it equals zero. „Direct‟ is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 if the target company is publicly traded and set to 0 otherwise. „Direct Acquirer‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is the direct acquirer, and set to 0 otherwise. 
„ME SWF‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is from one of the Greater Middle Eastern countries, and set to 0 otherwise. „SG SWF‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is 
either the GIC or Temasek, and set to 0 otherwise. „OECD target” is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in an OECD country, and set to 0 otherwise. „BRIC target‟ is a 
dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in Brazil, Russia, India or China, and set to 0 otherwise. „Finance target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a 
financial company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Real estate target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is  a real estate company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Crisis‟ is a dummy variable 
that is set to 1 if the transaction year is 2007 or 2008, and set to 0 otherwise. „Truman‟ refers to the Truman Scoreboard and ranges from 0 to 100. „Structure‟, „Governance‟, „Accountability and 
Transparency‟ and „Behavior‟ refer to the four categories of the Truman Scoreboard, each ranging from 0 to 100. „LMTI‟ refers to the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index and ranges from 0 to 10. 
„Market Capitalization (log)‟ is the logarithm of the market capitalization (market price at year end times common shares outstanding). „Dividend Yield‟ is defined as dividend per share divided by 
share price.  „Leverage‟ is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. „ROE‟ is the return on equity. „Pre-Event CMAR‟ is the cumulative market-adjusted return for the time pre-announcement 
window [-365, -2]. The p-values are displayed in brackets below the coefficient estimates and are based on White‟s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. „No. of obs.‟ reports the number of observations. „Year FE‟ are year fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual 
years. „Industry FE‟ are industry fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual industries. „R2‟ is the coefficient of determination and is the proportion of the variability that is fitted 
by the model. „Adjusted R2‟ adjusts R2 for the number of explanatory variables. The F-statistic tests whether the model has predictive capability. 




Table 17: Cross-sectional regressions on 3-day CAR[-1, +1] for HF investments 
This Table shows the cross-sectional regressions for the full sample of cross-border HF investments (144 observations) during the time 
period from 1990 to 2009. The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR [-1, +1]. „Share sought‟ is the fraction of the target company‟s 
shares outstanding that the HF acquires. „Initial‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is the first transaction of the HF in 
the target company, otherwise it equals zero. „Direct‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is publicly traded and set 
to 0 otherwise. „Inv. Group‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the HF belongs to an investor group, otherwise it equals zero. „US HF‟ 
is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the HF is located in the US, and is set to 0 otherwise. „UK HF‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 
if the HF is located in the UK, and set to 0 otherwise. „OECD target” is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located 
in an OECD country, and set to 0 otherwise. „BRIC target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in Brazil, 
Russia, India or China, and set to 0 otherwise. „Finance target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a financial 
company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Real estate target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a real estate company, 
and set to 0 otherwise. „Crisis‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the transaction year is 2007 or 2008, and set to 0 otherwise. „Market 
Capitalization (log)‟ is the logarithm of the market capitalization (market price at year end times common shares outstanding). „Dividend 
Yield‟ is defined as dividend per share divided by share price. „Leverage‟ is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. „ROE‟ is 
the return on equity. „Pre-Event CMAR‟ is the cumulative market-adjusted return for the time pre-announcement window [-365, -2]. The 
p-values are displayed in brackets below the coefficient estimates and are based on White‟s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. „No. of obs.‟ reports the number of 
observations. „Year FE‟ are year fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual years. „Industry FE‟ are industry fixed 
effects included by using dummy variables for individual industries. „R2‟ is the coefficient of determination and is the proportion of the 
variability that is fitted by the model. „Adjusted R2‟ adjusts R2 for the number of explanatory variables. The F-statistic tests whether the 






VARIABLE  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept 0.0017 -0.0763 -0.0690 -0.0509 -0.0640 -0.0080 0.1157 
 (0.9170) (0.0152)** (0.0758)* (0.2819) (0.2744) (0.9189) (0.2474) 
Share Sought 0.2929 0.3161 0.1472 0.1545 0.1772 0.1708 0.1094 
 (0.1008) (0.0897)* (0.1194) (0.1123) (0.0702)* (0.2515) (0.4820) 
Share Sought Square -0.2952 -0.3282 0.1786 0.1880 0.2124 -0.1343 -0.0715 
 (0.0990)* (0.0794)* (0.1134) (0.1042) (0.0679)* (0.3232) (0.6232) 
Initial  0.0257 0.0265 0.0271 0.0319 0.0238 0.0016 
  (0.1979) (0.3074) (0.4448) (0.4721) (0.3429) (0.9559) 
Direct  0.0585 0.0319 0.0396 0.0445 0.0354 0.0334 
  (0.0042)*** (0.0130)** (0.0448)** (0.0140)** (0.1636) (0.1398) 
Investor Group   0.0210 0.0223 0.0257 0.0074 0.0201 
   (0.5665) (0.7978) (0.5014) (0.7139) (0.3381) 
US HF   0.0222 0.0227 0.0270 0.0025 -0.0042 
   (0.7669) (0.7334) (0.9973) (0.9130) (0.8758) 
UK HF   0.0282 0.0288 0.0353 0.0318 0.0007 
   (0.5328) (0.5119) (0.9475) (0.1502) (0.9802) 
OECD target    0.0229 0.0293 -0.0250 -0.0473 
    (0.3757) (0.2096) (0.3697) (0.1574) 
BRIC target    0.0331 0.0389 -0.0076 -0.0337 
    (0.4775) (0.1331) (0.8206) (0.2311) 
Finance Target    0.0255  -0.0274  
    (0.4927)  (0.0931)*  
Real Estate Target    0.0389  0.0383  
    (0.4656)  (0.6025)  
Crisis    0.0190  -0.0016  
    (0.4192)  (0.9272)  
Market Capitalization (log)      -0.0004 -0.0022 
      (0.9285) (0.5825) 
Dividend Yield      0.2462 -0.0610 
      (0.1607) (0.7824) 
Leverage      -0.1494 -0.1802 
      (0.0023)*** (0.0009)*** 
ROE      0.0001 0.0003 
      (0.5705) (0.0936)* 
Pre-Event CMAR      -0.0285 -0.0224 
      (0.0493)** (0.1378) 
No. of Obs. 133 133 133 133 133 98 98 
Year FE No No No No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No No No No Yes No Yes 
R^2 0.0348 0.0662 0.0758 0.0978 0.2576 0.2252 0.3826 
Adjusted R^2 0.0200 0.0370 0.0241 0.0076 -0.0652 0.0606 -0.0694 
F-statistics 2.3400 2.2700 1.4700 1.0800 0.8000 1.3700 0.8500 
  (0.1000) (0.0654)* (0.1857) (0.3795) (0.7854) (0.1752) (0.7096) 




Column 1 in the two Tables shows the regression on two independent variables 
(„Shares sought‟ and „Shares sought square‟). For the SWF sample, the variable 
„share sought‟ has a positive coefficient and the variable „share sought square‟ has a 
negative coefficient, but the results are not significant.
96
 Results for the HF sample 
are significant for some of the regressions conducted, indicating that the effects of 
„share sought‟ on the dependent variable are nonlinear. 
Column 2 adds the variable „Full control‟ for the SWF sample. The variable has a 
positive sign and is statistically significant for most of the regressions. With a 100 
percent ownership, minority shareholders do not exist and potential conflicts can be 
avoided. As for the variable „Initial‟, the coefficient is positive, but not significant, for 
both the SWF and the HF sample. A positive sign is to be expected as a first 
investment is more likely to be associated with a „surprise effect‟, leading to a larger 
market reaction. Dewenter et al. (2010) report positive, significant coefficients for 
this variable, whereas Bortolotti et al. (2009) report positive, but insignificant 
coefficients. The variable „Direct‟ shows positive, significant results for the HF 
sample. The results for the SWF sample are negative, but insignificant. This is to be 
expected given the results shown in Table 7 where we showed that results for the 
„Direct‟ and „Subsidiary‟ subsamples in the SWF sample are not significantly 
different
97.  The variable „Direct Acquirer‟ is mostly negative, but insignificant for 
the SWF sample. This is also in line with the results obtained in Table 7 where we 
                                                 
96
 Dewenter et al. (2010) interpret that a positive coefficient for „Share sought‟ and a negative coefficient for „Share 
sought
2‟ means that SWF investments have effects similar to private blockholder investments. They find that 
announcement period abnormal return first increases with an increase in stake acquired, reaches a maximum at around 
40-45% and then decreases. They conclude that this nonlinearity supports the tradeoff between gains from signaling and 
losses due to SWF tunneling. Their results for these variables are only significant for their clean sample (which excludes 
all transactions where concurrent announcement happened on the announcement date). In additional robustness tests, 
they analyze the full sample as well and report results that are not significant which is in line with our results.   
97
 The results for the „Direct‟ and „Subsidiary‟ subsamples in the HF sample also did not show a significant difference, 
however, we highlighted that it was difficult to obtain reliable test results due to the small sample size in the „Subsidiary‟ 
subsample (14 observations).   




only found a significant difference between announcement period abnormal returns of 
„Direct Acquirer‟ and „Indirect Acquirer‟ when comparing the median results, not 
when comparing the mean results. The variable „Direct Acquirer‟ does not influence 
the results for the mean 3-day CARs.     
Column 3 adds the variables „Greater Middle Eastern SWF‟ („ME SWF‟) and 
„Singapore SWF‟ („SG SWF‟) for the SWF sample and „Investor Group‟, „US HF‟, 
and „UK HF‟ for the HF sample in order to see whether different acquirers matter. 
For the SWF sample, both the variables “ME SWF‟ and „SG SWF‟ display negative 
coefficients, however, results are only significant in some cases for the ME SWFs. A 
negative ME SWF suggests that markets do not value investments by ME SWFs as 
much as investments by other SWFs. For the HF sample, all its three variables are not 
significant. 
Column 4 adds the target region explanatory variables „OECD target‟ and „BRIC 
Target‟ as well as the target industry explanatory variables „Finance target‟ and „Real 
Estate target‟ and the variable „Crisis‟. The SWF sample shows mainly positive but 
insignificant coefficients for OECD targets and negative, mostly significant, 
coefficients for BRIC targets. Bortolotti et al. (2009) also report negative coefficients 
for BRIC targets, however, their results are not statistically significant. In contrast, 
their results for OECD targets are negative
98
. The HF sample shows insignificant 
coefficients for both OECD and BRIC targets. For the variable „Financial target‟, 
both the SWF and the HF samples show a negative coefficient which is significant in 
some of the regressions. The negative sign coefficient for the SWF sample is to be 
                                                 
98
 Bortolotti et al. (2009)‟s explanation for the negative coefficients is that it is possible that OECD targets have more 
possibilities of financing or that developed markets are better in predicting that SWF investments generate negative 
returns in the long run. As the authors consider both national and cross-border equity investments in their paper and 
national equity investments take up a large portion of the total sample size, a comparison of the results for the variable 
„OECD target‟ is difficult.  




expected given the results in Table 13 already showed that 3-day CARs for financial 
firms are not significantly different from zero, whereas 3-day CARs of non-financial 
firms are positive and significantly different from zero.  
The crisis variable „Crisis‟ displays a positive coefficient for both the SWF and HF 
sample, although only for the SWF sample is the coefficient significant in one 
regression. These results are in line with what we found in Section 5.5. The tests 
conducted suggest that only SWF investments display significantly higher mean 
announcement period abnormal returns during the crisis years of 2007 and 2008 than 
during other times.  
Columns 5 and 6 in the SWF regression add the variable „Truman‟ and its sub-indices 
„Structure‟, „Governance‟, „Accountability & Transparency‟ and „Behavior‟. Column 
7 adds the variable „LMTI‟99. The Truman variable, the individual sub-indices and the 
LMTI mostly do not show statistically significant results. Bortolotti et al. (2009) 
report similar results, suggesting that both the LMTI and Truman Index do not seem 
to be related to the reaction of the market. The results of Dewenter et al. (2010) also 
show the „Truman Index‟ to be an insignificant coefficient for most of their 
regressions and they state that „it is hard to draw any firm conclusions‟100. 
Column 8 in the SWF regression and column 5 in the HF regression add year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects as a robustness test. It is possible to improve the 
proportion of variability that is fitted by the model (R
2
) by adding both year fixed 
                                                 
99
 As both Truman score and LTMI cover the transparency of a SWF, they correlate substantially. This is why they are 
not both included in the regression at the same time.  
100
 Dewenter et al. (2010) have several hypotheses that can explain positive or negative coefficients for the Truman 
index. If well-managed funds have high Truman scores and these funds are more effective monitors and have more 
information than funds that are less well-managed with lower Truman scores, the effects on the firm value should be 
higher if a fund with a high Truman score makes an investment. This would explain a positive coefficient. However, if 
high scores mainly refer to the SWF being transparent, the coefficient can be negative as transparency may inhibit a fund 
to influence government actions, show part of its investment strategy that reveal potential transactions before they 
happen or the fund is transparent just because it has no influence or insights in the first place.  




effects and industry fixed effects. However, adjusted R
2
 (which accounts for the 
number of explanatory variables) cannot be improved.  
Columns 9, 10 and 11 in the SWF sample and columns 6 and 7 in the HF sample add 
the accounting variables „Market Capitalization‟, „Dividend Yield‟, „Leverage‟, and  
„ROE‟ as well as the variable „Pre-Event CMAR‟ in order to account for any 
momentum or reversal effect. Results are shown with and without year and industry 
fixed effects. „Market capitalization‟ has a negative coefficient for both the SWF and 
the HF sample, but it is significant only in one SWF regression. The negative 
coefficient indicates that larger companies tend to display lower announcement period 
abnormal returns. This negative coefficient is in line with the results by Bortolotti et 
al. (2009), although all the results for their SWF sample are insignificant. „Dividend 
Yield‟ is insignificant for the HF sample, but negative and significant for the SWF 
sample. An explanation can be that companies that pay high dividends tend to be 
more stable, mature companies with less growth prospects and that, correspondingly, 
the stock prices of these companies will tend to show lower positive announcement 
period abnormal returns than stock prices of other companies. „Leverage‟ is 
insignificant for the SWF sample, but strongly significant and negative for the HF 
sample. This indicates that HF investments that are highly leveraged will tend to 
show lower announcement period abnormal returns. „ROE‟ is not significant for the 
SWF sample, but positive and marginally significant for the HF sample. „Pre-Event 
CMAR‟ is negative and significant for both samples, indicating that the target 
companies that had high abnormal returns in the year prior to the investment had 
lower announcement period abnormal returns. This result is in line with Bortolotti et 
al. (2009). An explanation can be that the market has already been enthusiastic about 




these companies and this is why they outperformed in the year prior to the 
investment. An announcement of an investment by a SWF or HF then does not send a 
very strong signal to the market. On the other hand, if the target company was an 
underperformer in the year prior to the investment, an investment announcement by a 
SWF or HF sends a much stronger signal to the market which is then reflected in a 
higher announcement period abnormal return.   
 
In addition, we create a pooled sample regression analysis whereby a dummy is set 
equal to 1 if the investment is a SWF investment and equal to 0 if the investment is a 
HF investment. In order to make a comparison possible, we only keep the control 
variables that both the SWF and the HF sample have in common. Results are 
displayed in Table 18. Most of the variables show results that are not significant, so 
we would like to focus our interpretation only on the variable „SWF dummy‟. Before 
adding accounting variables to the regressions, the variable „SWF dummy‟ is mostly 
significantly negative. Once accounting variables are added, „SWF dummy‟ is not 
significant anymore. This is in line with the results displayed in Table 7, Panel C. 
Both SWF and HF investments display significantly positive 3-day CARs around the 
announcement period, but their 3-day CARs are not significantly different from each 
other. An interpretation for why „SWF dummy‟ shows significantly negative results 
before accounting variables are added could be that HFs tend to have higher CARs 
because the stocks they pick are different from those picked by SWFs. The results 
could also be an indication of HFs showing better stock picking skills. Once these 
differences are accounted for (by adding the accounting variables), the 3-day CARs 
are not significantly different anymore.        




Table 18: Pooled sample regression on 3-day CAR[-1, +1] for SWF and HF investments 
This Table shows the pooled sample regression for the full sample of cross-border SWF investments (204 observations) and HF 
investments (144 observations) during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR [-1, +1]. „SWF 
dummy‟ equals 1 if the investment is a SWF investment and equals 0 if the investment is a HF investment. „Share sought‟ is the fraction 
of the target company‟s shares outstanding that the SWF or HF acquires. „Initial‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is 
the first transaction of the SWF or HF in the target company, otherwise it equals zero. „Direct‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the 
target company is publicly traded and set to 0 otherwise. „OECD target” is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is 
located in an OECD country, and set to 0 otherwise. „BRIC target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in 
Brazil, Russia, India or China, and set to 0 otherwise. „Finance target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a 
financial company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Real estate target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a real estate 
company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Crisis‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the transaction year is 2007 or 2008, and set to 0 
otherwise. „Market Capitalization (log)‟ is the logarithm of the market capitalization (market price at year end times common shares 
outstanding). „Dividend Yield‟ is defined as dividend per share divided by share price. „Leverage‟ is defined as long-term debt divided by 
total assets. „ROE‟ is the return on equity. „Pre-Event CMAR‟ is the cumulative market-adjusted return for the time pre-announcement 
window [-365, -2]. The p-values are displayed in brackets below the coefficient estimates and are based on White‟s heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. „No. of obs.‟ 
reports the number of observations. „Year FE‟ are year fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual years. „Industry 
FE‟ are industry fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual industries. „R2‟ is the coefficient of determination and is 
the proportion of the variability that is fitted by the model. „Adjusted R2‟ adjusts R2 for the number of explanatory variables. The F-




In the next cross-sectional regressions, the focus is on the long-run performance of 
the target firms. Tables 19 and 20 show the regression results for the post-
announcement windows of 6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years, using CMAR as the 
VARIABLE  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 0.0135 -0.0083 -0.0049 -0.0052 0.0484 0.0816 
 (0.1446) (0.7487) (0.8349) (0.8651) (0.2581) (0.1505) 
SWF dummy -0.0193 -0.0166 -0.0158 -0.0188 -0.0034 -0.0055 
 (0.0694)* (0.0939)* (0.1156) (0.0748)* (0.7635) (0.6345) 
Share Sought 0.1578 0.1596 0.1556 0.1705 0.0683 0.0661 
 (0.0533)* (0.0699)* (0.0762)* (0.0484)** (0.3612) (0.4103) 
Share Sought Square -0.1196 -0.1243 -0.1253 -0.1425 -0.0433 -0.0399 
 (0.1177) (0.1223) (0.1247) (0.0781)* (0.5373) (0.5901) 
Initial  0.0175 0.0167 0.0152 0.0125 -0.0050 
  (0.1891) (0.2213) (0.2746) (0.4521) (0.7488) 
Direct  0.0071 0.0061 0.0035 -0.0059 -0.0010 
  (0.6887) (0.7065) (0.8380) (0.7546) (0.6343) 
OECD target   -0.0033 0.0047 -0.0056 0.0061 
   (0.7637) (0.6955) (0.6415) (0.5944) 
BRIC target   -0.0262 -0.0313 -0.0115 -0.0116 
   (0.0480)** (0.0207)** (0.4772) (0.4770) 
Finance Target   -0.0125  -0.0200  
   (0.2002)  (0.0988)*  
Real Estate Target   0.0185  0.0076  
   (0.5004)  (0.8060)  
Crisis   0.0154  0.0182  
   (0.1430)  (0.1272)  
Market Capitalization (log)     -0.0024 -0.0035 
     (0.3231) (0.1748) 
Dividend Yield     0.0378 -0.0259 
     (0.8629) (0.9009) 
Leverage     -0.0211 -0.00252 
     (0.5357) (0.4981) 
ROE     <0.0001 <0.0001 
     (0.8576) (0.7231) 
Pre-Event CMAR     -0.0158 -0.0147 
     (0.1032) (0.1144) 
No. of Obs. 310 310 310 310 247 247 
Year FE No No No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes No Yes 
R^2 0.0309 0.0372 0.0605 0.1631 0.0553 0.1817 
Adjusted R^2 0.0214 0.0214 0.0291 0.0387 -0.0060 -0.0016 
F-statistics 3.2600 2.3500 1.9300 1.3100 0.9000 0.9900 
  (0.0219)** (0.0409)** (0.0414)** (0.1106) (0.5624) (0.4948) 




dependent variable for SWF investments and HF investments, respectively
101
. 
Regressions for the 5-year post-announcement window need to be treated with 
caution as the sample size is very small. For the HF sample, it is not possible to 
obtain 5-year cross-sectional regression results when both accounting variables and 
fixed effects are added as the sample size is too small.  
Dewenter et al. (2009) conduct long-run regressions for the 1-year, 3-year and 5-year 
post-announcement window. Variables are „Truman‟ and the four categories 
„Behaviour‟, „Structure‟, „Governance‟ and „Transparency‟ as well as „Temasek‟. 
Most of their regression results are insignificant. Bortolotti et al. (2009) conduct 6-
month, 1-year and 2-year regressions. They do not report 3-year regression results as 
the number of observations is “too small to obtain any meaningful coefficient 
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 For the long-run regressions of the SWF sample, only the Truman Index is displayed as independent variable, not the 
LMTI index. This is because results have shown that the Truman Index has a greater influence on R
2
 than the LMTI. 
However, results for the long-run regressions including LMTI as independent variable are available upon request.    











 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Intercept 0.1908 0.1751 0.6058 0.6182 -0.0513 -0.3789 -0.1699 -1.2014 0.7740 0.7600 -0.0817 -0.2120 0.6414 0.2111 0.4636 -0.1245 0.4220 -1.9176 0.0952 -1.1204 
 (0.4151) (0.5377) (0.2164) (0.2008) (0.8817) (0.3886) (0.8063) (0.0544)
* 
(0.1895) (0.2514) (0.9099) (0.7025) (0.2253) (0.6901) (0.6032) (0.861) (0.6396) (0.0914) 
* 
(0.9514) (0.4643) 
Share Sought 0.2931 0.7403 0.0321 0.2871 1.5202 2.4785 1.5620 2.4437 1.2578 2.3742 1.1524 1.4575 1.9889 3.3374 2.2072 3.8123 0.0780 4.0676 -0.0488 1.0810 



















Share Sought Square -0.3050 -0.6498 -0.2020 -0.2781 -2.2982 -3.3813 -2.6643 -3.5697 -2.5704 -3.7821 -2.4409 -2.9789 -3.1888 -4.9098 -3.4716 -5.5040 0.5432 -5.7133 0.6581 -1.9511 



























Full Control 0.0539 0.0548 0.0276 0.0739 0.9958 0.7484 0.5607 0.4787 2.0099 1.7471 - - 1.6273 1.7493 - - -1.1698 1.5524 - - 
















- - (0.1142) (0.2131) - - 
Initial -0.0451 -0.0818 -0.0016 -0.0368 -0.0046 0.1218 0.0095 0.1626 -0.2542 -0.1110 -0.2056 0.1695 -0.1900 -0.0480 -0.0804 0.2333 0.0031 -0.0796 -0.0907 -0.3192 
 (0.5357) (0.3656) (0.9827) (0.6836) (0.9640) (0.3022) (0.9212) (0.1608) (0.0368) 
** 
(0.3910) (0.1695) (0.3379) (0.2036) (0.6862) (0.7140) (0.2958) (0.9940) (0.8068) (0.7623) (0.1756) 
Direct -0.0637 -0.0258 -0.0798 -0.0448 0.0126 0.0647 0.0807 0.2535 -0.1393 -0.0828 0.0405 0.1305 -0.1902 -0.1398 -0.1471 0.0271 -0.4951 -0.0147 -0.5733 -0.6504 
 (0.3142) (0.6714) (0.3178) (0.6038) (0.9102) (0.5334) (0.5364) (0.0564)
* 
(0.3457) (0.5982) (0.7448) (0.2227) (0.3357) (0.4431) (0.3099) (0.8500) (0.2063) (0.9586) (0.2000) (0.0747)
* 
Direct Acquirer -0.0132 -0.0529 -0.0540 -0.0633 -0.0132 -0.0897 -0.0746 -0.1054 -0.1466 -0.2096 -0.1782 -0.2119 0.0424 0.1395 -0.0458 -0.0421 -0.4459 -0.6682 -0.4640 -0.8810 
 (0.8404) (0.4346) (0.4702) (0.3899) (0.8887) (0.3142) (0.4813) (0.2615) (0.2232) (0.0609) 
* 






ME SWF -0.2451 -0.4049 -0.2311 -0.4462 -0.2255 -0.3041 -0.1107 -0.1064 -0.3707 -0.5652 -0.3496 -0.7574 -0.7354 -0.6366 -0.2895 -0.2097 0.1395 1.1520 2.6334 3.8237 



































(0.2094) (0.1943) (0.9758) (0.5545) 
OECD target 0.0013 0.1397 -0.0534 0.1257 0.0815 0.1874 -0.0089 0.0682 0.0641 0.1473 -0.0816 -0.1295 0.2344 0.1818 0.2349 0.1199 0.3220 -0.0313 0.1829 0.0301 
 (0.9827) (0.0604) 
* 
(0.3957) (0.1363) (0.3789) (0.0725)
* 
(0.9304) (0.5194) (0.6256) (0.3043) (0.6016) (0.4303) (0.1325) (0.2330) (0.1835) (0.5723) (0.2804) (0.9112) (0.6134) (0.9387) 
BRIC target 0.0712 0.1724 0.0971 0.2226 0.1362 0.2923 0.1846 0.2627 0.1108 0.3158 0.2871 0.1166 0.1783 0.2879 0.3997 0.2121 0.4632 0.7600 1.0177 1.8742 


























Finance Target 0.1143  0.1031  0.2226  0.1599  0.1536  0.0171  0.0401  -0.0190  0.2825  0.0912  
 (0.0696)
* 
 (0.1439)  (0.0133)
** 
 (0.1167)  (0.1558)  (0.9218)  (0.7552)  (0.9340)  (0.1538)  (0.6755)  
Real Estate Target 0.0920  0.0099  0.0131  -0.0031  0.2093  0.1545  -0.0691  -0.2239  0.0239  -0.2821  
 (0.3364)  (0.9193)  (0.9318)  (0.9837)  (0.2508)  (0.2391)  (0.7498)  (0.1982)  (0.9211)  (0.2660)  
                     
Table 19: Cross-sectional long-run regressions for SWF investments 
This Table shows the cross-sectional long-run regressions for the full sample of SWF investments during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The dependent variable is the 6-month CMAR (1-year CMAR, 2-year CMAR and 3-year CMAR, 
respectively). „Share sought‟ is the fraction of the target company‟s shares outstanding that the SWF acquires. „Full control‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the SWF acquires 100% of the target company, otherwise it equals zero. „Initial‟ is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is the first transaction of the SWF in the target company, otherwise it equals zero. „Direct‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is publicly traded and set to 0 otherwise. „Direct 
Acquirer‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is the direct acquirer, and set to 0 otherwise.  „ME SWF‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is from one of the Greater Middle Eastern countries, and set to 0 otherwise. „SG SWF‟ is 
a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the SWF is either the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) or Temasek, and set to 0 otherwise. „OECD target” is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in an OECD 
country, and set to 0 otherwise. „BRIC target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in Brazil, Russia, India or China, and set to 0 otherwise. „Finance target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a 
financial company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Real estate target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a real estate company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Crisis‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the transaction year is 2007 or 2008, 
and set to 0 otherwise. „Truman‟ refers to the Truman Scoreboard and ranges from 0 to 100. „Market Capitalization (log)‟ is the logarithm of the market capitalization (market price at year end times common shares outstanding). „Dividend Yield‟ is 
defined as dividend per share divided by share price. „Leverage‟ is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. „ROE‟ is the return on equity. „Pre-Event CMAR‟ is the cumulative market-adjusted return for the time pre-announcement window [-
365, -2]. The p-values are displayed in brackets below the coefficient estimates and are based on White‟s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
„No. of obs.‟ reports the number of observations. „Year FE‟ are year fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual years. „Industry FE‟ are industry fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual industries. „R2‟ is the 
coefficient of determination and is the proportion of the variability that is fitted by the model. „Adjusted R2‟ adjusts R2 for the number of explanatory variables. The F-statistic tests whether the model has predictive capability. 
 




Table 19 (continued) 
Crisis -0.0347  -0.0161  -0.1040  -0.1099  -0.1118  -0.1883  0.0077  0.0606      
 (0.6409)  (0.8432)  (0.2723)  (0.3675)  (0.3522)  (<.0001) 
*** 
 (0.9540)  (0.0002)
*** 
     
Truman -0.0028 -0.0080 -0.0028 -0.0085 -0.0040 -0.0060 -0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0087 -0.0144 -0.0059 -0.0170 -0.0074 -0.0017 0.0054 0.0068 0.0131 0.0415 0.0712 0.1268 
 (0.5171) (0.1181) (0.5521) (0.0908) 
* 






Market Cap (log)   -0.016 -0.0229   0.01118 0.0293   0.067 0.1065   -0.0225 -0.0071   -0.1370 -0.1926 
   (0.4986) (0.2631)   (0.7265) (0.2201)   (0.9766) (0.9697)   (0.9933) (0.9982)   (0.2611) (0.0088)
*** 
Dividend Yield   -1.1728 -0.0098   -2.1617 -0.4984   -3.6499 -6.4624   -2.2097 -4.6916   -12.3055 -11.9551 












Leverage   -0.0609 -0.0960   0.06816 0.0973   -0.0704 0.1678   0.08624 0.3609   -1.4110 -1.3311 












ROE   -0.0013 -0.0014   -0.0012 -0.0017   -0.0048 -0.0038   -0.0053 -0.0026   -0.0074 -0.0088 




Pre-Event CMAR   -0.0931 -0.0546   -0.1096 -0.1946   -0.0086 0.1095   0.1927 0.0547   0.4276 1.8184 
   (0.2209) (0.4381)   (0.3958) (0.0978)
* 
  (<.0001) 
*** 
(0.7519)   (<.0001)
*** 
(0.8805)   (0.1615) (<.0001)
*** 
No. of Obs. 159 159 135 135 150 150 127 127 139 139 116 116 116 116 96 96 76 76 60 60 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R^2 0.0810 0.3426 0.1467 0.3976 0.1241 0.4132 0.1694 0.5104 0.1455 0.3689 0.2306 0.5279 0.1427 0.4544 0.2377 0.5313 0.1492 0.5538 0.5171 0.8443 
Adjusted R^2 -0.0084 0.0888 0.0058 0.0614 0.0332 0.1673 0.0219 0.2092 0.0490 0.0833 0.0879 0.2132 0.0239 0.1521 0.0595 0.1438 -0.0292 0.1194 0.3216 0.5165 
F-statistics 0.9100 1.3500 1.0400 1.1800 1.3700 1.6800 1.1500 1.6900 1.5100 1.2900 1.6200 1.6800 1.2000 1.5000 1.3300 1.3700 0.8400 1.2700 2.6500 2.5800 
















































 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Intercept -0.2527 -0.2570 -0.2384 -0.5844 -0.3367 -0.3677 -0.5123 -0.9616 -0.2730 -1.3226 0.0087 -1.2013 -1.2070 -1.9966 0.6010 -0.9198 0.2474 0.6842 12.5973 - 
 (0.2762) (0.2385) (0.4917) (0.1331) (0.4712) (0.4595) (0.5283) (0.3487) (0.7945) (0.0810) 
** 
(0.9962) (0.4790) (0.4948) (0.0681) 
* 
(0.8070) (0.6943) (0.9320) (0.8081) (0.0107)*
* 
- 
Share Sought -0.1991 -0.2907 -0.7289 -0.5786 -2.0464 -2.7283 -3.2831 -4.3465 2.6649 3.2414 2.8546 1.5045 2.7767 2.3325 -11.8865 -14.3516 -6.8638 -3.5806 -2.7195 - 










(0.3278) (0.7821) (0.9125) - 
Share Sought Square 0.7322 0.8504 1.3127 1.0545 4.5555 5.6220 6.1965 7.4799 -0.8669 -0.2169 -0.6645 2.7186 4.5616 8.1008 43.0587 46.4660 7.1686 -5.0325 -4.3192 - 














(0.3478) (0.7902) (0.9590) - 
Initial -0.1109 -0.0780 -0.0926 -0.1174 -0.1512 -0.1045 0.0808 0.0329 -0.6475 -0.5323 -0.3154 -0.2058 -0.6647 -0.4792 -0.6812 -0.6387 -2.2661 -3.2419 -3.9758 - 
 (0.3180) (0.4144) (0.3991) (0.2459) (0.4453) (0.6031) (0.6293) (0.8769) (0.2627) (0.2283) (0.6496) (0.7077) (0.5140) (0.5182) (0.5094) (0.3308) (0.1797) (0.0174) 
** 
(0.0034) - 
Direct 0.1434 0.1298 0.2894 0.3078 0.0534 0.1873 0.1472 0.3516 0.1206 0.2288 0.4701 0.8755 0.9152 1.1387 1.0479 1.5402 3.3291 2.2933 - - 










(0.2269) - - 
Investor Group 0.0912 0.1357 0.1468 0.1790 0.0988 0.1641 0.2309 0.2099 -0.2561 -0.0606 0.0107 -0.1793 -0.5004 -0.4428 0.0788 -0.2423 -0.8580 0.5441 -2.0592 - 
 (0.2864) (0.0533)* (0.1355) (0.0319) 
** 





US HF 0.0201 -0.0770 -0.1300 -0.1223 0.0982 0.0427 -0.1726 -0.2262 0.4047 0.5539 0.1351 0.2857 0.3062 0.6564 0.3574 0.5985 0.6337 0.3503 3.4645 - 
 (0.7984) (0.3152) (0.1440) (0.1739) (0.4418) (0.7563) (0.2658) (0.2119) (0.1490) (0.0391) 
** 
(0.7614) (0.4331) (0.5025) (0.1138) (0.5138) (0.3123) (0.2851) (0.6337) (0.0773)*
* 
- 
UK HF 0.1876 0.0861 0.1050 0.1332 0.3741 0.2629 0.3182 0.3325 0.2478 0.4043 0.1000 0.3579 -0.1631 0.0731 -0.2010 0.3421 -1.4415 -2.8394 16.2367 - 
 (0.1248) (0.3957) (0.4079) (0.3076) (0.0747)
* 




























(0.6249) (0.7842) (0.8577) (0.0130) - 
























Finance Target 0.0034  0.0497  0.2059  0.1992  -0.1266  -0.4463  -0.0806  0.0431  -0.0674  3.0069 - 
 (0.9691)  (0.6515)  (0.1164)  (0.2515)  (0.5222)  (0.0676) 
* 
 (0.7934)  (0.9160)  (0.9009)  (0.1095) - 
Real Estate Target 0.0977  0.0572  0.0236  0.4545  0.0983  0.4805  -0.0299  0.5631  0.2007  -4.8420 - 
 (0.4195)  (0.7573)  (0.9370)  (0.2879)  (0.7823)  (0.4526)  (0.9501)  (0.4080)  (0.6666)  (0.0167) 
** 
- 
Crisis -0.1451  -0.1069  -0.1800  -0.2082  -0.1824  -0.1330  0.2377  0.0969      
 (0.0274)
** 
 (0.1400)  (0.1708)  (0.1055)  (0.5015)  (0.6636)  (0.6171)  (0.8471)      
Table 20: Cross-sectional long-run regressions for HF investments 
This Table shows the cross-sectional long-run regressions for the full sample of HF investments during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The dependent variable is the 6-month CMAR (1-year CMAR, 2-year CMAR and 3-year CMAR, 
respectively). „Share sought‟ is the fraction of the target company‟s shares outstanding that the HF acquires. „Initial‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is the first transaction of the HF in the target company, otherwise it equals zero. 
„Direct‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is publicly traded and set to 0 otherwise. „Inv. Group‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the HF belongs to an investor group, otherwise it equals zero. „US HF‟ is a dummy variable 
that is set to 1 if the HF is located in the US, and is set to 0 otherwise. „UK HF‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the HF is located in the UK, and set to 0 otherwise. „OECD target” is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is 
located in an OECD country, and set to 0 otherwise. „BRIC target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in Brazil, Russia, India or China, and set to 0 otherwise. „Finance target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the 
target company is a financial company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Real estate target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a real estate company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Crisis‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the transaction 
year is 2007 or 2008, and set to 0 otherwise. „Market Capitalization (log)‟ is the logarithm of the market capitalization (market price at year end times common shares outstanding). „Dividend Yield‟ is defined as dividend per share divided by share 
price. „Leverage‟ is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. „ROE‟ is the return on equity. „Pre-Event CMAR‟ is the cumulative market-adjusted return for the time pre-announcement window [-365, -2]. The p-values are displayed in 
brackets below the coefficient estimates and are based on White‟s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. „No. of obs.‟ reports the number of 
observations. „Year FE‟ are year fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual years. „Industry FE‟ are industry fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual industries. „R2‟ is the coefficient of determination and is 
the proportion of the variability that is fitted by the model. „Adjusted R2‟ adjusts R2 for the number of explanatory variables. The F-statistic tests whether the model has predictive capability. 




Table 20 (continued) 
Market Cap (log)   0.0022 0.0225   0.0072 0.0399   -0.0378 -0.0397   -0.0826 0.0738   -0.5278 - 
   (0.8880) (0.2089)   (0.8470) (0.3423)   (0.6867) (0.6606)   (0.5957) (0.6141)   (0.0616) 
** 
- 
Dividend Yield   -0.1964 0.0213   1.4039 1.3858   -0.5101 0.2525   0.4573 -0.6833   -64.4274 - 
   (0.6515) (0.9769)   (0.1684) (0.3232)   (0.7568) (0.9305)   (0.8489) (0.8423)   (0.0062) 
*** 
- 
Leverage   -0.3900 -0.1101   -0.5953 -0.1646   -1.8802 -0.9858   -1.0689 -1.5333   7.1093 - 
   (0.1784) (0.5928)   (0.2641) (0.7640)   (0.0722) 
* 
(0.4020)   (0.4434) (0.3619)   (0.0087) 
*** 
- 
ROE   0.0001 -0.0002   -0.0007 -0.0010   0.0014 0.0106   0.0000 -0.0068   -0.0147 - 
   (0.7737) (0.8116)   (0.4118) (0.4005)   (0.7747) (0.0086) 
*** 
  (0.9961) (0.3728)   (0.4278) - 
Pre-Event CMAR   -0.0126 -0.0962   -0.1143 -0.2600   -0.0440 -0.1820   0.1147 0.2900   -1.0223 - 
   (0.7759) (0.0385) 
** 
  (0.2392) (0.0089)
*** 
  (0.8598) (0.3074)   (0.7941) (0.3182)   (0.0348) 
** 
- 
No. of Obs. 127 127 96 96 121 121 92 92 108 108 80 80 88 88 65 65 35 35 20 - 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No - 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No - 
R^2 0.2146 0.4431 0.2705 0.5211 0.2587 0.4468 0.3790 0.5889 0.1696 0.4912 0.1862 0.5951 0.2566 0.5410 0.4789 0.7163 0.4085 0.8524 0.8912 - 
Adjusted R^2 0.1319 0.1934 0.1115 0.1575 0.1763 0.1804 0.2364 0.2517 0.0647 0.2109 -0.0369 0.1799 0.1377 0.2013 0.2904 0.3274 0.1255 -0.0034 0.4833 - 







































For the SWF sample, „Share sought‟ has a positive coefficient, and „Share sought 
square‟ has a negative coefficient. Some of the results are statistically significant. 
This highlights the nonlinear effect of stake acquired on the dependent variables, 
consistent with Dewenter et al. (2010)‟s monitoring and tunneling theory which states 
that firm value should increase for stakes acquired below a certain percentage (due to 
gains from monitoring), but then decline for stakes acquired above a certain 
percentage (due to losses from tunneling), showing that SWF investments have a non-
linear effect on firm value. Also, „Full control‟ has a positive coefficient and is 
statistically significant which supports the interpretation that potential conflicts with 
other shareholders can be avoided if the SWF acquires 100 percent of a company. 
Results for this variable are only available for the first year
102
. The results for the 
variables „Direct‟ and „Direct Acquirer‟ are mostly insignificant. Both „ME SWF‟ and 
“SG SWF‟103 show negative coefficients which are statistically significant for later 
years, indicating that target companies of ME SWFs and SG SWFs tend to 
underperform in the long-run relative to target companies of other SWFs. The 
variable „OECD target‟ is unstable and produces mostly insignificant results. Results 
for the variable „BRIC target‟, on the other hand, are positive and mostly significant, 
indicating that BRIC targets are associated with good long-run performance. The 
variable „Finance target‟ is positive in the first year, which is in line with results in 
Table 12 which showed that in the first year after the SWF investment only non-
financial targets display negative CMARs. „Crisis‟ shows a negative coefficient in 
                                                 
102
 The full SWF sample only contains 8 observations where the SWF takes full control. The longer the time horizon, the 
more observations drop out because of missing data. This is why there are no „Full control‟ results for the regressions 
including accounting variables in the years 2 and 3. 
103
 Dewenter et al. (2010) report a positive coefficient for the variable „Temasek‟ in their cross-sectional regressions on 
3-year and 5-year cumulative market-adjusted returns. However, these results cannot be compared directly as they 
include both national and cross-border equity investments in their sample. The „SG SWF‟ variable in our sample also 
contains the transactions of the GIC, not only Temasek.  




year 2 and a positive coefficient in year 3, indicating that investments conducted 
during the crisis years display lower CMARs than investments conducted during 
other times in year 2, but higher CMARs in year 3. The variable „Truman‟ is 
insignificant over most time horizons, indicating that the Truman score does not 
provide additional insight into which SWFs perform better than others. Only in year 5 
is the variable „Truman‟ mostly significantly positive, which is in line with Dewenter 
et al. (2009). „Market Capitalization‟ is also insignificant, indicating that size of the 
target company does not play a major role in determining abnormal market adjusted 
returns in the long-run. Dividend yield is negative and significant for years 2 and 3. If 
higher dividend yields are representative of stable and mature companies with low 
growth prospects, it means that these companies are suffering larger 
underperformance in the long term. The variable „Leverage‟ is somewhat unstable 
over time, but it appears to be a positive in later years, indicating that more levered 
companies are able to achieve larger abnormal returns. „ROE‟ is negative throughout, 
however, not significant. „Pre-Event CMAR‟ is negative in the first and second year 
and turns positive in year 3. This is an indication of a trend reversal. The target 
companies that outperformed in the year prior to the investment not only 
underperform at announcement but also in the two years following the investment.   
 
For the HF sample, the coefficient of „Share Sought‟ is mostly negative and 
significant in year 1 and year 3. „Share sought square‟ is mostly positive and 
significant for the 6 month, 1 year and 3 year period, indicating that the relationship 
between long-run abnormal return and percentage stake acquired is nonlinear. It is 




possible that HFs will try to increase their influence on the management of the 
company if they acquire larger stakes in the company. This means that larger stakes 
are accompanied by larger changes that the company has to go through and possibly 
conflicts with other shareholders which might be reflected in lower abnormal returns. 
However, it is expected that the HFs face fewer conflicts with other shareholders if 
they acquire very large stakes in the target companies. This could explain the 
nonlinear nature of the relationship between long-run abnormal return and percentage 
stake acquired.  „Direct‟ shows positive coefficients, with some of the results being 
significant. It is expected that the influence the HFs have on direct investments is 
higher than the influence they have on subsidiary investments. As HFs are active 
monitors, it is expected that their returns on direct investments are higher. „Inv. 
Group‟ shows positive coefficients in the first 6 months, but this is followed by 
insignificant, coefficients in later years. An interpretation can be that the market has 
high expectations about the activism of Investor Groups which is displayed in higher 
CMARs in the first 6 months after the investment. If, however, the Investor Groups 
do not push for activities such as takeovers or asset sales, the market responds 
accordingly, leading to CMARs not higher than for other HF investments.  Both „US 
HF‟ and „UK HF‟ results are unstable and mostly insignificant, and therefore difficult 
to interpret. Both the coefficients for „OECD targets‟ and „BRIC targets‟ are positive 
and mostly significant. As most HFs are located in the US or the UK, it is expected 
that they are able to achieve positive abnormal returns in OECD countries as they 
should be more familiar with stocks in these countries. Similar to the SWFs, the HFs 
are also able to achieve high abnormal returns with BRIC investments, as displayed 




by a positive, sometimes significant, coefficient. Both the variables „Finance target‟ 
and „Real Estate target‟ are not statistically significant. „Crisis‟ only shows a 
significantly negative coefficient after 6 months, while the coefficients in later 
periods are insignificant. „Market Capitalization‟ is also insignificant, indicating that 
size of the target company does not play a major role in determining cumulative 
market adjusted returns. Both the variables „Dividend yield‟ and „ROE‟ are unstable 
over time, making an interpretation difficult. „Leverage‟ is insignificant throughout. 
The „Pre-Event CMAR‟ variable is negative for the 6-month and 1-year period, 
indicating a trend reversal, that is, companies that outperformed in the year prior to 
the HF investment tended to underperform in the year after the investment. The F-
statistic shows that most of the models for the HF sample have significant predictive 
capability for the different time periods
104
.  
In addition, we create a pooled sample regression analysis for the 6-month, 1-year, 2-
year, 3-year and 5-year CMARs whereby a dummy is set equal to 1 if the investment 
is a SWF investment and equal to 0 if the investment is a HF investment. CMARs for 
longer time horizons need to be treated with caution as we do not have data on 
possible divestments of SWFs and HFs available and therefore have to take into 
account the possibility that other, not incorporated changes drive the results for these 
time periods. Again, in order to make a comparison possible, we only keep the 
control variables that both the SWF and the HF sample have in common. Results are 
displayed in Table 21.  
 
 
                                                 
104
 Additional regressions were run by including only Year Fixed Effects, not Industry Fixed Effects. Results are not 
reported as adjusted R
2
 was lower.  




Table 21: Pooled sample regression on long-run returns for SWF and HF investments 
This Table shows the pooled sample regressions for the full sample of cross-border SWF and HF investments during the time period from 1990 to 2009. The dependent variable is the 6-month CMAR (1-year CMAR, 2-year 
CMAR, 3-year CMAR and 5-year CMAR, respectively). „SWF dummy‟ equals 1 if the investment is a SWF investment and equals 0 if the investment is a HF investment. „Share sought‟ is the fraction of the target company‟s 
shares outstanding that the SWF or HF acquires. „Initial‟ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is the first transaction of the SWF or HF in the target company, otherwise it equals zero. „Direct‟ is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 if the target company is publicly traded and set to 0 otherwise. „OECD target” is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in an OECD country, and set to 0 otherwise. „BRIC 
target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is located in Brazil, Russia, India or China, and set to 0  otherwise. „Finance target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a financial 
company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Real estate target‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the target company is a real estate company, and set to 0 otherwise. „Crisis‟ is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the transaction year is 
2007 or 2008, and set to 0 otherwise. „Market Capitalization (log)‟ is the logarithm of the market capitalization (market price at year end times common shares outstanding). „Dividend Yield‟ is defined as dividend per share 
divided by share price. „Leverage‟ is defined as long-term debt divided by total assets. „ROE‟ is the return on equity. „Pre-Event CMAR‟ is the cumulative market-adjusted return for the time pre-announcement window [-365, -
2]. The p-values are displayed in brackets below the coefficient estimates and are based on White‟s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. „No. of obs.‟ reports the number of observations. „Year FE‟ are year fixed effects included by using dummy variables for individual years. „Industry FE‟ are industry fixed effects included by using dummy 
variables for individual industries. „R2‟ is the coefficient of determination and is the proportion of the variability that is fitted by the model. „Adjusted R2‟ adjusts R2 for the number of explanatory variables. The F-statistic tests 
whether the model has predictive capability. 
 
 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Intercept -0.1084 -0.1846 -0.0358 -0.2593 -0.2865 -0.3248 -0.4944 -0.9006 0.1158 0.0493 -0.2407 -0.5779 -0.3993 -0.3774 -0.0319 -0.4840 1.5257 1.2618 4.3530 2.3826 
 (0.2592) (0.1418) (0.8855) (0.3312) (0.1099) (0.1624) (0.2697) (0.0808)
* 







SWF dummy -0.0678 -0.0852 -0.0155 -0.0558 -0.0592 -0.1187 0.0142 -0.1550 -0.2905 -0.2758 -0.1634 -0.3094 -0;.3904 -0.2796 -0.1742 -0.2002 -0.7711 -0.4145 -0.6032 -0.2573 
 (0.1347) (0.0732) 
* 








(0.1037) (0.4603) (0.3403) (0.0224)
** 
(0.1022) (0.2095) (0.4490) 
Share Sought 0.3503 0.4463 0.2374 0.2322 0.0726 0.1500 -0.0620 -0.1695 1.6589 1.8952 1.5711 1.8719 3.9380 3.5310 4.1994 3.9853 0.1598 -1.0280 -0.4027 2.2640 








(0.0850) (0.9318) (0.5432) (0.8603) (0.4125) 
Share Sought Square -0.1720 -0.3022 -0.1280 -0.0936 0.6678 0.4463 0.8617 0.8914 -1.4133 -1.7040 -1.4965 -1.6263 -3.0707 -2.9309 -3.5283 -3.3983 -0.2290 0.7022 1.5581 -2.9446 
 (0.6245) (0.3748) (0.7524) (0.8148) (0.6719) (0.7796) (0.6678) (0.6323) (0.3107) (0.1923) (0.4127) (0.3186) (0.1416) (0.1302) (0.2058) (0.1548) (0.9018) (0.6965) (0.6065) (0.4433) 
Initial -0.0502 -0.0420 -0.0215 -0.0095 -0.0259 0.0484 0.0398 0.1395 -0.3301 -0.2110 -0.2190 -0.0171 -0.3410 -0.1405 -0.2367 0.0672 -0.3718 -0.2257 -0.3586 -0.4250 
 (0.3930) (0.4689) (0.7351) (0.8836) (0.7600) (0.5762) (0.6255) (0.1394) (0.0727) 
* 
(0.1618) (0.2820) (0.9177) (0.2086) (0.5150) (0.4651) (0.7765) (0.4076) (0.5122) (0.3753) (0.1776) 
Direct 0.0156 0.0010 0.0469 0.0614 0.0407 0.0257 0.1586 0.2119 -0.0215 -0.0577 0.2181 0.3458 0.2752 0.1954 0.4160 0.5557 -0.5270 -0.7075 -0.8117 -0.5463 




























(0.2076) (0.9679) (0.6988) 





























Finance target 0.0606  0.0508  0.1746  0.1121  0.0118  -0.1568  -0.0346  -0.2245  -0.1423  0.0572  
 (0.2380)  (0.4095)  (0.0275)
** 
 (0.2652)  (0.9167)  (0.2343)  (0.8328)  (0.2713)  (0.5756)  (0.8342)  
Real Estate target 0.0913  0.0135  0.0730  0.0499  0.0707  0.1349  -0.0309  -0.1065  -0.1697  -0.3873  
 (0.1984)  (0.8650)  (0.5514)  (0.7211)  (0.6797)  (0.5411)  (0.8870)  (0.6980)  (0.4315)  (0.1268)  
Crisis -0.0522  -0.0263  -0.0282  -0.0246  -0.0405  0.0095  0.1351  0.2947      
 (0.2476)  (0.6099)  (0.7288)  (0.7935)  (0.7276)  (0.9451)  (0.5790)  (0.3196)      
Market Cap (log)   -0.0056 0.0024   0.0086 0.0308   0.0210 0.0371   -0.0334 0.0004   -0.1616 -0.0984 
   (0.7118) (0.8697)   (0.7308) (0.2144)   (0.6186) (0.3187)   (0.6331) (0.9957)   (0.1449) (0.2734) 
Dividend Yield   -0.1565 0.1832   -0.4961 -0.0680   -2.0684 -1.0618   -3.9317 -3.3670   -7.8584 -6.1408 












Table 21 (continued) 
Leverage   -0.0351 0.0013   0.0964 0.1668   -0.6175 -0.3815   -0.5819 -0.4751   -1.0456 -0.2614 
   (0.8136) (0.9932)   (0.7269) (0.5006)   (0.1274) (0.2727)   (0.3271) (0.4263)   (0.0576) 
* 
(0.7462) 
ROE   -0.0007 -0.0008   -0.0009 -0.0009   -0.0025 -0.0007   -0.0024 -0.0051   -0.0074 -0.0028 
   (0.2193) (0.1412)   (0.2510) (0.1673)   (0.4078) (0.8062)   (0.6259) 0.2771)   (0.1419) (0.6004) 
Pre-Event CMAR   -0.0452 -0.0400   -0.1287 -0.1419   -0.0298 -0.0672   0.0625 0.2215   -0.2027 0.2130 
   (0.3409) (0.3400)   (0.1955) (0.1155)   (0.8677) (0.6832)   (0.8442) (0.4844)   (0.5107) (0.4792) 
No. of Obs. 299 299 241 241 283 283 228 228 256 256 202 202 210 210 164 164 113 113 82 82 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yer No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R^2 0.0616 0.1869 0.0632 0.2072 0.0736 0.2335 0.0853 0.2870 0.0798 0.2380 0.0671 0.2643 0.1195 0.2736 0.1181 0.3243 0.1398 0.4483 0.3350 0.5956 
Adjusted R^2 0.0290 0.0609 0.0008 0.0242 0.0395 0.1068 0.0206 0.1107 0.0423 0.1005 -0.0081 0.0581 0.0753 0.1122 0.0287 0.0821 0.0646 0.2078 0.1961 0.2382 


































The variable „SWF dummy‟ is not significant in the 6-month and 1-year long-run 
pooled regressions, confirming the results we had obtained in Table 10, namely that 
6-month and 1-year CMARs of SWF and HF investments are not significantly 
different. Adding accounting variables do not change the results. For the 2-year 
pooled regressions, the variable „SWF dummy‟ is mostly significantly negative, 
highlighting the significantly lower mean CMARs for SWF investments over that 
time period. The 3-year and 5-year pooled regressions show insignificant results for 
the variable „SWF dummy‟ once the accounting variables and fixed effects are added. 
A variable that is significantly positive in most of the regressions is „BRIC target‟. 
This was to be expected given the significant results of this variable in the long-run 
cross-sectional regressions of SWF and HF investments (see Tables 19 and 20) and 
indicates that BRIC targets are associated with good long-run performance. Also the 
variable „OECD target‟ shows mostly significantly positive results. All pooled sample 
regressions which exclude the accounting variables are significant
105
. Regression 
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 Separate pooled sample regressions are conducted whereby only the accounting variables are used as independent 
variables for the regression. Results are not reported in Table 21 as Adjusted R
2
 cannot be improved, but significant 





: 0.0321, F-statistics: 2.8000 (0.0175**) without fixed effects, and R
2
: 0.1871, Adjusted R
2
: 0.0545, 





: 0.0352, F-statistics: 2.8700 (0.0154**) without fixed effects, and R
2
: 0.2400, Adjusted R
2
: 0.1075, 





: 0.0106, F-statistics: 1.4800 (0.1974) without fixed effects, and R
2
: 0.2209, Adjusted R
2
: 0.0668, F-





: -0.0001, F-statistics: 1.0000 (0.4208) without fixed effects, and R
2
: 0.2651, Adjusted R
2
: 0.0887, F-





: 0.1664, F-statistics: 4.8300 (0.0006***) without fixed effects, and R
2
: 0.4018, Adjusted R
2
: 0.1165, 
F-statistics: 1.4100 (0.1230) with year- and industry-fixed effects.                                                  




5.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the paper. We analyzed announcement 
period abnormal returns for both SWF and HF samples and long-run cumulative 
market-adjusted returns for the pre-announcement period [-365, -2] and the time 
periods 6 months [+2, +182], 1 year [+2, +365], 2 years [+2, +730], 3 years [+2, 
+1,095] and 5 years [+2, +1825]. In addition, we analyzed the announcement period 
abnormal returns during the crisis years of 2007 and 2008 for both the SWF and the 
HF sample as well as the announcement period abnormal returns of financial targets 
of the SWF sample during those years. Finally we conducted cross-sectional 
regressions with 3-day CARs (6-month CMARs, 1-year CMARs, 2-year CMARs and 
3-year CMARs, respectively) as dependent variable as well as pooled sample 
regressions in order to see which explanatory variables drive the abnormal returns of 
SWF and HF investments.  








We examine the impact of cross-border SWF investments and cross-border HF 
investments on the performance of the target companies. Existing literature on SWFs 
suggests that SWF investments lead to positive announcement period abnormal 
returns (for example, Dewenter et al., 2010; Bortolotti et al., 2009; Kotter and Lel, 
2010). The existing literature on HFs suggests that HF investments lead to positive 
announcement period abnormal returns. Our results confirm these findings. Both 
cross-border SWF investments and cross-border HF investments in our sample 
display statistically significant positive abnormal returns for the 3-day [-1, +1] 
announcement window. The average 3-day CAR for the SWF sample is 1.59 percent 
(median: 1.39 percent), and the average 3-day CAR for the HF sample is 2.89 percent 
(median: 0.54 percent). We also find that the abnormal returns in the two samples are 
not significantly different, indicating that market reactions for SWF and HF 
investments are similar. Different subsamples are analyzed and it is found that 
median announcement period abnormal returns are higher if the SWF is involved as 
an indirect acquirer, rather than as a direct acquirer, possibly because transactions 
where SWFs are indirect acquirers could be strategic acquisitions rather than 
investment choices by SWFs. Furthermore, we find that both SWFs and HFs tend to 
target companies that outperformed their local benchmark in the year prior to the 
investment, suggesting that both SWFs and HFs prefer „outperformers‟. However, in 
the year following the investment, average long-run cumulative market-adjusted 




returns are negative for the SWF sample. For the HF sample, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the target companies on average display normal returns after the first 
year. However, the results of the two samples are not significantly different. HFs are 
considered to be active monitors of the companies they invest in, but are not able to 
outperform the investments conducted by SWFs and also are not able to outperform 
the local markets in the first year after the investment. Only in later years (from year 
2 onwards for the HF sample and in year 5 for the SWF sample) are mean cumulative 
market-adjusted returns positive. These returns are significantly higher for the HF 
sample from year 2 onwards, suggesting that HFs investments outperform SWF 
investments in the long run. SWF investments during the crisis period of 2007 and 
2008 display higher mean announcement period abnormal returns than during the 
whole sample period excluding 2007 and 2008, suggesting that the market values 
SWF investments more during that time. HF investments do not display significantly 
higher announcement period abnormal returns during the crisis years of 2007 and 
2008 than during the whole sample period excluding 2007 and 2008. Despite several 
investments of SWFs in struggling financial companies during the crisis period 2007 
and 2008, their announcement period abnormal returns are not significantly different 
from announcement period abnormal returns of SWF investments in non-financial 
companies during that time.  
 
6.2 Limitations to this study 
There are several limitations to this study. One limitation is the small sample sizes of 
both the SWF and HF investments. We try to account for that by also reporting 




median results and conducting non-parametric tests, but the small sample sizes make 
it difficult to study subsamples in greater depth. Another limitation is the short track 
record (most of the transactions happened after 2005) which makes it more difficult 
to study long-run returns as the sample size is reduced considerably.  Lastly, data on 
possible divestments by SWFs or HFs were unavailable for this analysis. Thus we 
make the assumption that both SWFs and HFs hold their investments long-term.  
 
6.3 Motivation for future research 
With more data becoming available in the future, it will be possible to construct more 
detailed analysis in order to gain more insight and to study the subsamples in greater 











Table A.1: Truman scoreboard  
This table lists the Truman scoreboard as described in Truman (2008). It contains 33 elements, and is grouped into four 
categories: (1) fund structure (objectives, fiscal treatment, separate from the country‟s international reserves or not) (2) 
fund governance (roles of the government and the managers, whether the fund follows guidelines for corporate 
responsibility and ethical investment behavior) (3) accountability and transparency of the fund in relation to its 
investment strategy, investment activity, reporting, and audits (4) behavior of the fund in managing its portfolio and in 
the use of derivatives and leverage. The maximum score that a SWF can obtain is 100, the minimum score is 0. 
 
       
Country Fund Structure Governance Accountability 
& Transparency 
Behavior Total 
       
       
NONPENSION FUNDS 
U.S. (Alaska) Alaska Permanent Fund 100 80 100 83 94 
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global 94 100 100 67 92 
U.S. (Wyoming) Permanent Mineral Trust Fund 100 90 82 100 91 
U.S. (New Mexico) Severance Tax Permanent Fund 100 50 86 100 86 
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund for Timor-Leste 100 40 96 50 80 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund  88 60 89 50 77 
Canada (Alberta) Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 94 60 79 50 74 
Chile Economic & Social Stabilization Fund 94 60 82 17 70 
Hong Kong Exchange Fund 88 40 79 33 67 
Kazakhstan National Fund  88 60 64 33 64 
Botswana Pula Fund 69 60 54 33 55 
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 100 60 46 0 53 
Korea Korea Investment Corporation 75 60 45 25 51 
Russia Reserve Fund & National Welfare Fund 72 40 50 33 51 
Sao Tome & Principe National Oil Account 100 60 29 17 48 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 75 80 41 0 48 
Mexico Oil Income Stabilization Fund 69 20 43 50 47 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 50 50 61 0 45 
Singapore GIC 63 40 39 17 41 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 44 50 46 0 38 
China China Investment Corporation 50 50 14 17 29 
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 69 60 7 0 29 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 56 40 11 17 27 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account 50 30 14 17 26 
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund 50 20 18 0 23 
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 50 0 18 17 23 
Venezuela National Development Fund 38 0 27 0 20 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 50 0 18 0 20 
Sudan Oil Reserve Stabilization Account 56 0 14 0 20 
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency 31 0 25 0 18 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) Mubadala Development Company 44 10 7 0 15 
UAE (Dubai) Istithmar World 38 10 7 0 14 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 34 0 2 0 9 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) ADIA 25 0 4 8 9 
       
Subtotal  68 41 44 25 46 
       
PENSION FUNDS 
Canada Canada Pension Plan 100 100 96 83 95 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 100 100 100 75 95 
Canada (Quebec) Caisse de depot et placement de Quebec 100 100 89 83 92 
France Fonds de reserve pour les retraites 100 100 89 83 92 
U.S. (California) CalPERS 100 100 96 67 92 
Japan Government Pension Investment Fund 100 90 80 83 87 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund 100 100 86 58 86 
Netherlands Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP  100 100 86 50 86 
Australia Future Fund 100 80 68 83 80 
China National Social Security Fund 100 40 82 67 77 
       
Subtotal  100 91 87 73 88 
       







Table A.2: Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (LMTI) 
This table lists the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (LMTI) ratings as published by the SWF Institute as of 
the 2nd Quarter 2010. The maximum rating a SWF can achieve is 10 (very transparent), the minimum rating is 0 
(non-transparent).  
  






Ireland – NPRF 10 
Azerbaijan 10 
U.S. –Alaska 10 
Norway – GPF 10 
New Zealand 10 
U.S. – Wyoming 9 
U.S. – New Mexico 9 
South Korea – KIC 9 
Canada – APFC 9 
Australian Future Fund 9 
Bahrain 8 
Hong Kong – HKMA 8 
China – CIC 7 
Kazakhstan 6 
Timor-Leste 6 
Singapore – GIC 6 
Kuwait – KIA 6 
Malaysia 5 
Trinidad & Tobago 5 
Russia 5 
Qatar – QIA 5 
China – NSSF 5 
Saudi Arabia – SAMA 4 
UAE – ADIA 4 
Saudi Arabia – PIF 4 
Vietnam 4 
UAE- ICD 4 
China – CAD 4 
Botswana 3 
UAE – IPIC 3 
UAE – EIA 2 
Libya – LIA 2 






























Table B.1 shows the Fama and French 17 industries definition sorted by SIC codes. In 
order to be able to distinguish between financial companies and real estate 
companies, industry 16 is split into two industries for the purpose of this analysis. For 
a detailed description of the 17 industries defined by Fama and French, please refer to 
their homepage:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
Table B.1: Fama and French 17 industries definition 
This table shows the Fama and French 17 industries definition sorted by SIC codes.  
 
1  Food 
          0100-0199 Agric production - crops 
          0200-0299 Agric production - livestock 
          0700-0799 Agricultural services 
          0900-0999 Fishing, hunting & trapping 
          2000-2009 Food and kindred products 
          2010-2019 Meat products 
          2020-2029 Dairy products 
          2030-2039 Canned-preserved fruits-vegs 
          2040-2046 Flour and other grain mill products 
          2047-2047 Dog and cat food 
          2048-2048 Prepared feeds for animals 
          2050-2059 Bakery products 
          2060-2063 Sugar and confectionery products 
          2064-2068 Candy and other confectionery 
          2070-2079 Fats and oils 
          2080-2080 Beverages 
          2082-2082 Malt beverages 
          2083-2083 Malt 
          2084-2084 Wine 
          2085-2085 Distilled and blended liquors 
          2086-2086 Bottled-canned soft drinks 
          2087-2087 Flavoring syrup 
          2090-2092 Misc food preps 
          2095-2095 Roasted coffee 
          2096-2096 Potato chips 
          2097-2097 Manufactured ice 
          2098-2099 Misc food preparations 
          5140-5149 Wholesale - groceries & related prods 
          5150-5159 Wholesale - farm products 
          5180-5182 Wholesale - beer, wine 
          5191-5191 Wholesale - farm supplies 
 
2  Mining and Minerals 
          1000-1009 Metal mining 
          1010-1019 Iron ores 
          1020-1029 Copper ores 
          1030-1039 Lead and zinc ores 
          1040-1049 Gold & silver ores 
          1060-1069 Ferroalloy ores 
          1080-1089 Mining services 
          1090-1099 Misc metal ores 
          1200-1299 Bituminous coal 
          1400-1499 Mining and quarrying non-metalic  
          minerals 
          5050-5052 Wholesale - metals and minerals 
 
3 Oil and Petroleum Products 
          1300-1300 Oil and gas extraction 
          1310-1319 Crude petroleum & natural gas 
 
 
3 Oil and Petroleum Products (continued) 
          1320-1329 Natural gas liquids 
          1380-1380 Oil and gas field services 
          1381-1381 Drilling oil & gas wells 
          1382-1382 Oil-gas field exploration 
          1389-1389 Oil and gas field services 
          2900-2912 Petroleum refining 
          5170-5172 Wholesale - petroleum and petro  
          prods 
 
 4  Textiles, Apparel & Footware 
          2200-2269 Textile mill products 
          2270-2279 Floor covering mills 
          2280-2284 Yarn and thread mills 
          2290-2295 Misc textile goods 
          2296-2296 Tire cord and fabric 
          2297-2297 Nonwoven fabrics 
          2298-2298 Cordage and twine 
          2299-2299 Misc textile products 
          2300-2390 Apparel and other finished 
          products 
          2391-2392 Curtains, home furnishings 
          2393-2395 Textile bags, canvas products 
          2396-2396 Auto trim 
          2397-2399 Misc textile products 
          3020-3021 Rubber and plastics footwear 
          3100-3111 Leather tanning and finishing 
          3130-3131 Boot, shoe cut stock, findings 
          3140-3149 Footware except rubber 
          3150-3151 Leather gloves and mittens 
          3963-3965 Fasteners, buttons, needles, pins 
          5130-5139 Wholesale – apparel 
 
5 Consumer Durables 
          2510-2519 Household furniture 
          2590-2599 Misc furniture and fixtures 
          3060-3069 Fabricated rubber products 
          3070-3079 Misc rubber products 
          3080-3089 Misc plastic products 
          3090-3099 Misc rubber and plastic products 
          3630-3639 Household appliances 
          3650-3651 Household audio visual equip 
          3652-3652 Phonographic records 
          3860-3861 Photographic equip  (Kodak etc,  
          but also Xerox) 
          3870-3873 Watches clocks and parts 
          3910-3911 Jewelry-precious metals 
          3914-3914 Silverware 
          3915-3915 Jewelers' findings, materials 
          3930-3931 Musical instruments 
           
 
5 Consumer Durables (continued) 
          3940-3949 Toys 
          3960-3962 Costume jewelry and notions 
          5020-5023 Wholesale - furniture and  
          home furnishings 
          5064-5064 Wholesale - electrical  
          appliance TV and radio 
          5094-5094 Wholesale - jewelry and  
          watches 
          5099-5099 Wholesale - durable goods 
 
6 Chemicals 
          2800-2809 Chemicals and allied products 
          2810-2819 Industrial inorganical chems 
          2820-2829 Plastic material & synthetic 
          2860-2869 Industrial organic chems 
          2870-2879 Agriculture chemicals 
          2890-2899 Misc chemical products 
          5160-5169 Wholesale - chemicals & allied 
          prods 
 
 7 Drugs, Soap, Perfums, Tobacco 
          2100-2199 Tobacco products 
          2830-2830 Drugs 
          2831-2831 Biological products 
          2833-2833 Medicinal chemicals 
          2834-2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 
          2840-2843 Soap & other detergents 
          2844-2844 Perfumes cosmetics 
          5120-5122 Wholesale - drugs & propietary 
          5194-5194 Wholesale - tobacco and  
          tobacco products 
 
8 Construction and Construction Materials 
          0800-0899 Forestry 
          1500-1511 Build construction - general  
          contractors 
          1520-1529 Gen building contractors –  
          residential 
          1530-1539 Operative builders 
          1540-1549 Gen building contractors - non- 
          residential 
          1600-1699 Heavy Construction - not  
          building contractors 
          1700-1799 Construction - special  
         contractors 
          2400-2439 Lumber and wood products 
          2440-2449 Wood containers 
          2450-2459 Wood buildings-mobile homes 
          2490-2499 Misc wood products 
          
 
8 Construction and Construction Materials  
(continued) 
          2850-2859 Paints 
          2950-2952 Paving & roofing materials 
          3200-3200 Stone, clay, glass, concrete  
          3210-3211 Flat glass 
          3240-3241 Cement hydraulic 
          3250-3259 Structural clay prods 
          3261-3261 Vitreous china plumbing  
          fixtures 
          3264-3264 Porcelain electrical supply 
          3270-3275 Concrete gypsum & plaster 
          3280-3281 Cut stone and stone products 
          3290-3293 Abrasive and asbestos  
          products 
          3420-3429 Handtools and hardware 
          3430-3433 Heating equip & plumbing  
          fix 
          3440-3441 Fabicated struct metal  
          products 
          3442-3442 Metal doors, frames 
          3446-3446 Architectual or ornamental 
          metal work 
          3448-3448 Pre-fab metal buildings 
          3449-3449 Misc structural metal work 
          3450-3451 Screw machine products 
          3452-3452 Bolts, nuts screws 
          5030-5039 Wholesale - lumber and  
          construction materials 
          5070-5078 Wholesale - hardware,  
          plumbing, heating equip 
          5198-5198 Wholesale - Paints,  
          varnishes, and supplies 
          5210-5211 Retail - lumber & other  
          building mat 
          5230-5231 Retail - paint, glass,  
          wallpaper 
          5250-5251 Retail - hardward stores 
 
 9 Steel Works Etc 
          3300-3300 Primary metal industries 
          3310-3317 Blast furnaces & steel works 
          3320-3325 Iron & steel foundries 
          3330-3339 Prim smelt-refin nonfer  
          metals 
          3340-3341 Secondary smelt-refin nonfer  
          metals 
          3350-3357 Rolling & drawing  
          nonferrous metals 




Table B.1: Fama and French 17 industries definition (continued) 
 
9 Steel Works Etc (continued) 
          3360-3369 Non-ferrous foundries and casting 
          3390-3399 Misc primary metal products 
 
10 Fabricated Products 
          3410-3412 Metal cans and shipping containers 
          3443-3443 Fabricated plate work 
          3444-3444 Sheet metal work 
          3460-3469 Metal forgings and stampings 
          3470-3479 Coating and engraving 
          3480-3489 Ordnance & accessories 
          3490-3499 Misc fabricated metal products 
 
11  Machinery and Business Equipment 
          3510-3519 Engines & turbines 
          3520-3529 Farm and garden machinery 
          3530-3530 Constr, mining material handling  
          machinery 
          3531-3531 Construction machinery 
          3532-3532 Mining machinery, except oil field 
          3533-3533 Oil field machinery 
          3534-3534 Elevators 
          3535-3535 Conveyors 
          3536-3536 Cranes, hoists 
          3540-3549 Metalworking machinery  
          3550-3559 Special industry machinery 
          3560-3569 General industrial machinery 
          3570-3579 Office computers 
          3580-3580 Refrig & service ind machines 
          3581-3581 Automatic vending machines 
          3582-3582 Commercial laundry and drycleaning  
          machines 
          3585-3585 Air conditioning, heating, refrid eq 
          3586-3586 Measuring and dispensing pumps 
          3589-3589 Service industry machinery 
          3590-3599 Misc industrial and commercial  
          equipment and mach 
          3600-3600 Elec mach eq & supply 
          3610-3613 Elec transmission 
          3620-3621 Electrical industrial appar 
          3622-3622 Industrial controls 
          3623-3629 Electrical industrial appar 
          3670-3679 Electronic components 
          3680-3680 Computers 
          3681-3681 Computers - mini 
          3682-3682 Computers - mainframe 
          3683-3683 Computers - terminals 
          3684-3684 Computers - disk & tape drives 
          3685-3685 Computers - optical scanners 
          3686-3686 Computers - graphics 
          3687-3687 Computers - office automation  
          systems 
          3688-3688 Computers - peripherals 
          3689-3689 Computers - equipment 
          3690-3690 Miscellaneous electrical machinery  
          and equip 
          3691-3692 Storage batteries 
          3693-3693 X-ray, electromedical app 
          3694-3694 Elec eq, internal combustion engines 
          3695-3695 Magnetic and optical recording media 
          3699-3699 Electrical machinery and equip 
          3810-3810 Search, detection, navigation,  
          guidance 
          3811-3811 Engr lab and research equipment 
          3812-3812 Search, detection, navigation,  
          guidance 
          3820-3820 Measuring and controlling equipment 
          3821-3821 Lab apparatus and furniture 
          3822-3822 Automatic controls - Envir and applic 
          3823-3823 Industrial measurement instru 
          3824-3824 Totalizing fluid meters 
          3825-3825 Elec meas & test instr 
          3826-3826 Lab analytical instruments 
          3827-3827 Optical instr and lenses 
          3829-3829 Meas and control devices 
          3830-3839 Optical instr and lenses 
          3950-3955 Pens pencils and office supplies 
          5060-5060 Wholesale - electrical goods 
          5063-5063 Wholesale - electrical apparatus and  
          equipment 
          5065-5065 Wholesale - electronic parts 
          5080-5080 Wholesale - machinery and equipment 
          5081-5081 Wholesale - machinery and equipment  
 
12 Cars   Automobiles 
          3710-3710 Motor vehicles and motor  
          vehicle equip 
          3711-3711 Motor vehicles & car bodies 
          3714-3714 Motor vehicle parts 
          3716-3716 Motor homes 
          3750-3751 Motorcycles, bicycles and parts   
          (Harley & Huffy) 
          3792-3792 Travel trailers and campers 
          5010-5015 Wholesale - autos and parts 
          5510-5521 Retail - auto dealers 
          5530-5531 Retail - auto and home supply  
          stores 
          5560-5561 Retail - recreational vehicle  
          dealers 
          5570-5571 Retail - motorcycle dealers 
          5590-5599 Retail - automotive dealers 
 
13 Transportation 
          3713-3713 Truck & bus bodies 
          3715-3715 Truck trailers 
          3720-3720 Aircraft & parts 
          3721-3721 Aircraft 
          3724-3724 Aircraft engines, engine parts 
          3725-3725 Aircraft parts 
          3728-3728 Aircraft parts 
          3730-3731 Ship building and repair 
          3732-3732 Boat building and repair 
          3740-3743 Railroad Equipment 
          3760-3769 Guided missiles and space  
          vehicles 
          3790-3790 Misc trans equip 
          3795-3795 Tanks and tank components 
          3799-3799 Misc trans equip 
          4000-4013 Railroads-line haul 
          4100-4100 Transit and passenger trans 
          4110-4119 Local passenger trans 
          4120-4121 Taxicabs 
          4130-4131 Intercity bus trans (Greyhound) 
          4140-4142 Bus charter 
          4150-4151 School buses 
          4170-4173 Motor vehicle terminals, service  
          facilities 
          4190-4199 Misc transit and passenger  
          transportation 
          4200-4200 Motor freight trans, warehousing 
          4210-4219 Trucking 
          4220-4229 Warehousing and storage 
          4230-4231 Terminal facilities - motor  
          freight 
          4400-4499 Water transport 
          4500-4599 Air transportation 
          4600-4699 Pipelines, except natural gas 
          4700-4700 Transportation services 
          4710-4712 Freight forwarding 
          4720-4729 Travel agencies, etc 
          4730-4739 Arrange trans - freight and cargo 
          4740-4742 Rental of railroad cars 
          4780-4780 Misc services incidental to trans 
          4783-4783 Packing and crating 
          4785-4785 Motor vehicle inspection 
          4789-4789 Transportation services 
 
14 Utilities 
          4900-4900 Electric, gas, sanitary services 
          4910-4911 Electric services 
          4920-4922 Natural gas transmission 
          4923-4923 Natural gas transmission-distr 
          4924-4925 Natural gas distribution 
          4930-4931 Electric and other services  
          combined 
          4932-4932 Gas and other services combined 
          4939-4939 Combination utilities 
          4940-4942 Water supply 
 
15  Retail Stores 
          5260-5261 Retail - nurseries, lawn, garden  
          stores 
          5270-5271 Retail - mobile home dealers 
          5300-5300 Retail - general merchandise  
          stores 
          5310-5311 Retail - department stores 
          5320-5320 Retail - general merchandise  
          stores  
15  Retail Stores (continued) 
          5330-5331 Retail - variety stores 
          5334-5334 Retail - catalog showroom 
          5390-5399 Retail - Misc general  
          merchandise stores 
          5400-5400 Retail - food stores 
          5410-5411 Retail - grocery stores 
          5412-5412 Retail - convenience stores 
          5420-5421 Retail - meat, fish mkt 
          5430-5431 Retail - fruite and vegatable  
          markets 
          5440-5441 Retail - candy, nut,  
          confectionary stores 
          5450-5451 Retail - dairy product stores 
          5460-5461 Retail - bakeries 
          5490-5499 Retail - miscellaneous food  
          stores 
          5540-5541 Retail - gasoline service  
          stations 
          5550-5551 Retail - boat dealers 
          5600-5699 Retail - apparel & acces 
          5700-5700 Retail - home furniture and  
          equipment stores 
          5710-5719 Retail - home furnishings  
          stores 
          5720-5722 Retail - household appliance  
          stores 
          5730-5733 Retail - radio, TV and  
          consumer electronic stores 
          5734-5734 Retail - computer and  
          computer software stores 
          5735-5735 Retail - record and tape stores 
          5736-5736 Retail - musical instrument  
          stores 
          5750-5750 Retail  
          5800-5813 Retail - eating places 
          5890-5890 Eating and drinking places 
          5900-5900 Retail - misc 
          5910-5912 Retail - drug & proprietary  
          stores 
          5920-5921 Retail - liquor stores 
          5930-5932 Retail - used merchandise  
          stores 
          5940-5940 Retail - misc 
          5941-5941 Retail - sporting goods stores,  
          bike shops 
          5942-5942 Retail - book stores 
          5943-5943 Retail - stationery stores 
          5944-5944 Retail - jewelry stores 
          5945-5945 Retail - hobby, toy and game  
          shops 
          5946-5946 Retail - camera and photo shop 
          5947-5947 Retail - gift, novelty 
          5948-5948 Retail - luggage 
          5949-5949 Retail - sewing & needlework  
          stores 
          5960-5963 Retail - non-store retailers  
          (catalogs, etc) 
          5980-5989 Retail - fuel & ice stores (Penn  
          Central Co) 
          5990-5990 Retail - retail stores 
          5992-5992 Retail - florists 
          5993-5993 Retail - tobacco stores 
          5994-5994 Retail - newsdealers 
          5995-5995 Retail - computer stores 
          5999-5999 Retail stores 
 
16  Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other 
Financials 
          6010-6019 Federal reserve banks 
          6020-6020 Commercial banks 
          6021-6021 National commercial banks 
          6022-6022 State banks - Fed Res System 
          6023-6023 State banks - not Fed Res  
          System 
          6025-6025 National banks - Fed Res 
          System 
          6026-6026 National banks - not Fed Res  
          System 
          6028-6029 Banks 
          6030-6036 Savings institutions 
          6040-6049 Trust companies, nondeposit 
          6050-6059 Functions closely related to  
          banking 
16  Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other 
Financials  (continued) 
          6060-6062 Credit unions 
          6080-6082 Foreign banks 
          6090-6099 Functions related to deposit 
          banking 
          6100-6100 Nondepository credit  
          institutions 
          6110-6111 Federal credit agencies 
          6112-6112 FNMA 
          6120-6129 S&Ls 
          6140-6149 Personal credit institutions  
          (Beneficial) 
          6150-6159 Business credit institutions 
          6160-6163 Mortgage bankers 
          6172-6172 Finance lessors 
          6199-6199 Financial services 
          6200-6299 Security and commodity  
          brokers 
          6300-6300 Insurance 
          6310-6312 Life insurance 
          6320-6324 Accident and health  
          insurance 
          6330-6331 Fire, marine, property- 
          casualty ins 
          6350-6351 Surety insurance 
          6360-6361 Title insurance 
          6370-6371 Pension, health, welfare  
          funds 
          6390-6399 Insurance carriers 
          6400-6411 Insurance agents 
          6500-6500 Real estate 
          6510-6510 Real estate operators 
          6512-6512 Operators - non-resident  
          buildings 
          6513-6513 Operators - apartment  
          buildings 
          6514-6514 Operators - other than  
          apartment 
          6515-6515 Operators - residential mobile  
          home 
          6517-6519 Lessors of real property 
          6530-6531 Real estate agents and  
          managers 
          6532-6532 Real estate dealers 
          6540-6541 Title abstract offices 
          6550-6553 Real estate developers 
          6611-6611 Combined real estate,  
         insurance, etc 
          6700-6700 Holding, other investment  
          offices 
          6710-6719 Holding offices 
          6720-6722 Investment offices 
          6723-6723 Management investment,  
          closed-end 
          6724-6724 Unit investment trusts                           
          6725-6725 Face-amount certificate  
          offices  
          6726-6726 Unit inv trusts, closed-end                 
          6730-6733 Trusts 
          6790-6790 Miscellaneous investing 
          6792-6792 Oil royalty traders 
          6794-6794 Patent owners & lessors 
          6795-6795 Mineral royalty traders 
          6798-6798 REIT 
          6799-6799 Investors, NEC 
 
17  Other 
          2520-2549 Office furniture and fixtures 
          2600-2639 Paper and allied products 
          2640-2659 Paperboard containers, boxes,  
          drums, tubs 
          2661-2661 Building paper and board  
          mills 
          2670-2699 Paper and allied products 
          2700-2709 Printing publishing and allied 
          2710-2719 Newspapers: publishing- 
          printing 
          2720-2729 Periodicals: publishing- 
          printing 
          2730-2739 Books: publishing-printing 
          2740-2749 Misc publishing 




Table B.1: Fama and French 17 industries definition (continued) 
 
17  Other (Continued) 
          2750-2759 Commercial printing 
          2760-2761 Manifold business forms 
          2770-2771 Greeting card publishing 
          2780-2789 Book binding 
          2790-2799 Service industries for print trade 
          2835-2835 In vitro, in vivo diagnostics 
          2836-2836 Biological products, except  
          diagnostics 
          2990-2999 Misc petroleum products 
          3000-3000 Rubber & misc plastic products 
          3010-3011 Tires and inner tubes 
          3041-3041 Rubber & plastics hose and belting 
          3050-3053 Gaskets, hoses, etc 
          3160-3161 Luggage 
          3170-3171 Handbags and purses 
          3172-3172 Personal leather goods, except  
          handbags 
          3190-3199 Leather goods 
          3220-3221 Glass containers 
          3229-3229 Pressed and blown glass 
          3230-3231 Glass products 
          3260-3260 Pottery and related products 
          3262-3263 China and earthenware table articles 
          3269-3269 Pottery products 
          3295-3299 Non-metalic mineral products 
          3537-3537 Trucks, tractors, trailers 
          3640-3644 Electric lighting, wiring 
          3645-3645 Residential lighting fixtures 
          3646-3646 Commercial lighting  
          3647-3647 Vehicular lighting 
          3648-3649 Lighting equipment 
          3660-3660 Communication equip 
          3661-3661 Telephone and telegraph apparatus 
          3662-3662 Communications equipment 
          3663-3663 Radio TV comm equip & apparatus 
          3664-3664 Search, navigation, guidance systems 
          3665-3665 Training equipment & simulators 
          3666-3666 Alarm & signaling products 
          3669-3669 Communication equipment 
          3840-3849 Surg & med instru 
          3850-3851 Ophthalmic goods 
          3991-3991 Brooms and brushes 
          3993-3993 Signs, advertising specialty 
          3995-3995 Burial caskets 
          3996-3996 Hard surface floor cover 
          4810-4813 Telephone communications 
          4820-4822 Telegraph and other message  
          communication 
          4830-4839 Radio-TV Broadcasters 
          4840-4841 Cable and other pay TV services 
          4890-4890 Communication services (Comsat) 
          4891-4891 Cable TV operators 
          4892-4892 Telephone interconnect 
          4899-4899 Communication services 
          4950-4959 Sanitary services 
          4960-4961 Steam, air conditioning supplies 
          4970-4971 Irrigation systems 
          4991-4991 Cogeneration - SM power producer 
          5040-5042 Wholesale - professional and  
         commercial equipment and supplies 
          5043-5043 Wholesale - photographic equipment 
          5044-5044 Wholesale - office equipment 
          5045-5045 Wholesale - computers 
          5046-5046 Wholesale - commerical equip 
          5047-5047 Wholesale - medical, dental equip 
          5048-5048 Wholesale - ophthalmic goods 
          5049-5049 Wholesale - professional equip and  
          supplies 
          5082-5082 Wholesale - construction and mining  
          equipment 
          5083-5083 Wholesale - farm and garden  
          machinery 
          5084-5084 Wholesale - industrial machinery and  
          equipment 
          5085-5085 Wholesale - industrial supplies 
          5086-5087 Wholesale - machinery and equipment  
          5088-5088 Wholesale - trans eq except motor  
          vehicles 
          5090-5090 Wholesale - misc durable goods 
          5091-5092 Wholesale - sporting goods, toys 
          5093-5093 Wholesale - scrap and waste materials 
          5100-5100 Wholesale - nondurable goods 
           
17  Other (Continued) 
          5110-5113 Wholesale - paper and paper  
          products 
          5199-5199 Wholesale - non-durable goods 
          7000-7000 Hotels, other lodging places 
          7010-7011 Hotels motels 
          7020-7021 Rooming and boarding houses 
          7030-7033 Camps and recreational vehicle  
          parks 
          7040-7041 Membership hotels and lodging 
          7200-7200 Services - personal 
          7210-7212 Services - laundry, cleaners 
          7213-7213 Services - linen 
          7215-7216 Services - coin-op cleaners, dry  
          cleaners 
          7217-7217 Services - carpet, upholstery  
          cleaning 
          7218-7218 Services - industrial launderers 
          7219-7219 Services - laundry, cleaners 
          7220-7221 Services - photo studios, portrait 
          7230-7231 Services - beauty shops 
          7240-7241 Services - barber shops 
          7250-7251 Services - shoe repair 
          7260-7269 Services - funeral 
          7290-7290 Services - misc 
          7291-7291 Services - tax return 
          7299-7299 Services - misc 
          7300-7300 Services - business services 
          7310-7319 Services - advertising 
          7320-7323 Services - credit reporting  
          agencies, collection services 
          7330-7338 Services - mailing, reproduction, 
          commercial art 
          7340-7342 Services - services to dwellings,  
          other buildings 
          7349-7349 Services - cleaning and building  
          maint 
          7350-7351 Services - misc equip rental and  
          leasing 
          7352-7352 Services - medical equip rental 
          7353-7353 Services - heavy construction  
          equip rental 
          7359-7359 Services - equip rental and  
          leasing 
          7360-7369 Services - personnel supply  
          services 
          7370-7372 Services - computer  
          programming and data processing 
          7373-7373 Computer integrated systems 
          design 
          7374-7374 Services - computer processing,  
         data prep 
          7375-7375 Services - information retrieval  
          services 
          7376-7376 Services - computer facilities  
          management service 
          7377-7377 Services - computer rental and  
          leasing 
          7378-7378 Services - computer maintenance 
          and repair 
          7379-7379 Services - computer related  
          services 
          7380-7380 Services - misc business services 
          7381-7382 Services - security 
          7383-7383 Services - news syndicates 
          7384-7384 Services - photofinishing labs 
          7385-7385 Services - telephone  
          interconnections 
          7389-7390 Services - misc business services 
          7391-7391 Services - R&D labs 
          7392-7392 Services - management  
          consulting & P.R. 
          7393-7393 Services - detective and  
           protective (ADT) 
          7394-7394 Services - equipment rental &  
          leasing 
          7395-7395 Services - photofinishing labs  
          (School pictures) 
          7397-7397 Services - commercial testing  
          labs 
          7399-7399 Services - business services 
          7500-7500 Services - auto repair, services 
          7510-7519 Services - truck, auto, trailer  
          rental and leasing          
17  Other (Continued) 
          7520-7523 Services - automobile parking 
          7530-7539 Services - auto repair shops 
          7540-7549 Services - auto services, except  
          repair (car washes) 
          7600-7600 Services - Misc repair services 
          7620-7620 Services - Electrical repair  
          shops 
          7622-7622 Services - Radio and TV repair 
          shops 
          7623-7623 Services - Refridg and air  
          conditioner repair 
          7629-7629 Services - Electrical repair  
          shops 
          7630-7631 Services - Watch, clock and  
          jewelry repair 
          7640-7641 Services - Reupholster,  
          furniture repair 
          7690-7699 Services - Misc repair shops 
          7800-7829 Services - motion picture  
          production and distribution 
          7830-7833 Services - motion picture  
          theatres 
          7840-7841 Services - video rental 
          7900-7900 Services - amusement and  
          recreation 
          7910-7911 Services - dance studios 
          7920-7929 Services - bands, entertainers 
          7930-7933 Services - bowling centers 
          7940-7949 Services - professional sports 
          7980-7980 Amusement and recreation  
          services  
          7990-7999 Services - misc entertainment 
          8000-8099 Services - health 
          8100-8199 Services - legal 
          8200-8299 Services - educational 
          8300-8399 Services - social services 
          8400-8499 Services - museums, galleries,  
          botanic gardens 
          8600-8699 Services – membership 
          organizations 
          8700-8700 Services - engineering,  
          accounting, research, management 
          8710-8713 Services - engineering,  
          accounting, surveying 
          8720-8721 Services - accounting, auditing,  
          bookkeeping 
          8730-8734 Services - research,  
         development, testing labs 
          8740-8748 Services - management, public  
          relations, consulting 
          8800-8899 Services - private households 
          8900-8910 Services - misc 
          8911-8911 Services - engineering &  
          architect 
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